Impact of Israeil Settlements

Posted on: September 2006

The Gaza disengagement implemented by Israel in September, 2005 and all its ramifications have proven to be detrimental to Palestinian industrial capacity, trade and economic activity.Israel’s continued control of Palestinian border crossings to Jordan and Egypt, as well as the unpredictable and poorly managed crossings between Israel and the Palestinian territory (initially in the Gaza Strip and more currently being applied to the West Bank as a result of the Separation Wall) have proven to be detrimental to the competitive capacity of the Palestinian economy, as a whole, and to Palestinian industry, specifically.

This has materialized in the tremendous increase in transaction costs both in obtaining production inputs, as well as, in movement of products out of the factory and into targeted markets. “With the ability to guarantee delivery dates a vital part of securing export markets, speed and reliability are mandatory, particularly for agricultural products. As things stand, today’s regime represents an overwhelming obstacle to investment and growth…”

The forced separation between the West Bank and the Gaza markets, as well as, the chaotic state of West Bank movement have steadily reduced the Palestinian market size and minimized the competitive edge of Palestinian products in the local market. Thus, the only outlet for Palestinian industry became external markets. These, however were also constrained due to the lack of Palestinian access to alternative trade routes independent of Israel.

For instance, the closure of the Karni commercial border crossing between Gaza and Israel for nearly 60% of the first quarter of 2006, served to severely curtail the potential of exporting goods out of the Gaza Strip to European Markets via Israeli ports and airport.

It is quite evident the extents to which opening the Rafah border crossing with Egypt and the Alenby and Damiah Bridges to Jordan are critical. In so doing, the needed alternative trade routes to the outside world would be afforded to Palestinian industries. However, such efforts should not detract from the parallel importance of eliminating internal closures with the West Bank and opening the West Bank and Gaza Strip to each other.

The following study will assess the impact of Israeli closures and movement Impediments / restrictions on the competitive capacity of Palestinian industries both locally and in external markets. It will also quantify the potential benefits of functional alternative trade routes.

Background 

The last few years, and especially the year 2005 has seen some serious changes in the terms of trade arrangements and Palestinian channels of trade. After the success of Kadima in the recent Israeli elections, the spirit of unilateralism, which was the main reason for the changes that took place in 2005, will continue. Thus, unilateral disengagement will be transferred to the West Bank. Coupled with the separation wall and the existing closure regime within the West Bank, this will ultimately lead to further deterioration in the potential for any type of economic recovery. ” The Bank estimates that internal closures accounted for approximately half of the decline in real GDP (perhaps some 15 percent) observed between 2000 and 2002.”

The 2004 World Bank Report to the AHLC, the Roadmap and all international parties and observers without exception have been calling on Israel to ease and eliminate the countless restrictions on internal Palestinian movement, which not only make the banalities of everyday life a challenging experience but also make economic recovery an impossible task, adding prohibitive transaction costs to all but the most localized economic activities. Israel, in turn has consistently not reduced but increased these obstacles. According to the World Bank, “there are now more than 540 checkpoints and fixed impediments compared to 376 in August 2005” within the West Bank.

Palestinian industries have suffered the most as a result of these restrictions on movement. The negative effect of the current situation is seen in three layers:

(1) Impact on attaining the required production inputs (2) inability of workers to get to their workplaces and (3) the difficulties arising from the current situation, which negatively affect the distribution and marketing of products both in the internal and export markets. “The combined impact of these impediments, coupled with complex permit restrictions, has been a fragmentation of the socioeconomic space in the West Bank into a northern, a central and a southern economic zone, bounded on three sides by the separation barrier and to the west by a Jordan Valley that is increasingly difficult for Palestinians to access.

As a result of this fracturing process, transportation costs have increased by 67- times along some routes.”

The following is a description of the movement restrictions, which had dire effects on the Palestinian industrial sector:

The Closure System: 

The closure system is a primary cause of poverty and the humanitarian crisis in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip5 and restricts Palestinian access to health and education services, employment, markets and social and religious networks. The types of obstacles include permanent and partially manned checkpoints, roadblocks (consisting of rows of 1-meter concrete blocks), metal gates, earth mounds, earth walls (a long series of earth mounds), trenches, road barriers and permit restrictions. 

The West Bank Closure System: 

The Closure system in the West Bank comprises 540 physical obstacles placed by the Israeli Occupation Forces on roads to control and restrict Palestinian vehicle traffic, compared to 376 physical obstacles, in August 2005 – an increase of 164 closure obstacles or a 30% increase. The number of manned checkpoints reached 68 permanently-manned and eight partially-manned checkpoints around the West Bank. The increase has occurred in unmanned physical obstacles.

Physical Obstacles:

The addition of physical obstacles was most noticeable in Hebron governorate and in the northern West Bank around Nablus governorate, Salfit governorate and Tulkarm governorate.

The number of physical obstacles in the central region has remained stable.

However, the internationally illegal separation wall is increasingly causing access problems around Ramallah governorate and East Jerusalem. Approximately 299 km (45% of the Barrier’s total length) has been constructed. Of this, 53 km have been constructed since October 2005. A further 124 km is under construction (19% of the Barrier’s total length).

There has been an increase in road barriers – consisting of long stretches of fencing or concrete barriers along road verges – on main West Bank roads.

Some obstacles that were imposed immediately prior to Israeli disengagement have remained in place and are hampering Palestinian Access.

Prior to disengagement, north-south traffic was able to bypass Nablus city because the Shave Shomeron checkpoint was removed. However, during disengagement (from 15 August 2005) this section of road was completely blocked and it remains closed until today.9 The result is that the northern West Bank is closed off from the central and southern regions and travelers need to pass through Nablus.

Two gates originally installed to secure the evacuation of two settlements remain in place and now hamper movement for Palestinians between Jenin and Tulkarm governorates, specifically on Road 585.

The IDF10 states the reason for the rise in the number of physical obstacles is an increase in Palestinian violence. At the same time, they acknowledge that some of the physical obstacles and restrictions are unrelated to security needs.

Road Barriers: 

Road Barriers are a more common feature within the West Bank. The Israeli

Occupation Force states that they have two functions: to protect Israeli settlers traveling in roads bordered by Palestinian communities and road safety.

Nevertheless, these obstacles block access for Palestinian communities onto and across main West Bank roads and cause problems for residents to access emergency and other services, markets and jobs. Palestinians are required to travel longer distances to reach openings in the road barrier, where movement is often controlled by an IDF gate or flying checkpoint.

Tunnels and Bridges:

As of January 2006, there were 27 tunnels and bridges constructed and 19 planned or under construction. These tunnels link Palestinian Areas A and B to each other, most commonly under roads that are limited for Israeli use that run through Area C and the Barrier. The trend is that Palestinian traffic is funneled onto fewer roads that lead to and from the tunnels. These roads may not have the capacity to absorb a greater traffic load.

The network of tunnels together with the roads leading to and from them which remain separate from Israeli restricted roads makes it difficult to envision any possible return to the situation pre-2000 as laid out in the Road map. The

Roadmap requires that: “Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress.” 

This increase in obstacles, coupled with the election of a Hamas dominated Palestinian Legislative Council and therefore government has not only eliminated any potential for Palestinian – Israeli official contacts, but has also minimized the potential for donor assistance in the process of the badly needed economic recovery. Currently, Palestinian unemployment has increased dramatically, and donor assistance to cover the Palestinian Authority’s salary bill, which formulated an important component in maintaining the running wheels of the economy, has stopped. Israeli transfers of VAT and Import taxes have also stopped, thereby closing any potential for operations of the Palestinian Authority.

The starting point in creating the makings for economic recovery, is to recognize that economic recovery can only start with increasing potential for Palestinian trade, both internally and externally. Hence, dealing with structural unemployment, poverty and economic degeneration is dependent on the creation of a systemized, efficient and secure border regime which would be conducive to trade and movement of goods. According to the World Bank, “It has been widely acknowledged that the future economic viability of the Palestinian economy depends on the creation of a trade logistics system which permits the safe, reliable and competitively-priced movement of people and cargo”

As a result of the closure system, which includes, but is not limited to blocks, checkpoints, permits, restricted roads and the Barrier, the following trends have been observed:

1. Interregional movement in hampered by the east – west lines, which split the West Bank. The effect of these is a trisection of the area.
2. The West Bank has been narrowed due to tight access restrictions on movement:
3. on the east side, to the Jordan Valley;
4. On the west Side due to “closed areas’ between the Green Line and the Wall, including East Jerusalem.

Israel has stated that the closure system is a security measure to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian attacks. This justification does not always appear consistent with developments on the ground. For example, the new road barriers on Roads 317 and 60 in southern Hebron governorate are explained by the Israelis as a traffic safety measure instituted by the civilian (rather than military) authorities.5 In the Jordan Valley, which has witnessed the recent tightening of access restrictions, the reason remains unclear given the absence of Palestinian attacks emanating from the area in the past several years.

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Source:

http://www.kas.de

During the first 25 years of the occupation, residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were able to move reasonably freely between the two parts of the Occupied Territories through Israel. This was made possible by general permits issued by the military regarding entry and exit from the Territories. The outbreak of the first intifada in 1988 saw a change in Israel’s policy. First, the general entry permits were cancelled and, as a result, Palestinians who wished to travel from one area to the other were required to apply to the military commander of each area for a personal entry permit. In February 1991, during the First Gulf War, Israel changed the order permitting exit from the Territories. The general permits were cancelled and the residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were required to apply for personal permits in order to leave the area where they lived. The cancellation of the general exit permits marked the beginning of Israel’s closure policy. In 1993, the military commander issued another order canceling the personal exit permits. In practice, this order, which has been continuously renewed, established the “general closure” of the Territories in effect to this day.

The territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, despite being physically separate, constituted a single political unit prior to the peace process owing to the national identity shared by the residents of the two areas, their common history prior to 1948, and the integration processes the two areas have undergone since the beginning of the occupation in all aspects of life: family ties, education, culture and economy. Israel has administered the regime of the occupation in the two areas in a similar and coordinated way, yet only in the framework of the 1993 Declaration of Principles and later in the Interim Agreement signed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 1995 (the “Oslo Accord”), did Israel acknowledge that the two parts form one unit. Additionally, in the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian Authority was defined as the Palestinian leadership in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and the two parts were recognized as a single territorial unit in which the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination would be realized.

The Supreme Court reinforced this principle in its judgment in HaMoked’s petition in the Ajuri matter (HCJ 7015/02), when it ruled that forcibly removing residents of the West Bank to the Gaza Strip does not constitute deportation but rather assigned residence in the same occupied area, as defined in article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This being the case, residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are entitled to freedom of movement between these two parts and all it entails. This fundamental right, which is parallel to an individual’s right to move freely inside his own country, is well established in international humanitarian and human rights law as well as Israeli constitutional law. The right to freedom of movement may be restricted for security reasons. However, imposing sweeping disproportionate and unreasonable restrictions, as Israel has been doing regarding movement between the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the beginning of the second intifada, is a clear violation of international and Israeli law. It is worth noting at this point that as far as travel of Palestinians between the Gaza Strip and West Bank is concerned, Israel controls only the perimeter of the two parts. That is, in the absence of an assigned residence order, Israel may only limit entry into its territory for the purpose of traveling between the two parts of the Occupied Territories, but it cannot limit travel between the two parts per se – this is HaMoked’s position.

The obligation to allow passage between the Gaza Strip and West Bank stems also from the right recognized in public international law as the right of transit. A state must allow passage in its territory to foreign subjects wishing to travel to a different country when such passage is required but will cause no harm to the state through which they transit. This obligation exists even when there are alternative travel options. A divided territory, such as the Palestinian territory, is among the cases which contributed to the development of the principle of the right of transit.
As part of the peace process, the parties agreed to establish a safe passage running through Israel which Palestinians may use to freely move between the Gaza Strip and West Bank. One of the routes of the “Safe Passage” was first opened in October 1999. According to the agreement, those wishing to use the passage required Israeli permits and those who were considered “barred entry” were allowed to travel only in secured buses. The “Safe Passage” operated for about one year only. When the second intifada broke out Israel closed the passage and its operation has not been resumed since.

Since the outbreak of the second intifida at the end of 2000, Israel has tightened restrictions on movement between the Gaza Strip and West Bank still further. Israel often imposes complete closures during which no exit or entry into or out of the Gaza Strip and West Bank is allowed. From time to time, Israel decides to completely prevent movement of certain age groups between the two parts. Additionally, a person’s registered address as it appears in the population registry plays a crucial role in restrictions on movement. The Oslo Accord transferred the authority to manage the Palestinian population registry to the Palestinian Authority. This includes the authority to update changes of address. In order to assure that Israel has an exact copy of the Palestinian population registry, it was determined that the Palestinian side must inform the Israelis of all changes it makes in the registry retroactively. However, the authentic registry is the one managed by the Palestinian Authority. It must be noted that the Oslo Accord contains no special reference to changes of address between the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

In 2000, Israel decided to halt updating changes of address between the Gaza Strip and West Bank in its copy of the population registry as part of its general goal to separate between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The information contained in the registry at that time was frozen with no possibility to change, amend or challenge it. This resulted in a discrepancy between the original Palestinian registry and the copy held by Israel; and Palestinians living in the West Bank whose registered address is in the Gaza Strip or vice versa have been detained as “illegal aliens.” In fact, Israel is restricting freedom of movement based on the address appearing in its copy of the population registry regardless of where a person actually lives.

Over the years, HaMoked has filed many HCJ petitions demanding Israel lift individual restrictions on movement it had imposed on Palestinians wishing to travel between the two parts of the Occupied Territories. The petitions dealt with, inter-alia, passage for the purpose of undergoing medical exams, visiting deportees and family members and studying in university, as well as in cases where passage was required as a result of having changed domicile. Many of these petitions were accepted and the restrictions on movement lifted.
In March 2006, HaMoked filed a petition dealing with general issue of the sweeping restrictions Israel imposes on the movement of Palestinians between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The petition was deleted after the Court refused to hear it on the grounds that it challenged a general policy.

 

Source:

http://www.hamoked.org

Center for the Defence of the Individual

Posted on: February 26, 2014

By Waleed Ahmed 

(Note: The Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) refers to the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem which have been under Israeli occupation since 1967 ) 

Apartheid roads and restrictions on freedom of movement

Israel has created a system of extensive roads in the Palestinian territories, primarily in the West Bank, which connect Jewish colonies to each other and to Israel. These roads are largely off-limits to Palestinians even though they are built on occupied Palestinian land. Palestinians are forced to use an alternative road network of inferior and more circuitous roads that run between the Israeli road network. In effect a two-tier road system — Israeli and Palestinian — operates side-by-side[1].

The first major impact of the forbidden road regime is that it has placed severe restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement, effectively stifling the economy. A scheme of manned checkpoints, the Separation Wall, road blocks and a permit system ensure that Palestinians use the alternate system of sub-level streets, dirt roads and tunnels to by-pass settlements [2]. While Jewish settlers can travel freely without any hindrance on roads, Palestinians are required to present permits and need to be approved by IDF soldiers[3]. They are subject to constant delays, long lines and humiliating searches at check points. Access to receiving and providing medical services is also a serious concern; at least 39 cases of Palestinians dying due to delays at check points have been documented [4].

The second impact of the apartheid roads is that it has lead to territorial fragmentation of the West Bank, as can be seen on the left. Each Palestinian Bantustan is surrounded by these roads and is isolated from the neighboring enclave. The occupation forces not only prevent Palestinians from using ‘settler-only’ roads, they also prevent them from simply crossing the roads[5]. As a result, they can’t just drive across a road to the neighboring Bantustan; they have to take long routes to by-pass Israel’s road regime. A 10-20 minute journey now takes 2-3 hours [6]. In addition, each road has a 50–75m buffer zone on each side, where no construction is allowed. As a result, for each 100 km of road about 2,500 acres of West Bank land is confiscated [7].

Israel defends this road regime on security grounds. However, the security pretext is a racist one as it assumes that all Palestinians are a security risk; indigenous people have to prove their innocence to receive a permit — something rarely granted. Critics have objected to the roads being called ‘Jewish-only’ as they are accessible to anyone with Israeli citizenship. However, the roads are meant to service the settlements which are for exclusive Jewish use. This system resembles the “pass laws” of apartheid South Africa, which required black South Africans to demonstrate permission to travel or reside anywhere in South Africa [8].

Home demolitions and discriminatory legal enforcement

In areas of the OPT under its absolute authority (East Jerusalem and 60 per cent of West Bank), Israel exercises complete control over any construction activity that takes place. Any Palestinian construction needs approval from Israeli authorities; else it is deemed ‘illegal’ and is subject to demolition. Thus, when Palestinians construct, repair or renovate homes, schools and hospitals without Israeli permission, they are at the risk of being bulldozed. [9] [10]

Despite the need to accommodate population growth and rebuild ageing infrastructure, this approval is rarely granted and Palestinians are forced to either renovate without permission or abandon their breaking homes. 94 per cent of permit requests were rejected between 2000 and 2007; over 1600 buildings were bulldozed in this period — effectively displacing thousands of people. The UN reported that Israel demolished at least 25 schools in 2009 alone which served 6000 students [11].

On the other hand, Jewish colonizers have built buildings, roads — even entire settlement outposts — without Israeli authorization and they have not been demolished [12]. Unauthorized ‘outpost’ settlements are illegal even by Israeli law, yet they are not bulldozed (all settlements are illegal under international law). A few outposts which were demolished were rebuilt and the same number remains today. Settlement infrastructure continues to expand and the permit regime poses no obstacles to it. While settlers have moved to the Palestinian territories from abroad, Palestinians have no choice but to build illegally if they wish to remain in their native land [13].

Discriminatory distribution of resources (farming and water)

Israel has placed severe restrictions on agricultural resources available to Palestinians. By the creation of the illegal Separation Wall, Israel has isolated some of the richest and most productive farmland from the West Bank. Despite this ‘seam-zone’ area lying within the OPT, Palestinians farmers require permits to access their own land in the area. Requirements to obtain a permit are extremely stringent; only 40 per cent of farmers were given access in 2006 [14].  Even when access is granted, it is for a very limited time with the gates often closing sporadically — they aren’t allowed to stay overnight. This regime prevents the ploughing, pruning, spraying and weeding required throughout the year that is necessary or optimum yields [15]. Farmers live in constant fear of being totally dispossessed of their land if the restrictions are increased. By contrast, Israelis and Jewish settlers face no such restrictions and do not require any sort of permits. [16]

Restrictions on farming and fishing are even more severe and brutal in the Gaza Strip, which has been subject to the US-backed Israeli siege. Israel has declared a buffer zone that extends for 1,500 meters into Gaza from the border fence (17 per cent of the Strip); fishing has been restricted to three nautical miles from the shoreline [17]. The buffer zone has taken away 35 per cent of the agricultural land available in Gaza. Farmers, fishermen and even children are shot at if they dare cross into this ‘buffer zone’ — despite this area being within the Palestinian territories. Since March 2010, the IDF has shot 17 children while they collected building gravel in this area [18]. In addition to these extra judicial killings, the Israeli military routinely levels agricultural produce in this area using tanks, bulldozers and fires in order to terrorize farmers and squash any hope they have left [19].

Discriminatory distribution of water to Jews and Palestinians is one of the most inhuman, yet hidden, policies of this regime. The Mountain Aquifer serves as the sole water source for Palestinians; Israel allocates just 20 per cent of its water for them [20]. As a result, Palestinian per capita water consumption barely reaches 70 liters/ day — this is well below the recommended daily minimum of 100 liters per day set by the World Health Organization  (WHO). By contrast, Israeli daily consumption (including settlements) is 4 times that. In some parts of the West Bank, Jewish settlers use 20 times the water consumed by neighboring Palestinians, who survive on 20 liters of water per capita a day. This is the emergency amount set by the WHO in cases of disasters for ‘short-term relief’ in cases such as Darfur and the Haiti earthquake. In the Gaza Strip, 90 per cent of the water is contaminated and unfit for human consumption [20] [21].

While settlements enjoy well-watered lawns, swimming pools and large irrigated farms, Palestinians down the road barely have enough water to suit domestic needs. They often have to rely on buying water from portable water tanks which can cost them 1/6 of their income. Like other oppressive policies, Israel also uses water restriction as a means of expulsion. The IDF has attacked and confiscated water tankers and transport equipment from villagers; offering to return them in return for leaving the land. Palestinians, being the resilient people that they are, continue to rebuild their homes and live in dire conditions- refusing to abandon the land which is rightfully theirs. [22] [23]

Waleed Ahmed is a freelance writer based out of Toronto. He enjoys writing about current affairs, human rights and religion. 

References

[1] The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank.  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2007, pg 68

[2] Ibid , pg 58

[3] Separate and Unequal: Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Human Rights Watch, New York 2010 — pg 15,16

[4] Forbidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank, B’Tselem. August 2004. pg 19

[5] Ibid , pg 70

[6] United Nations Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, John Duggard. ID: A/62/275, August 2007 — pg 16

[7] Apartheid Roads: Promoting Settlements, Punishing Palestinians. Ma’an Development Center, Ramallah. December 2008 — pg 3

[8] United Nations Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, John Duggard. ID: A/HRC/7/17, January 2008 — pg 16

[9]  Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions. FAQs

[10] Separate and Unequal: Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Human Rights Watch, New York 2010 — pg 11, 40, 43

[11] Ibid

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid

[14] The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank.  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2007, pg 110, 111

[15] Ibid

[16] Separate and Unequal: Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in theOccupiedPalestinianTerritories. Human Rights Watch, New York 2010 — pg 15,16

[17] Between Fence and a Hard Place  – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

[18] United Nations Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Richard Falk . ID: A/HRC/16/72, 2010 — pg 15

[19] Between Fence and a Hard Place  – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

[20]  Taking Control of Water Resources — B’Tselem, May 2011

[21] Thirsting For Justice, Amnesty International, 2009

[22] Ibid — pg 5

[23] Separate and Unequal: — pg 19

 Source:

http://rabble.ca

Posted on: December 2003

According to a new report released today by B’Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights, the IDF violates the right of residents of the Occupied Territories to obtain medical treatment. The security claims cited to justify this violation are dubious.

Dozens of staffed checkpoints and some 600 physical roadblocks have been set up within the West Bank in the framework of Israel’s siege policy. These obstacles to movement restricts the access of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to medical treatment. Since September 2000, the number of hospital births has dropped by approximately 50%. In 70% of calls to the Red Crescent, the ambulances are unable to reach the patient’s house. 72.3% of the Palestinian population report that they face difficulties in reaching medical clinics and hospitals.

The physical roadblocks make passage for ambulances difficult. Sick people are forced to make their own way across the roadblocks, and then spend hours traveling on winding, makeshift roads. Soldiers at checkpoints within the Occupied Territories frequently delay sick people and medical personnel, and sometimes humiliate or abuse them. In some cases, IDF soldiers have even used Red Crescent ambulances for military purposes.

International law is unequivocal on matters relating to the protection of medical teams. Medical personnel are not to be unnecessarily delayed or harmed, unless they participate in military activity. In effect, the IDF is collectively punishing hundreds of thousands of civilians by preventing access to basic medical treatment.

Any use of ambulances for non-medical purposes is a grave violation of international law.

While the IDF justifies routine delays of ambulances based on the claim that Palestinians use them for military purposes, they have only presented one such incident. Regardless, individual cases of misuse of ambulances does not justify the sweeping policy described in this report.

B’Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights call on the security forces to: Remove all the siege checkpoints; allow Palestinians to receive medical treatment quickly and without delay; and refrain from humiliating or abusing medical personnel.

Source:

http://electronicintifada.net

 

 

By Stephen Lendman

This article summarizes an August 2007 B’Tselem report now available in print. It’s one of a series of studies it conducts on life in Occupied Palestine to reveal what major media accounts suppress. This one is titled: “Ground to a Halt – Denial of Palestinians’ Freedom of Movement in the West Bank.”

B’Tselem has a well-deserved reputation for accuracy and integrity. It’s the Jerusalem-based independent Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). It was founded in 1989 by prominent academics, attorneys, journalists and Knesset members to “document and educate the Israeli public and policymakers about human rights violations in (Occupied Palestine), combat (the Israeli public’s) denial, and create a human rights culture in Israel” to convince government officials to respect human rights and obey international law.

Its work is detailed, wide-ranging, carefully researched, and based on hundreds of testimonies and dozens of on-the-ground observations. For verification, it’s also cross-checked with relevant documents and other government sources. Work on this report was completed over a six month period in 2007. It included information from other reports, statements from political and military officials, petitions to Israel’s High Court of Justice, and media accounts.

B’Tselem states: “For the past seven years (since the September 2000 Second Intifada began), Israel has imposed restrictions and prohibitions on Palestinian movement that are unprecedented in scope and duration.” It refers to hundreds of permanent and temporary checkpoints, other obstacles, physical barriers, and Israel’s Separation Wall (ruled illegal by the World Court) on confiscated Palestinian land.

Free movement in the West Bank is severely restricted and nearly always entails “intolerable and arbitrary delays, much uncertainty, friction with soldiers, and often substantial expense.” B’Tselem stresses that throughout 2008, it will continue to focus on this topic – with new maps, short videos, and various “public education and advocacy activities to highlight” Israel’s unnecessary, outlandish and illegal restrictive measures. People need to know, and B’Tselem intends to tell them.

This is its 14th report on this topic since September 2000. Previous ones covered specific type restrictions like checkpoints, for-Jews only roads, and the Separation Wall. The one is comprehensive. It surveys all of them and their collective effects on Palestinians’ lives.

The measures aren’t new or restricted to the West Bank. They’ve been ongoing since the early 1990s and have undergone expansion and refinement ever since. Until 1991, Palestinians (except small numbers designated security threats) could move freely throughout the Territories and were able to enter and stay in Israel during daytime hours. It helped Palestine establish social, cultural and commercial ties to its neighbor, Israeli Arab citizens in it, as well as between Gaza and the West Bank.

During the January 1991 Gulf war, everything changed. General permits were cancelled and replaced by new restrictive policies. Thereafter, all Palestinians needed (selectively authorized) permits to enter Israel and East Jerusalem. Checkpoints and barriers were erected for enforcement. They’ve restricted movement ever since, and at times, like the 1993 killings of nine Israelis, became a general closure policy. All free movement was halted, Palestinians lost their jobs in Israel, few opportunities at home could replace them, and the Territories suffered great economic and social harm.

Closure also split the OPT into three areas: East Jerusalem, the remaining West Bank and Gaza. After September 2000, Israel tightened free movement further and continues harassing and containing relentlessly. Two main factors explain how:

— Israel’s “ever-expanding settlement enterprise….along the length and breadth of the West Bank;” they’re on strategically chosen and most valued lands; in areas designed to contain Palestinian city expansions; further harmed by Israel’s (for-Jews-only) bypass roads that constrict, isolate and divide West Bank areas; and

— the effects of the Oslo Accords; they split the West Bank into three areas – Area A under Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civil affairs control; Area B under Israel security and right to restrict free movement; and Area C under total Israeli control, including on matters relating to land, planning and building; Areas B and C comprise 80% of the West Bank, including its main roads, so that lets Israel restrict movement how, when, for as long, and for whatever purpose it wishes over most of the Territory.

After September 2000, its measures were hardened. It clamped down on free movement, isolated Palestinians in cantonized enclosures, and made a fundamental human right a privilege to grant or withhold as it pleases. Its pretext is security but, in fact, that’s false. The real aim is harassment, land grab, and a state-sponsored expulsion plan so Israel can seize all the land it wants for Jews only. It’s gone on for decades and so far unchallenged by the world community. B’Tselem wants to stop it along with all other law violations so Palestinians can have their long denied justice they deserve and should get.

Israel’s Means to Control Movement

B’Tselem divides Israeli control into three categories reflecting “different layers” of restrictive policy. They, in turn, build on each other and are interrelated:

— physical means to divert movement to certain passageways and roads and prevent access to others;

— restrictions and prohibitions that first layer physical tools enforce; and

— the means to ease or tighten, selectively and under careful monitoring, second layer restrictions and prohibitions.

The essential idea is that in combination these layers represent a single control mechanism, all parts operate together, and determining their impact requires evaluating the combined effect of four types of control:

(1) obstructions to deny access to main roads; they divert Palestinians to checkpoints where the army (IDF) supervises movement from one area to another or can deny it altogether; obstructions are in different forms – dirt mounds, concrete blocks, boulders, trenches, fences and iron gates; their numbers have gradually increased and in mid-2007 totaled 455 throughout the West Bank; they limit pedestrian and vehicular movement, and especially affect the elderly, the ill, pregnant women and small children; they’re even more restrictive in winter when water accumulation turns dirt areas muddy;

(2) permanent staffed checkpoints; they’re fairly constant in number, and Israel has used them to some degree throughout 41 years of occupation; they gained prominence, however, after Israel cancelled general-entry (free movement) permits in 1991; they were then expanded during the Second Intifada; over time, they’ve become the most conspicuous occupation symbol and one of its most hated;

— in mid-2007, 80 were in place of which 33 were the last inspection point before entering Israel along the Green Line; the other 47 lie inside the West Bank, some with control towers; seven are to transfer goods; they’re called “back-to-back” because merchandise is unloaded on one side, checked, then reloaded on another truck on the other side; operating times vary – many open at 6AM and close at night; others are staffed around the clock but limit crossings to “urgent humanitarian” cases;

— movement restrictions vary from one checkpoint to another and always at Israel’s discretion; to pass, travelers must show proper ID or crossing permits; searches may be conducted; procedures are at the discretion and mood of soldiers; some checkpoints are for pedestrians only; others are restricted to commercial and public transportation.

(3) so-called flying checkpoints; they’re temporary, may be erected anywhere, and remain for hours or longer; in recent years, they’ve increased in numbers – from a weekly average of 73 in late 2005 to 136 in 2006 to about 150 in 2007 and at times up to 200. Again, the pretext is security, their real aim is to harass, and no one does it better than Israelis.

Consider the effects of all checkpoints. Since September 2000, they’ve become “the main (source of) friction (between) Palestinians and Israeli security forces.” They generate tension, create uncertainty, deny or delay passage, humiliate and overall makes things intolerable. They’re also degrading by demanding that males expose their upper bodies in public simply as a way to harass them.

It gets worse by selective detentions in so-called “positions” – isolated holding areas for additional “security” checks that, in fact, are to punish and further humiliate; they can last hours, in exposed heat or cold, without food or water, and at times include physical abuse; many Palestinians are affected daily; Israel’s high command has full knowledge; the government does as well; nominal recommendations are made to stop it, yet abuse continues and few offenders are ever punished.

(4) the Separation Wall; in June 2002, Israel decided to build it; again the claim was security; in fact, it was separation and theft of over 10% of Palestinian land, including for-Jews only roads to connect settlements with Israel and other settlements; most of the Wall is completed; its planned length is 721 kilometers; only 20% of it lies along the Green Line; most of it runs deep inside the West Bank; near Jerusalem, it surrounds the Ma’ale Adumim settlements about 14 km into the West Bank on stolen Palestinian land;

— its route creates two kinds of Palestinian enclaves – villages and farmland between the Wall and Green Line (in the “seam zone”) on the Israeli side of the barrier; another area comprises villages on the Palestinian side that are surrounded on three or more sides because of the route’s winding path or that the Wall meets roads on which Palestinian movement is forbidden or physical obstructions prevent it.

Physical restrictions and movement prohibitions give Israeli security forces more latitude, and they take full advantage through a fourfold layer of control: 

1) by imposing a siege to completely or partially prevent Palestinians from crossing to or from a certain area as well as isolating the area from other parts of the West Bank; it’s done with physical obstructions to block access and force residents to pass through staffed checkpoints; closing off the area facilitates sweeping movement prohibitions on specific classifications of people by gender, age or place of residence; the IDF claims their “risk profile” makes them “potential terrorists;” targeting them by siege is a frequently used post-September 2000 tactic; large areas of the West Bank have been affected; their degree of harshness varies; and areas like the Jordan Valley, Area A and cities like Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm and Hebron have been especially impacted.

— in December 2001, the West Bank IDF commander signed the Proclamation Regarding the Closure of Area (Encirclement) (Area A); it classified it as a closed military area, was unlimited in duration and still remains in force; in April 2007, a separate order was issued for Nablus restricting entry to and exit from the city to certain checkpoints; again the army claims it’s a security measure “to prevent terrorists and materiel from leaving Palestinian towns in Judea and Samaria….”

(2) the “seam zone;” Israelis say it’s the enclosed area between the Green Line and Separation Wall; when its first section was completed (in October 2003), the IDF declared this section a closed military area with entry into it forbidden; later areas may also be closed off, but even ones that aren’t will have severe movement restrictions the way they’re imposed throughout the West Bank; all Palestinians are affected; Jews and foreigners have permits permitting easy entry and exit.

(3) prohibiting travel on certain roads for Jews only; on some roads, no Palestinian vehicles are allowed; on others, travel is allowed for ones with special permits; the Oslo Accords set the rules; most often (but not always), Palestinians may travel on Areas A and B roads but prohibited or restricted in Area C; they’re excluded from about 311 km of West Bank roads for Jews only; they connect settlements to Israel or other settlements.

— rules are so harsh and convoluted that further restrictions are imposed on some roads Palestinians may use; an example is forbidding Palestinian vehicles from crossing a road, requiring passengers to leave their vehicles on one side, cross on foot, and get other transportation on the other side; this creates great hardship, is only to harass, and in cases of passenger illness or mothers in labor it may be life-threatening; in addition, Israeli security forces have great enforcement latitude; orders are issued verbally, not in writing, and soldiers at checkpoints can pretty much do as they please, depending on their mood.

(4) harsh travel laws act as deterrence; they impose high fines and/or insurance requirements; Palestinian violators are treated discriminatorily; and a high percentage of drivers are affected.

To counter public criticism, Israel issued two selective easing measures; they help some Palestinians but tighten movement restrictions for others:

(1) the permits regime; since 1991, Israel required Palestinians to have personal entry permits to enter its territory and East Jerusalem; after 1996, Palestinians also needed permits to enter West Bank jurisdictional areas; post-September 2000, rules were further tightened; some Palestinians must have permits to enter, remain in, or leave large areas inside the West Bank, including the “seam zone” and areas under siege; other permits are needed to arrange (passenger and commercial) vehicular checkpoint crossings; a limited number are allowed based on the capacity of security forces to inspect vehicles, goods and passengers;

— B’Tselem lists nine different type permits for passenger vehicles – commercial ones; public ones for taxis and buses; movement in areas under encirclement; humanitarian ones; for permanent “seam zone” residents; for daily “seam zone” entry; “seam zone” entry for farming or work; and to enter the Jordan Valley;

— movement restrictions and prohibitions are so onerous and for so many reasons that Israelis consider permits a privilege; for Palestinians, they’re essential to meet daily needs; West Bank District Coordination Offices (DCOs) issue them, but procedures are unclear and lack transparency; B’Tselem believes “two general and sweeping criteria must be met” to get one:

(a) “lack of ‘prevention,’ either for security or police-related reasons relating to the applicant,” and

(b) having documents to show justification for the request.

Quotas exist in all cases; when they’re filled, many qualified residents are left out; in addition, other qualifying procedures exist but are unstated; ultimately DCO officials have total discretion in awarding or denying permits and can be pretty arbitrary about it; “seam zone” residents provide an example of what all Palestinians endure; to get a permit to their own home area, they must prove they reside there from their ID card address on the day the declaration of closed military area was made or in some other way show their center of life is there; those getting one are allowed entry via one checkpoint only;

(2) So-called “fabric of life” roads for Palestinians only; the West Bank’s main roads are only for Jews; initially, those for Palestinians passed through villages and city centers, but because of criticism an alternate plan was developed – creating a separate, contiguous road network running north-south in the West Bank; it’s based on separate levels in places where Israeli and Palestinian roads meet; bridges and interchanges achieve separation with Israelis able to travel on top at high speed; lower level “fabric of life” roads comprising 20% of the West Bank’s total are for Palestinians; elements of the plan have been implemented and “fabric of life” roads are being built; they represent another part of Israel’s repressive apartheid scheme.

Splitting the West Bank

Article 13 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

(1) “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”

Israel is a serial international law and human rights abuser. For Palestinians, it believes allowing free movement is a privilege, denying it is the norm, and actions no matter how outlandish require no explanation or justification.

Israel divided the West Bank into three control areas – A, B and C. For purposes of restricting movement, it further split the Territory into six geographical units:

— North that includes the Jenin, Tulkarm, Tubas and Nablus districts, except for those in the Jordan Valley and Separation Wall enclaves; about 840,000 Palestinians lived in this area as of summer 2007; today the number is somewhat higher;

— Central that includes the Salfit, Ramallah, and Jericho districts, except for parts in the Separation Wall enclaves; in summer 2007, the Palestinian population exceeded 400,000;

— South that includes the Hebron and Bethlehem districts, except for the northern Dead Sea and Separation Wall enclaves; Palestinians here number over 700,000;

— the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea that includes the eastern strip of the West Bank, except for Jericho and nearby refugee camps; the Palestinian population is around 10,000;

— the Separation Wall-created “seam zone” and inside the West Bank “internal” enclaves; when the Wall is completed, the “seam zone” Palestinian population will number about 30,000; an additional 25,000 will be in “internal” enclaves; the “seam zone” also contains thousands of Palestinian farmland dunams (a dunam equals about one fourth of an acre) and 39 settlements; unlike the other geographical units, the enclaves are dozens of non-contiguous sections that are separated from the rest of the West Bank; and

— East Jerusalem that includes all the area Israel annexed in 1967 and is attached to the Jerusalem Municipality, except for the Shu’afat refugee camp and Kfar Aqeb that the Wall separates from the city; around 200,000 Palestinians live in this section.

All geographical units are constricted by Israel’s rigid control system explained above. Below are the checkpoints that control movement from one section to another:

— Za’tara (Tupuah) Checkpoint controls North to Central sections movement; in addition, the IDF directs to this checkpoint all west and east traffic along the Trans-Samaria highway and from Route 60 from Nablus in the north and Ramallah in the southwest and south; Palestinians may generally pass freely heading north; those traveling south encounter ID and sometimes vehicle checks; delays are common; males aged 16 – 35 often aren’t allowed to go south.

— Container Checkpoint almost totally controls movement between the South and Central sections; Border Police staff it round the clock; from 2002 to February 2007, passenger cars were prohibited without a special permit; it’s now cancelled; since September 2000, Palestinians have been prohibited from using Route 398 that runs from the checkpoint to the Ma’ale Adumim and Qedar settlements; Palestinians are diverted to other worn roads of nearby villages; Palestinian traffic passing through the checkpoint are subjected to lengthy delays and at times searches; when Israel declares a comprehensive closure, it applies to this checkpoint; it severs the southern West Bank from the rest of the Territory and requires Palestinians traveling to or from the South to do it by foot.

— Tayasir, Hamra, Gittit and Yitav checkpoints control movement to and from the Jordan Valley. In May 2005, Israel instituted sweeping Palestinian movement prohibitions here, except for residents with ID cards and persons with special permits. They were cancelled in April 2007, it affects only pedestrians and those using public transportation (that also requires a permit), and applies only to the Tayasir and Hamra crossings.

— Almog Checkpoint that controls movement to and from the northern Dead Sea; generally only Palestinians with work permits for nearby settlements and/or to enter Israel may pass; since May 2007, the latter category was cancelled.

— the Separation Wall directs movement between the “seam zone” enclaves and the rest of the West Bank to several gates in the Wall; only Palestinians with special entry permits may pass; 38 gates are in place; only six operate daily from 12 to 24 hours continuously; 17 others open two or three times a day for 30 minutes to two hours; 13 additional ones operate during farming season; two other gates allow movement of residents of a few houses that are enclosed by the Wall and separated from their village; still other crossings are for Israeli travel between the West Bank and Israel; they operate round the clock.

— the Separation Wall also directs movement between East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank; this section is called the “Jerusalem envelope” and has 12 checkpoints; crossing (permitted only through four of them) requires a valid ID and permit and submitting to stringent checks; they include exiting vehicles, having them searched, and passing through a revolving gate equipped with a metal detector; the remaining eight checkpoints are for settlers, Israeli residents and East Jerusalem Palestinians with Israeli IDs.

In addition to area to area restrictions, Israel tightens them further with others within areas by breaking them into sub-areas and controlling movement between them. Nablus in the North is separated from nearby villages and from other northern West Bank districts.

The Nablus area includes the city, three refugee camps and 15 villages that contain over 200,000 Palestinians combined. It’s been under siege for seven years; entry and exit is through four surrounding checkpoints; passage through them entails stringent personal and vehicle checks, including for all merchandise in both directions; and special permits are required for passenger vehicle entry.

Collective Nablus movement prohibitions are harsh and unique in the Territory. Males between 16 and 35 are especially affected, but they overall disrupt life for everyone. The restricted male population alone affects 26,000 persons. If the age is lowered to 15, it rises to 36,000, and if females are included (as sometimes happens) it totals 73,000. This group is the area’s main work force, its entire economic life depends on them, and prohibiting their movement brings it to a halt.

When it’s in force, siege conditions vary by checkpoint for those allowed through. The two main Beit Iba and Huwara ones inflict the longest and most burdensome delays and restrictions. In addition, all persons having a “risk profile” because of age are forbidden to leave the area and need a “movement permit in area under encirclement” if they want to exit. However, it’s not easy getting one with a convoluted system in place that requires a party permitted to cross to apply for persons who aren’t and even they can’t do it easily. In addition, permits aren’t issued for “ordinary” needs, such as work, family visits or school. Those considered are only for “humanitarian” reasons like needed medical care. Few overall are issued.

The Nablus siege also restricts movement in the Jenin Tulkarm and Tubas districts. Nablus is vital for them and for years was the West Bank’s economic and industrial center. Now these districts are separated, and major roads between them are blocked. In the past, traveling from Jenin to Nablus took about 40 minutes on the main road. It now takes one to three hours on narrow, winding roads plus a long wait at one of the Nablus area checkpoints.

Over the past two years especially, accessing Nablus has been hard and complicated for villagers located to its north. Checkpoint access is limited, some are closed to traffic, and those that operate have delays running up to hours. In addition, soldiers at times block road traffic for several hours, no advance notice is given, and it causes undue hardship for travelers having to wait or use alternate routes. The IDF is also at times punitive. It sets up indiscriminate flying checkpoints, uses them for punishment, and makes it harsher with instances of violence and confiscation of permits and identity cards that can only be redeemed at a permanent checkpoint that may or may not be operating.

The Central Section splitting caused much the same type hardships. It created two principal sub-areas around Salfit and Ramallah. It detached some of these cities’ villages and separated them from their residents’ farmland.

After the IDF blocked Salfit’s main entrance road from the north, alternate routes became necessary, and they lengthened travel times considerably. It created great hardship for travelers who rely on Nablus for basic services and also for villagers who are blocked from their farmland. Sixty-six thousand people are affected.

It’s even worse for the 300,000 Ramallah district residents in a city that’s the West Bank’s seat of government because Israel denies East Jerusalem that status. In addition, after undo restrictions and hardships caused many Palestinian entrepreneurs to leave Nablus and the northern West Bank, Ramallah developed into the Territory’s cultural and economic center. Obstructions, checkpoints and the Separation Wall demarcate the area and combined make movement just as hard as throughout the rest of the West Bank.

It’s the same for Jericho’s 40,000 residents. In addition, for 10,000 of them in the north in the besieged Jordan Valley, they’re separated from the city, and for those in the east there’s another obstacle – 19 km of trenches and land east of it that’s a closed military area.

The South section’s splitting has been less conspicuous, but it hasn’t made movement easier. Most notably since September 2000, have been restrictions in Route 60’s southern section that runs the entire length of the southern West Bank and is this subsection’s principal roadway. Access roads to the Route are now blocked, over time some have been eased, but use of the road remains limited.

Most harmed are residents in towns and villages in Hebron’s southern area. To reach the city, they must use long, winding, beat-up roads that are no substitute for decent ones. Once the Separation Wall is completed east of the Efrat and Gush Atzion settlements, Route 60’s northern quarter in the South section will be on the Wall’s Israeli side and completely off-limits to Palestinians. As a result, Bethlehem will be separated from Jerusalem as well as the main road to Hebron with all the hardships that will create.

Consider how they affect Hebron. It’s the only Palestinian West Bank city (other than East Jerusalem that Israel annexed in 1967) with an Israeli settlement in its center. Because of it, the IDF created a contiguous strip of land through the city over which Palestinian vehicles are prohibited. It runs from the Kiryat Arba settlement in the east to the Palestinian Tel Rumeida neighborhood in the west, and in many sections along its center, Palestinian pedestrians are banned. The main Shuhada Street is most affected. In addition, the strip blocks Hebron’s main north-south artery harming the entire Palestinian population.

Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea restrictions involve the use of Route 90 that runs the entire length of the section. Israel operates five checkpoints here for control. Only public transportation and vehicles with special permits may pass. That frees the Route for settlers and Israelis traveling between Jerusalem and the Beit She’an Valley, the Sea of Galilee, or the Galilee area in the north. It also allows the IDF to use large Jordan Valley sections as fire-exercise zones and close off much of their water and grazing areas to Palestinians.

Dozens of non-contiguous “seam-zone” enclaves are also affected. The Separation Wall separates them by winding back and forth between the Green Line and deep into the West Bank. They all contain Palestinian farmland on the barrier’s Israeli side. Some also include villages where 30,000 Palestinians live. Because they aren’t connected, crossing from one subsection to another at best is hard and at worst impossible. It forces travelers to cross the Wall twice with all the hardships that entails. Further, since permits are for one enclave only, entering another one requires a second permit.

The Separation Wall then can be divided into five sections plus the Jerusalem area, and each one contains separate enclaves. Combined they form a crazy quilt isolation pattern with physical obstacles and human repression used against a defenseless civilian population.

Internal community and farmland enclaves are affected as well but not by having to pass through the Wall or obtain permits. However, roads that used to connect them have been closed making travel times longer and more complicated. When completed, the Wall’s route will create 13 non-contiguous internal enclaves for about 240,000 Palestinians in dozens of towns and villages.

East Jerusalem is the final section. Israeli Arabs with identity cards may move about fairly freely with one notable exception. It’s the use of temporary checkpoints (so-called “collection” ones) to collect resident tax debts. They operate a few hours at a time on main neighborhood roads where Israeli Police (usually Border Police) provide security along with tax officials to do the collecting. Police stop cars, collectors do the rest, but never to Jerusalem’s Jewish residents.

Harm to Palestinians’ Fabric of Life

West Bank separation and division inflicts great harm to Palestinians’ fabric of life in the short and longer term. This section examines how.

First consider health as a fundamental human right and how restricting movement affects it. Ill persons needing treatment are greatly impeded reaching medical centers. The quality and availability of service is hampered as well by delaying or restricting physicians and staff. First aid crews also aren’t able to reach the sick and injured quickly. Even when situations aren’t life threatening, movement restrictions increase morbidity chances and may shorten a life span.

Overall, West Bank Palestinians have limited or no access to medical care, and residents of villages and outlying areas are most gravely affected. Then consider so-called “risk profile” people being denied passage through checkpoints. Another example is persons needing a permit for access to Jerusalem hospital treatment. To get one, patients must provide medical documents testifying to their illness and confirming their appointment at a specific hospital.

The situation is especially problematic for pregnant women when their time to deliver approaches and their hospital is in Jerusalem. Permits are valid only for one or two days, as it is for all ill persons, but the moment when it’s needed is uncertain. They must thus be continually renewed, and there are times when it’s impossible. It thus forces mothers to give birth at checkpoints because they’re denied passage through them.

In 1996, the Physicians for Human Rights petitioned the State Attorney’s office for relief and nominally got it – to allow passage through checkpoints without permits in cases of medical emergency so ill persons can be treated. All checkpoint locations are supposed to comply, but it turns out they don’t. Soldiers don’t treat Palestinians kindly, are unresponsive to their needs, and are untrained medically to recognize emergencies.

Patients encounter other obstacles as well. Their travel is slowed by having to use long, winding and worn roads; they’re sometimes blocked causing long delays; they have no access to ambulances or other transportation; must pass through checkpoints when they do or by foot; be up against closed ones; be forced to wait at open ones; and undergo searches.

These problems make people more dependent on first aid that can’t cope in emergency cases where special expertise is required. At times, long distances are involved, and when need is greatest, it means lives are endangered. This is what Palestinians endure daily.

Movement restrictions also affect hospitals, especially East Jerusalem ones that are considered the OPT’s best because they provide services unavailable elsewhere in the Territories. East Jerusalem’s separation from the rest of the West Bank and needing a permit to enter is the problem. It affects staff and patients with the situation at al-Makassed Hospital typical. Twelve of its workers live outside the city and are classified “prevented entry.” They have no permits. Even workers with them face long checkpoint delays or their closure when Israel wishes.

Restricting free movement also impacts health care professionals from developing their skills through in-service training. Students as well are affected, are unable to complete their studies or receive a lower professional training degree. It places Palestinians needing medical care in a hopeless situation. They’re unable to move freely or receive expert care if they can.

B’Tselem’s report is on the West Bank. Gaza is another matter, and since Israel’s June 2007 siege, 130 in the Territory have died because they couldn’t be treated. Their deaths are in addition to the hundreds of others from near daily incursions that continue without letup.

Movement restrictions also greatly affect the OPT’s economy and trade. Post-September 2000, it’s been in deep depression. GDP has declined around 40%, unemployment stands at about 80%, and the poverty level is punishing. It’s how Israel and Washington planned it to bring the Territories to their knees and demand surrender as the price for relief.

At present, look how working conditions and transport of goods are affected. Palestinians could once travel freely outside their communities to jobs. No longer, and many lost out and have no means of employment. Employers as well are affected. They lost workers, had to scale back their operations or shut them down entirely.

The same hardships apply to transporting goods. They can no longer move freely, permits are required, they’re hard to get, travel times are longer even with them, at much greater cost, and an example is trade between Nablus and Ramallah. The cost is fourfold what it was in 2002, the result is greatly reduced trade, it’s forced merchants to concentrate more on their own communities and those nearby, and the result is far less commerce overall that severely impacts everyone.

Here’s what’s involved to move goods between Nablus and East Jerusalem:

— permits are needed;

— a quota restricts the number;

— goods allowed to be transported endure the so-called “back-to-back” method; at point of shipment they’re loaded; then stopped at a checkpoint; unloaded; inspected by mechanical scanner, manually, and/or by dogs; they’re then reloaded on another truck for delivery;

— damage is frequent because of extra handling and Israelis aren’t too gentle about it;

— delays are the rule and they’re costly;

— transport requires passing through other checkpoints and repeating the whole procedure again that may be more or less stringent depending on the whims of inspectors;

— when the Separation Wall is completed, transport will be even harder and its cost greater.

Tourism is also affected. Between the Oslo Accords and September 2000, cities like Bethlehem were desired destinations. No longer because of difficulties getting there and how hard it is to move around. The result is privately owned tourist sites throughout the West Bank have closed or have greatly cut back. An example is the Barahameh family’s park in al-Badhan, a village 10 km north of Nablus. Getting there from Ramallah means passing through four permanent checkpoints plus whatever flying ones are up for the day. The result is wasted hours to spend a day at the park, and most tourists won’t do it.

Small businesses like stores, souvenir shops and restaurants are also impacted. Many close down or operate at a fraction of their former levels. A World Bank West Bank report cites movement restrictions and their costs as two major obstacles affecting a healthy Palestinian economy.

They affect farming as well in areas like the Jordan Valley and “seam zone.” Agriculture is an important source of Palestinians’ income. Farmers need permits for it in these areas. Many are denied and their livelihoods destroyed or greatly impacted. Farm workers are also affected. They, too, need permits, but even having them means putting up with long travel times and exhausting days. Many workers won’t do it it so farmers lose a vital work force and the ability to grow their crops productively.

Farmer and merchant Husni Muhammad ‘Adb a-Rahman Sawafteh is an example of what others like him endure:

— he lives, works and farms in Tubas; he and his brothers have a house and 250 dunams of land in Bardala, a northern Jordan Valley village; they also have livestock;

— to reach Bardala, they must pass through Tayasir checkpoint; doing it involves “much difficulty;” it affects their workers as well;

— to sell their produce, they need to reach Bardala, but the hardship forces Sawafteh to manage things by phone; it’s inadequate because it’s vital to be current on prices and dealer payments that requires being in Bardala to do it;

— sometimes he can’t be for a month; the result is dealers send “payment on account” and pay less than the amount owed; their back due debts accumulate; being there is essential to handle things; when he can’t do it, he hasn’t enough money for materials to fertilize the land and grow crops;

— caring for the livestock is another problem; they need daily care; Sawafteh had to build a new Tubas farm to do it, but it was lacking; Tubas hasn’t enough grazing land so the flock can’t do it daily as they need to; he thus has to buy them food; it’s an additional expense he can’t afford;

— he and other farmers have an additional problem as well; they need permits for themselves but also for their tractors and farm vehicles; it forces most of them to go long distances on foot or donkeys;

— it also restricts what crops can be grown; restrictions forced farmers like Sawafteh to forgo higher revenue-generating ones like tomatoes and cucumbers and switch to less labor intensive ones like wheat;

— some farmers give up altogether and let their land lie fallow rather than risk economic failure or work under onerous conditions.

Family and social life are also affected. Palestinian community life is based on extended familial ties even though members don’t often live in the same towns and villages. Movement restrictions and inability to get permits prevent their ability to see each other, and it’s especially felt in the “seam zone,” Jordan Valley and Nablus under siege.

Ni’ma ‘Ali Salameh Abu Sahara from Nablus is a case in point:

— her daughter married and moved to the Jordan Valley;

— no one has been able to see her, not even during holidays, because “the army doesn’t let us cross the Hamra checkpoint;”

— she wasn’t able to visit her first grandson and only saw him two months after his birth when her daughter visited her;

— her daughter just had a second child by Caesarean section; Abu Sahara went to the checkpoint to get through to see her; soldiers refused to let her pass; she begged them; they still refused; Abu Sahara “went home and cried.”

This story and many others like it are commonplace, and it’s caused the splitting up of nuclear families. Students leave parents to be near school. Wage earners and tradesmen leave families to be close to work. The ill live in cities to be near essential medical care facilities. From the time they leave homes to whenever they try to return, they encounter problems. For most Palestinians, they’re painful to impossible.

Restrictions prevent routine family gatherings as well as special ones like weddings, funerals, and caring for the sick. Palestinians once could take vacations, and a favorite spot was the northern Dead Sea area with its 25 km of coastline. No longer. The ‘Ein Fascha nature reserves there (one of the most popular recreational sites) are now operated by Israel’s Nature Reserves and Parks Authority for Jews only.

Movement restrictions affect all facets of daily life, including basic services and law enforcement – urban infrastructure, social services, mail, governance, rescue operations, electricity and gas, water, and locally-based security. When breakdowns occur and repairs are needed or other vital services have to be performed, district government employees get no preferential treatment crossing checkpoints to handle them. The result is long delays fixing essential public services or dealing with problems like medical emergencies.

“Fabric of life” roads for Palestinians are also affected, including the way they were built. They’re on expropriated private land, inefficiently use public property, and take other Palestinian land for the Separation Wall. An example is a road Israel built between the village of Shufa (south of Tulkarm) and a-Ras, northeast of the Sal’it settlement. Israel took village lands for it – from Far’on, a-Ras and ‘Izbat Shufa. To connect the two district seats, Israel seized private land, destroyed olive and citrus orchards on them, asked no permission to do it, and paid no compensation for the losses.

Israel unilaterally chooses routes for new roads, Palestinians’ interests aren’t considered, and injuries and losses they incur get no redress. They’re also harmed in other ways. Roads often demarcate villages, they limit their ability to build and expand for their growing populations, their costs outweighs their benefits, the harm affects whole communities, and it’s long-term.

Restrictions on Free Movement from the Perspective of International Law 

Besides Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international humanitarian law, the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is very clear about free movement. Its Article 12 states:

1.”Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within the territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.

4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”

 

Besides legitimate national security and military necessity, restricting free movement must meet another requirement – proportionality. Under Israeli administrative law as well, the state must prove the legitimate necessity of restrictions, that security can’t be achieved by less harmful means, and that the end result justifies the cost under international law. The UN Human Rights Committee states that the principle of proportionality requires that movement restrictions be incorporated in clear and justifiable legislation. Failure to do so violates international law under which Israel is accountable.

 

Israel claims justification for its occupation policies – that they’re vital to secure its West Bank settlers as well as Israelis traveling on the Territory’s roads. Clearly, the threat is real, but unasked is why. It’s because of Israel’s longstanding belligerency forcing Palestinians to respond in self-defense and at times take Israeli lives. There’s no secret how to stop it, but Israel abjures – stop attacking Palestinians so they stop fighting back. Long ago it was that way before Palestine became Israel. Arabs and Jews lived peacefully at a time the population imbalance heavily favored Palestinians and the great Jewish immigration wave hadn’t begun.

Today, it’s another matter, Israel manufactures its own security problem, then unjustifiably claims the right to react, and in the process, inflict great harm on a mostly-civilian population. Its actions are unrelated to security, are entirely political and stem from its annexation aims – to seize the West Bank’s most valued areas, remove the Palestinian population, and resettle them in isolated cantons unconnected to the others except by a crazy quilt patchwork of obstructive checkpoints, barriers, and hard to traverse road network.

 

Israel acts illegally on occupied lands, and its draconian restrictions follow as a result. They’re less for security and mainly to let settlers (on stolen land) move around freely. They’re heavily protected, isolated from their Arab neighbors, able to travel on for-Jews only roads, live in Jewish-only communities, and get all the conveniences of a modern state that denies them to non-Jews in a country claiming to be a model democracy.

 

All West Bank settlements are illegal under international law. So is the main road network forbidden to Palestinians that’s built on annexed land. Israel’s justifications are unfounded. Security is a non-starter. So is the claim that it’s to protect against terrorist attacks that are, in fact, self-defense measures in an unfair fight. Palestinians are matched against the world’s fourth most powerful military that flexes its muscles by attacking civilians and claims its occupation is just. International law says otherwise, but Israel ignores it.

 

It also acts disproportionately. It fails the test by all measures:

 

— there’s no rational connection between the harm restrictions cause and Israel’s declared security objective; independent security and human rights experts concur on this; their view is that there’s a converse relationship between restrictions imposed and security desired; the greater the former, the less of the latter;

 

— a second failure is the lack of an alternative that causes less harm to achieve a security goal; in some instances, Israel admitted it hasn’t used other methods that would have caused less harm; the Separation Wall is the clearest example of a measure causing great harm with little payback except for confiscated land; after that, the Wall is purely punitive and the Palestinian response justifiable anger;

 

— a third failure is the lack of a proper relationship between the harm caused and security benefit gained; whatever reasons Israel claims for its policy, it must still justify that it acted in proper proportion to the benefit achieved; sweeping and protracted West Bank restrictions clearly fail the test; they affect all aspects of Palestinians’ lives, infringe on their human rights and deny them the right to family life, health, education, work, and all else Israelis take for granted and get; and in cases of Nablus under siege, the effects are much worse on a locked-down population; there’s no justification for causing so much harm for whatever benefits Israel claims to be getting; they’re disproportionately way out of whack.

Israel also imposes its might without military legislation or written orders. For measures this far-reaching and causing so much harm, orders are merely passed down the chain of command verbally with lots of latitude on their implementation on the ground no matter how harsh. Such a system begs for abuse, and that’s exactly what happens repeatedly.

 

Without official restrictions in writing, it’s near impossible to monitor how the IDF administers them or judge what’s right or wrong. By its policy, Israel has, in fact, given the army unlimited latitude, made it unaccountable, and instituted a system guaranteed to punish and abuse.

 

Under international humanitarian law, it’s a system of strictly prohibited collective punishment. Article 50 of the Hague Regulations states: “No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.”

 

Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention also states: “No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.” The UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (quoted above) concurs. So do all independent human rights experts.

 

Israel claims it acts to deter, not collectively punish, but evidence on the ground proves otherwise. The vast majority of Palestinians affected are innocent civilians, they’re suspected of nothing, they’re made to endure great suffering, and Israel’s actions have been imposed continuously and repressively for over seven and a half years plus the punitive effects of 41 years under occupation.

 

These are actions of one ethnic group against another, thus constituting another international law violation. It’s prohibited by the 1966 (UN General Assembly-adopted) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination that Israel ratified in 1979. Article 1.1 defines racial discrimination as follows:

 

“Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”

 

Article 5(d)(1) gives every person the right of free movement within the borders of the state without discrimination. Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits all measures that discriminate solely on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin. Israel violates all of the above. Its claims otherwise hold no water and are, in fact, convoluted. It denies legitimate citizens their legal rights on their own land, but provides preferential treatment for illegal settlers in stark breach of the law.

 

Conclusion

 

Israel’s repressive measures force West Bank Palestinians to live in a constant state of uncertainty, prevent them from making plans, deny them their basic rights, harm them when emergencies arise, and overall consign their lives to the will and whims to an illegal occupier.

 

Beyond the immediate harm that’s considerable, the West Bank’s geographical division causes severe long-term detriment to the entire Palestinian fabric of life – affecting their economic, political and social welfare. The result is an entire nation locked down, punished for being unwanted and in the way, and denied their right of self-determination and free movement on their own land.

 

Israel’s justification is fraudulent on its face, yet goes unchallenged by the world community as well as by neighboring Arab states. Shamefully and willfully, they turn a blind eye to a human calamity they won’t confront and denounce publicly as illegal and unacceptable.

B’Tselem has no such hesitancy. It ends its report by calling on Israel to:

 

— “immediately remove all the permanent and sweeping restrictions on movement inside the West Bank (including the Separation Wall ruled illegal by the International Court of Justice). In their place, Israel should” protect its citizens along the Green Line and inside the Jewish state according to the rule of law;

 

— “act immediately to evacuate all the settlements in the West Bank. Until this is done, Israel” has every right to protect its settlers security, but not to the detriment of the Palestinian people who are the lawful occupants of their own land; and

 

— “verify, before any temporary restriction….is approved (while settlements remain in place),” that it’s “needed for a legitimate security purpose and that the resultant harm to the Palestinian population will be proportionate,” according to international law. Restrictions in place “must be incorporated in a written order that specifies the nature of the restriction and the period of time it will remain in force.”

 

Until Israel takes these measures and begins ending its 41 year occupation, it will continue violating international law and remain in violation of dozens of UN resolutions condemning it for its actions, deploring it for committing them, and demanding they be ended. So far, Israel shows no signs of complying and continues acting with impunity, arrogance and defiance of the rule of law it disdains.

 

Source:

http://www.rense.com/

Posted on: July 2007

 This report examines the humanitarian impact on Palestinians from the ongoing construction of settlements in the West Bank and other Israeli infrastructure, such as the Barrier and the roads that accompany them.

The analysis shows that almost 40% of the West Bank is now taken up by Israeli infrastructure. It also demonstrates how roads linking settlements to Israel, in conjunction with an extensive system of checkpoints and roadblocks, have fragmented Palestinian communities from each other.

The deterioration of socio-economic conditions in the West Bank has been detailed in regular OCHA and World Bank reports over the last several years. These have underlined the fact that freedom of movement for Palestinians is crucial to improving humanitarian conditions and reviving socio-economic life.

The findings are based on extensive fieldwork combined with spatial analysis derived from satellite imagery.1 As the maps illustrate, the consequences of settlements and related infrastructure on Palestinian life are severe, and if current trends continue, socioeconomic conditions in the West Bank are likely to worsen.

Despite the transfer of Israeli civilians into occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) being illegal under international law, the Israeli settler population in the West Bank settlements has continued to grow steadily by around 5.5% each year. In 2007, approximately 450,000 settlers2 live in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, alongside 2.4 million Palestinians.

More than 38% of the West Bank now consists of settlements, outposts, military bases and closed military areas, Israeli declared nature reserves or other related infrastructure that are off-limits or tightly controlled to Palestinians. The settlements and other infrastructure are detailed in Chapter One.

The settlements are linked to each other and to Israel by an extensive road network. Palestinians for the most part are either prevented from using these roads or have only restricted access onto them. The roads and their restrictions on Palestinian movement are outlined in Chapter Two.

The West Bank has been dissected into dozens of enclaves by the settlements and related infrastructure. This fragmentation has negatively affected social and economic life for the vast proportion of Palestinians. Chapters Three and Four examine the impact of these restrictions in both urban and rural settings.

Palestinians compete with Israeli settlers for West Bank resources, notably limited land and water, while their freedom of access and movement is denied. These issues, which are directly related to Israeli settlements and infrastructure, are detailed in the concluding chapter.

To read the full report click here

Posted on: July  2013

 Key Facts

-Less than 200 people per day (on average) were allowed out of Gaza via Israel in the first half of 2013, compared to 26,000 in the equivalent period of 2000, before the second Intifada.

-Less than one truckload of goods per day (on average) exited Gaza in the first half of 2013, compared to 38 during the first half of 2007, before the imposition of the blockade.

-Kerem Shalom, the only functioning official crossing for goods to and from Gaza, was closed for almost half of the time (52 days) in the first four months of 2013.

-The volume of construction materials that entered Gaza via the tunnels in 2013 was over three times the amount allowed through the Kerem Shalom crossing.

-Access to land within 300 meters from the fence surrounding Gaza is generally prohibited and access to farming areas several hundred meters beyond is risky.

-Fishermen are allowed to access less than one third of the fishing areas allocated to them under the Oslo Accords: six out of 20 nautical miles.

-57% of Gaza households are food insecure and about 80% are aid recipients.

-Over a third (34.5%) of those able and willing to work are unemployed (PCBS) – one of the highest unemployment rates in the world.

-A longstanding electricity deficit, compounded by shortages in fuel needed to run Gaza’s power plant, results in power outages of up to 12 hours a day.

-Only a quarter of households receive running water every day, during several hours only.

-Over 90% of the water extracted from the Gaza aquifer is unsafe for human consumption.

-Some 90 million litres of untreated and partially treated sewage are dumped in the sea off the Gaza coast each day, creating public health hazards.

-Over 12,000 people are currently displaced due to their inability to reconstruct their homes, destroyed during hostilities.

-At least 230 Palestinian civilians have been killed and over 400 injured while working in tunnels between Gaza and Egypt, used for the transfer of restricted goods, since June 2007.

1. The longstanding restrictions on the movement of people and goods to, from and within the Gaza Strip have continued to undermine the living conditions of 1.7 million people. Many of the current restrictions, which were originally imposed in the early 1990’s, were intensified in June 2007, following the Hamas takeover of Gaza and the imposition of a blockade by Israel. Some of them have been subsequently eased since 2010. These restrictions have reduced access to livelihoods, essential services and housing, disrupted family life, and undermined the people’s hopes for a secure and prosperous future.
2.  Despite some economic growth in recent years, Gaza’s productive capacity remains extremely weak. The restrictions on external trade, including with Israel, and on transfers to and from the West Bank prevent the realization of the Gaza Strip’s economic potential. This is compounded by the restrictions on access to agricultural land and fishing waters, and the chronic shortage of electricity. Current constraints discourage investment, prevent sustainable growth, and perpetuate high levels of unemployment, food insecurity and aid dependency.
3.  Import restrictions have led to a sharp increase in tunnel activities under the border with Egypt. These restrictions, particularly on the import of basic construction materials, combined with the lack of employment opportunities and the huge reconstruction needs, have pushed thousands of workers, some of them children, to risk their lives every day in the “tunnels industry”.
4. Import restrictions have led to a sharp increase in tunnel activities under the border with Egypt. These restrictions, particularly on the import of basic construction materials, combined with the lack of employment opportunities and the huge reconstruction needs, have pushed thousands of workers, some of them children.
5. The restrictions on movement of people and goods between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are part of a “policy of separation” adopted by the Israeli authorities. As a result, people in Gaza are denied access to West Bank universities; cannot market their products or seek work in the West Bank; and cannot maintain normal family or cultural ties with Palestinians in the West Bank.
6. The UN has repeatedly condemned in the strongest terms the firing of rockets at Israel by Palestinian armed groups. Israel has the right and the obligation to take measures to address this and other security threats. However, such measures must be in conformity with international law: they must be proportionate to a specific threat, temporary, and must not be punitive in nature.

To keep reading the full text click here

Source:

http://www.ochaopt.org

Posted on: May 9, 2007

By World Bank Technical Team

Introduction 

1. Restrictions on movement in areas of the West Bank outside of East Jerusalem havetraditionally been measured by the number of physical impediments such as checkpoints, roadblocks and gates present at any given time As monitored by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Territories (OCHA), in the year between the advent of the AMA and November 2006, the number of physical impediments in the West Bank increased by some 44% despite commitments to the contrary. In March 2007, OCHA reported that physical impediments were even slightly higher again (546 in March 2007 vs. 540 in November 2006). Typically, the parties have sought improvement by concentrating efforts to remove certain physical impediments on the basis that a number of them were unnecessary or redundant from a security perspective and created unwarranted hardship on the Palestinian population. However, because of the difficulty in verification and the ease by which physical impediments can be removed in one form and reinstated in another, a count of physical impediments fails to give a full picture of the impact of restrictions. This was underlined by the admission by the IDF in January 2007 that forty-four impediments it claimed to have removed as part of a plan to ease movement did not actually exist. Moreover, analyzing movement restrictions solely on the basis of physical impediments overlooks the imposition of administrative obstacles which are one of the most potent means for restricting Palestinian movement and access.

 

2. GOI’s control of the Palestinian population registry, which allows it to issue ID cards and determine the place of residence of every Palestinian in WB&G over the age of 16, is at the core of the system of administrative obstacles. The population registry also supports the permit system which can be used to control nearly all facets of Palestinian movement outside of an individual’s immediate village or municipal area. Permits are used to restrict Palestinian access to large areas of the West Bank including East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, Settlement Areas, and the “seam zone”, as well as access to and movement between Areas A, B and C.

 

3. Under occupation, administrative restrictions on movement are defined and implemented by orders of the Military Commander of the West Bank. These orders, which are published and have the effect of law, are then supplemented by ad hoc measures which are communicated verbally to Palestinians, but which are not supported by published rules or procedures. Together, military orders and ad hoc measures create a system of movement restrictions which is non-transparent and highly unpredictable. As shown in maps developed by OCHA (see Annex 1), the combined effect of physical and administrative obstacles is the division of the West Bank into three segments (north, central, south) and additionally ten segments or enclaves, with Palestinians channeled through manned checkpoints in order to move between the trisections and in and out of the enclaves. The practical effect of this shattered economic space is that on any given day the ability to reach work, school, shopping, healthcare facilities and agricultural land is highly uncertain and subject to arbitrary restriction and delay. In economic terms, the restrictions have created a level of uncertainty and inefficiency which has made the normal conduct of business extremely difficult and therefore has stymied the growth and investment which is necessary to fuel economic revival.

 

II. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPEDIMENTS

Control of the Population Registry

4. In June 1967, GOI carried out a census of residents in WB&G and only those who were present in the territories at that time were registered in the Palestinian population registry, recognized as legal residents and provided with identification cards. From that time to the present, GOI has retained full control of the population registry despite the fact that the Oslo Accords required that GOI transfer control of the population registry, along with other civil matters, to the PA for Areas A and B. In practical terms, this means that any change of residence within the West Bank or Gaza, or between the two territories, for purposes of marriage, education or employment must be approved by GOI. Even after its disengagement from Gaza, Israel retained control of the registry and uses it to restrict movement. For example, only persons listed in the population registry, or issued permits by GOI, can use the Rafah crossing to enter into Egypt. Gazan residents are almost never allowed to live in the West Bank even in cases of marriage or to attend higher education. For the vast majority of Palestinians, even visiting between Gaza and the West Bank is prohibited. Only those with special permits – normally VIPs, high level government officials and certain business people – can travel between the two Palestinian territories. Approvals for movement between East Jerusalem and the rest of WB&G are likewise problematic.

Permit Regime

5. In addition to holding an ID card, Palestinians are often required to obtain permits for nearly all movement outside of their greater municipal area. Permit requirements are rarely published and are highly changeable. The system operates on two levels – one to control movement within the West Bank itself and another for movement across what GOI defines as “boundaries”. These include mandatory permits for WB&G ID-holders to access East Jerusalem, for East Jerusalem ID-holders to access other areas of WB&G; permits for Gazan residents to access the West Bank and for West Bank residents to access Gaza and for all non-residents of the Jordan Valley to freely access that area.1 Palestinians who enter settlement areas (normally only Palestinian laborers who work in the settlements) are also required to obtain permits. All WB&G residents require permission to enter Israel. Israeli citizens are generally prohibited from entering Gaza or Area A in the West Bank.

 

6. For movement within the West Bank, permit requirements are more fluid and obstacles can change from day to day. For example, movement in the northern governorates of the West Bank is currently heavily restricted, particularly around Nablus. There have been periods within the past year when GOI instituted a ban on all males between the ages of 16 and 35 from leaving the area. Such requirements are normally ad hoc and lack a formal system for notification. Palestinians typically learn of the restriction only when stopped by IDF soldiers at a given checkpoint, as movement restrictions requiring permits are usually communicated by verbal orders. Moreover, permits are valid only for individuals — private, public and commercial vehicles need separate permits, whether or not the driver is permitted.

 

7. The permit system is enforced by physical impediments which funnel Palestinians through permanent and/or “flying” checkpoints where soldiers determine whether a permit is needed or whether a permit held by a Palestinian is valid. Holding a valid permit does not necessarily guarantee the ability to cross a checkpoint. Requirements can be changed without notice at particular checkpoints and comprehensive closures, banning all movement, can be imposed at any time. According to B’Tselem, in 2006 there were 78 days on which comprehensive closures were imposed. While some of these closures occur because of a specific or perceived security threat, others do not. For example, there are typically blanket closures in the West Bank during public holidays in Israel. Unsurprisingly, these restrictions make the movement of people and goods more expensive, inefficient and unpredictable and therefore have a particularly chilling effect on economic activity. Beyond the personal hardship, an economy cannot run effectively if there is significant uncertainty about the ability of workers to reach their jobs, of goods reaching their markets, and of entrepreneurs being present to manage their place of business.

Family Unification and Establishment of Residency

8. Persons not listed in the population registry who wish to legally join their families and permanently reside in the West Bank can only do so through the approval of GOI for family

unification. However, according to GOI, family unification in the West Bank is not a vested right based on fundamental rights to family, but instead is a “special benevolent act of the Israeli authorities”. Following the start of the second intifada, GOI stopped processing requests for family unification and stopped issuing visitor permits to non-resident family members. The PA Ministry of Civil Affairs estimates that there have been some 120,000 requests for family unification since the start of the second intifada. This is in addition to the thousands of cases which were pending when the freeze began. Since then, requests have only been granted to “exceptional humanitarian cases” although criteria for this category has never been well defined and the wait for a substantive response from GOI concerning residency requests normally takes several years. This treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank is in contrast to the treatment of those who wish to take up residency in West Bank settlements. In the latter case, residency in settlements is open not only to Israeli citizens but to all foreign citizens eligible for citizenship in Israel under the Israeli Law of Return.

 

9. GOI has not made public the number of pending family unification applications. However one study estimates that roughly 17% of WB&G families are affected to the extent that a first-degree relative (parent, spouse, sibling or son/daughter) is not registered in the population registry and therefore cannot receive an identification card. Of this 17%, nearly 80% have filed unification requests and are still awaiting an official response. Because no set procedure exists to obtain residency, family members and other Palestinians who return to WB&G have had to depend on continually renewing three-month tourist visas. In some cases, persons have remained with their families for decades by leaving the country every three months to renew and then reenter WB&G on a tourist visa. Beginning in April of 2006, however, even this coping mechanism became more difficult as GOI began denying entry to many overseas Palestinians for family or business purposes even with a visa. This policy was directed at those who had invested in WB&G and who operated businesses there, those working for Palestinian governmental bodies, academic institutions and NGOs, as well as returning or visiting family members. In March 2007 GOI issued new rules which allow family members to extend their visitors permit up to a year, with a maximum coverage of 27 months, during which time the visitor must receive a WB&G ID without which they would have no legal basis to remain. There also remains considerable uncertainty whether a person will be allowed entry even with a valid visitor’s visa.

 

10. According to the presidents of eleven Palestinian universities, thousands of foreign passport holders of Palestinian descent, along with non-Palestinian family members, lecturers, NGO workers and international development specialists were affected by these new procedures. Up to fifty percent of foreign instructors at Birzeit University in Ramallah alone were reportedly denied entry between May and September 2006. Foreign students are also at risk since they too have to enter only on tourist visas – and tourist visas do not cover the entire semester. Such limitations risk lowering the high education standards that have historically been an important area of strength for the Palestinian economy.

 

11. The US Government lodged a protest with GOI stating that the US Government found it “hard to understand” discrimination against US citizens based on their ethnicity, especially as the US Government encouraged Palestinians to return to, and invest in WB&G in order to facilitate economic growth. Given that the vast majority of new investment in WB&G since the signing of the Oslo Accords has been through overseas Palestinians, such practices and the high degree of uncertainty connected to them will inevitably lead to a loss of foreign investment and knowledge transfer and a further contraction of the Palestinian economy.

To keep reading the full report click here

Source:

http://siteresources.worldbank.org

 

Israel, since its occupation of Jerusalem, has pursued various policies to integrate East Jerusalem into Israel proper by augmenting the legal status of the city, annexing land and expanding Jewish settlements within and around the city. Since East Jerusalem is an occupied territory, such Israeli practices formidably violate international law, in particular the Geneva Convention, which clearly emphasizes the illegality of transferring the citizens of the occupier to the territory it occupies.

However, Israel has managed to confiscate land around and within Jerusalem by issuing military orders that modify past Ottoman, British and Jordanian laws, i.e. by putting their settlement activities in a legal framework. A primary Military Order used to “legitimate” the confiscation of Palestinian land is Military Order 58 of 1967, known as the Absentee Property Law. According to this military order, land and properties of absentee Palestinians is transferred to the Israeli Civil Administration.

Any Palestinian who left the West Bank before or after June 7, 1967, is defined as an absentee. Military Order 321, issued in 1969, gives the Israeli military the authority to confiscate land for public purposes. However, Jewish settlers are the only beneficiaries of these public services. The construction of by-pass roads falls under this order.

Security is an often-used alibi to confiscate Palestinian land. In the 1970’s the Israeli High Court of Justice granted approval to the construction of settlements that are temporary and serve security purposes. Such areas are first designated as ‘closed military areas’, which often develop into a whole settlement. Settlement activity in Jerusalem is part of a broader settlement policy exercised in other parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. By the employment of military orders described above and the application of de facto politics, Israel has succeeded in imposing its hegemony over Jerusalem; thus, undermining Palestinian presence in the city. Besides building settlements, Israel’s discriminatory policies against Palestinian Jerusalemites have exacerbated Palestinian subjugation and ability to develop. Such is evidenced by the extreme difficulties faced by Palestinian residents to obtain building permits, whose many homes have been systematically demolished for that reason.

Israeli existing and planned settlement activities in and around Metropolitan Jerusalem will have debilitating impacts on the development of Palestinian neighborhoods in the city disconnecting them from each other and from other Palestinian urban centers in the West Bank. Such Israeli geopolitical arrangements, as described in the report, create a superimposed grid of roads and settlement blocks with total disregard to the impact of such infrastructure on Palestinian spatial delineations and viability. In other words, Israeli settlements and complementary roads will turn Palestinian Jerusalem neighborhoods into fractured slums without open space for future population growth.

The construction of settlement blocks around the city and the building of by-pass roads together cause a forced reconversion of the features of the city in a way that limits Palestinian access to land and hampers Palestinian building activity. In fact, as mentioned in the report, Palestinians are granted only 8% of the municipal area for construction. The resulted cantonization of Palestinian neighborhoods in the city will further complicate Palestinian urban development and exacerbate population congestion, which is already ubiquitous in various Palestinian areas in East Jerusalem.

One could imagine the socioeconomic implications of such Israeli settlement policies in the city. A growing population will be competing for a decreasing amount of land, physical infrastructure and services stifling any prospects for development.

Overcrowded areas will become breeding grounds for epidemics and poverty. Now, due to Israel’s closure policies, Palestinian Jerusalemites are totally separated from trading centers in other centers of the West Bank further deteriorating the economic standing of the city.

Besides the economic strangulation imposed by the settlement blocks around East Jerusalem, the Israeli Cabinet in its early sessions approved a plan, which envisions the building of electric fences, stonewalls, trenches, and roadblocks in areas outside city limits- at the end of March 2002. The plan also includes the installation of video cameras and observations posts, which will be manned by 500 border policemen stationed on the city’s outskirts. This plan is currently being implemented.

Israel has also been following a policy of closing down and transferring many Palestinian institutions out of East Jerusalem since the early nineties. The biggest jolt was the closure of the Orient House, the heart and soul of the PLO in East Jerusalem. The number of people who are able to come to Jerusalem for visiting, services, schools or work has steeply declined since the inception of the second Intifada. Therefore, closure and separation policies exercised by Israel have direct impact on the Palestinian social fabric, religion and education per se.

Unfortunately, the economic impact of settlement belts and closures are difficult to accurately assess, as data is still not available for East Jerusalem. One could speculate that tourism, which is a key economic sector in Jerusalem comprising 58% of Jerusalem’s economic activity, has been severely hit since the beginning of the Intifada, depriving many Jerusalemites of their main source of income.

On the political front, existing and envisioned Israeli spatial arrangements in the city will result in the total annexation of 15% of the West Bank into Israel proper. Thus, it becomes geographically and politically impossible for Palestinians to have sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Palestinian neighborhoods in the city will be totally separated from the West Bank by three settlement blocks surrounding Metropolitan Jerusalem in the North, East and South. Moreover, by-pass roads and the light rail will further carve up Palestinian physical existence in the city.

Ultimately, such Israeli spatial arrangements cause detrimental political mplications for they counteract the option of having Jerusalem as an “open city” for the following reasons:

1. There will not be free movement of people and goods into and within the borders of the Open City because the roads linking settlements are built exclusively for Jewish use. Moreover, borders will be controlled by Israel only as evidenced by the construction of a “security wall” to envelope Jerusalem.
2. The internal demarcation between the Israeli and Palestinian parts of the city will not be invisible, as defined for an open city option, since by-pass roads will make such demarcations and divisions concrete and almost irreversible. In fact, such spatial arrangements create physical barriers between Palestinian neighborhoods and Israeli ones.

It is also worth mentioning that this spatial plan for Jerusalem hinders a model for a divided city that will be ruled by separate sovereignties. Such is evidenced by Israeli plans made in connecting settlements in Eastern Jerusalem, which will cause the division of East Jerusalem into cantons as well as its separation and discontinuity with the West Bank.

The only possible vision is that Palestinians will be totally assimilated within an Israeli-dominated city in underdeveloped areas without any capacity for expanding or urban planning. The same systematic policy is also implemented elsewhere in the West Bank, where some Israeli plans in progress aim at creating two blocks of settlements, one in the east of the West Bank, and the other in the west, so as Israel can delineate the borders that it can annex in the future into the Israeli state. Such an arrangement will shrink the territory left for a potential Palestinian state that is also discontinuous because of the settlements and by-pass roads that divide up its districts.

The Palestinians will thus be left without a geographically contiguous piece of land.

The Palestinians will not have the option of forming a real viable state. The only other option is for Palestinians to accept a one-state, two-nation solution. However, such an option will not be accepted by Israel because of Palestinian demographic superiority that threatens the foundations of a Jewish state.

As a final note, by implementing such spatial and infrastructural arrangements in the city, Sharon’s government is not only consolidating an Israeli political control over the city, but is also making it highly costly for future Israeli negotiators to reverse such geopolitical realities to accommodate a Palestinian sovereign existence in the city. Hence, as a political strategy, the Palestinian negotiating team should publicly advocate, by garnering support from the international community, the return to the Camp David II and Taba peace talks. The only viable option is to reconsider the Open City concept with land swap, as a mechanism to circumvent the “creeping annexation” of Palestinian land in and around the city boundaries of East Jerusalem. The other option is to gear Palestinian objective towards one-state solution with all its ramifications on the national identity and ethos of the Palestinians. Definitely, as mentioned before, the Israelis will totally object to this idea of incorporating demographic in corporation of the Palestinians and this strategy might “push” the Israelis to reconsider their settlement policies and may be under pressure accept division of the city. These options are open and it depends on the Palestinians in how to deal with the issue at state.

Source:

http://palestinianmissionuk.com

The Separation Wall

In 2002, Israel began construction of the “West Bank Barrier” in order to separate the West Bank from Israel. Currently, the Separation Wall serpentines through the West Bank and annexes most illegal settlements rather than running along the 1967 Green Line (Armistice Line). In fact, the Separation Wall is twice as long as the Green Line and 85% of the Wall is located within the West Bank. The barrier, which most Israelis refer to as the “security fence” and most Palestinians as the “apartheid wall”, consists partly of fence (90% of its length) and partly of a concrete wall 6-8 meters high (10%). The Wall includes a “buffer zone” 30-100 meters wide, which often includes electric fences, razor wire, military patrols, cameras and sensors, and trenches. See here for an excellent map from B’tselem.

On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice rendered its advisory opinion that the Separation Wall built by Israel in the West Bank is illegal and should be dismantled. On July 24, 2004, the UN General Assembly also passed a resolution demanding that Israel and all UN member states abide by the International Court’s advisory opinion from two weeks previous. The Wall violates human rights, such as the right to freedom of movement, work, good health, education, an adequate standard of living, and the right to self-determination. B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, explains here how the Separation Wall is an extreme and harmful solution to Israel’s security threat and infringes upon the rights of Palestinians.

The Wall is not the only mechanism of movement control. As Stop the Wall points out, there are hundreds of checkpoints and other military obstructions such as roadblocks, trenches, and gates that restrict Palestinian movement. Additionally, there are 1,661 km (1,032 miles) of settler-only roads that connect settlements and settlement blocs. B’tselem further remarks on the many systems Israel has used to restrict movement since the 1990s, such as “checkpoints and obstructions, the Separation Barrier, forbidden roads or roads with restrictions in Palestinian use, and the movement-permit regime.” These restrictions have split the area into six areas: North, Center, South, the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea, enclaves created by the Separation Wall, and East Jerusalem. Israel restricts movement not only from area to area, but also movement within each area or enclave. More details on a specific and major system of movement control, checkpoints, is outlined next.

Checkpoints

Ever since the early 1990s, Israel has operated hundreds of military checkpoints and barriers of various sorts throughout the occupied Palestinian territory. Israel claims that checkpoints are for the sake of security, preventing Palestinian militants from entering Israeli settlements and towns. It is estimated the 30,000 Palestinian undocumented day-laborers cross the Green Line daily to work within Israel. Rather than restrict Palestinian movement into Israel, the system of checkpoints, permits and barriers restricts the Palestinians’ freedom of movement within the occupied area, greatly impacting their access to employment, school, medical care, and other vital social services.

The checkpoints and movement barriers violate Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.” The World Health Organization and other international humanitarian groups have noted hundreds of deaths and birth complications in the past decade as the result of Israeli soldiers’ actions and failure to allow Palestinians through. B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, refers also to checkpoints as a form of collective punishment, violating the rights of an entire population under the assumption that all Palestinians are a security threat. This form of collective punishment is detrimental to the economy as a whole, severely limiting the flow of goods, including humanitarian aid. According to a February 2010 UN World Bank report, movement and access restrictions such as the Separation Wall and checkpoints impact the Palestinian economy by creating greater unemployment, crippling private sector activity, causing a rapid decline in GDP, decreasing wages, and increasing poverty. In addition, checkpoints restrict the Palestinian economy by limiting access to economies of scale to create further growth, limiting access to natural resources, and making foreign investment extremely difficult.

Source:

http://www.globalexchange.org

Control of Palestinian movement has been a feature of Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territory since its inception in 1967.  However, over the last 14 years the draconian system of movement controls used by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory has become increasingly institutionalized and restrictive.  The permit system put in place in the early 1990s which requires that all Palestinians obtain military issued permits to move between the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem or to travel abroad is now complemented by a permanent system of roadblocks, gates, checkpoints, the Wall and other obstacles to movement in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza blockade.

Taken together all of these factors contribute to forced displacement, severely limit Palestinian access to basic resources including land and water and basic services including health care and education, and perpetuate a system of segregation and legal and structural inequality between Palestinians and Israelis.  Understanding how Palestinian’s freedom of movement is restricted is important to understanding the severe impact of Israel’s occupation on average Palestinians.

This paper provides background information on how Israel has restricted Palestinian movement and the impact that these restrictions have on Palestinians lives.

When did Israel first begin restricting Palestinian movement? 

Control over Palestinian movement has been a feature of the conflict since 1948.  Following the 1948 War Israel incorporated into its own laws the Defense (Emergency) Regulations imposed by the British Mandate Authorities in 1945.[i]  These regulations were used to restrict the rights of Palestinians inside post 1948 Israel, most notably their freedom of movement which was controlled by permit requirements and curfews.  In 1966 most of the restrictions imposed by Israel over Palestinian citizens of Israel under these regulations were lifted, but the regulations themselves remained in place.  After the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 the Defense (Emergency) Regulations were incorporated into the military laws used by Israel to administer the occupied Palestinian territory.

From 1967 to 1972 the occupied Palestinian territory was declared a closed military area by the Israeli military and many freedoms including the freedom of movement by residents were severely limited.  In 1972 the Israeli military issued a general exit order which allowed Palestinian to enter Israel from the West Bank and Gaza during daylight hours with few limitations.  During this period Palestinians could also travel with relative freedom between the West Bank and Gaza.

Some limits were imposed on the general exit permit during the first Intifada, and following the start of the first Iraq war in 1991 the general exit permit was revoked and a general closure was declared over the occupied Palestinian territory.  This was when Israel started requiring that all Palestinians acquire military issued permits if they wanted to enter Israel or move between the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza.  This permit regime was formalized as a part of the Oslo Accords and Palestinian movement into and out of Israel and between the different parts of the occupied Palestinian territory remains restricted to those Palestinians who have received travel permits from the Israeli military.

The Oslo Accords also resulted in new limitations on movement within the occupied Palestinian territory.  Under the Oslo Accords the West Bank was divided into three administrative areas (A,B, and C).  Area C, which comprises 61 percent of the West Bank, is under the full control of Israel through the Civil (Military) Administration in the West Bank.  Area B, 22% of the West Bank, is under the full administrative control of the Palestinian Authority but under the military control of Israel.  Area A makes up 17% of the West Bank and is under full Palestinian control.  Even before the start of the Second Intifada in September 2000 this division resulted in the imposition of movement restrictions between communities and between administrative areas inside the West Bank which were enforced through the imposition of mobile checkpoints.

After the start of the second intifada Israel intensified the general closure in place over the occupied Palestinian territory, more closely regulating travel by Palestinians and formalizing an internal system of movement restrictions through permanent checkpoints, roadblocks, gates, closed roads, barriers, and the Wall. This system which remains in place is addressed in more detail below.

Restrictions in place over Gaza were also further tightened in 2005 when Israel unilaterally withdrew its settlers and redeployed its troops from Gaza. Following the redeployment, Israel placed new and increased restrictions over the movement of people and goods into and out of Gaza. These restrictions were further tightened in 2006 after Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections and then tightened again in 2007 when Gaza was placed under siege following the Hamas-Fatah factional split.  These restrictions on movement placed over Gaza are also addressed in more detail below.

Has Israel eased movement restrictions in the West Bank over the last several years?

Israel has made travel between major Palestinian population centers (Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Hebron) in the West Bank easier over the last several years.  Several major checkpoints in the West Bank that restricted direct movement between and into these cities have been removed or modified.  However, in general this opening is less the result of an overall easing in movement restrictions than the result of the institutionalization of movement controls into a formal and permanent regime of restrictions that has replaced roadblocks with gates that can be opened and closed at the whim of the military and that has reconfiguring how Palestinians travel.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) the number of obstacles to movement inside the West Bank increased to 542 during 2013 from 529 in 2012.  Approximately 100 of these obstacles are permanent staffed checkpoints and the others are roadblocks, gates, unmanned checkpoints, and other obstacles.  Only 40 of these permanent checkpoints are a last inspection point before entry into Israel and most of these 40 checkpoints are located several kilometers inside the West Bank and not along the Green Line which is the internationally recognized demarcation line between the West Bank and Israel.  Additionally, each month the Israeli military puts in place several hundred temporary checkpoints that change location from day to day and which are used to control Palestinian movement.[ii]

Most of the movement restrictions in the West Bank are put in places to specifically restrict Palestinian access to roads used by settlers or to areas near or controlled by settlements.  While Palestinian movement is severely restricted, a separate system of roads that are closed to Palestinians or that bypass Palestinian communities has been set up for Settlers to ensure their unrestricted movement in the West Bank and between the West Bank and Israel.[iii]  According to the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem,

“there were 67 kilometers of roads in the West Bank that Israel classified for the sole, or practically sole, use of Israelis, first and foremost of settlers. Israel also prohibits Palestinians from even crossing some of these roads with vehicles, thereby restricting their access to nearby roads that they are ostensibly not prohibited from using. In these cases, Palestinians travelers have to get out of their vehicle, cross the road on foot, and find an alternative mode of transportation on the other side.”[iv]

OCHA has also reported that in 2013 at least 55 West Bank communities which are home to more than 180,000 people remain completely isolated as a result of roadblocks, barriers, checkpoints and other movement restrictions.  All of the main roads into and out of these communities remain blocked and residents wishing to leave these communities must use alternative routes that are two to five times longer than the blocked direct routes.  Many of these communities are located near the Wall, near settlements, or in the Jordan Valley.[v]

How does the Wall impact Palestinian’s Freedom of Movement?

As of late 2013 just over 60% of the Wall had been built.  Although Israel has said that the ostensive purpose of the Wall is to stop Palestinians from crossing into Israel, 85% of the Wall’s route runs through the West Bank as opposed to along the Green Line.  When the Wall is completed 9.5% of all West Bank land will be located on the Western Side of the Wall and thus will be effectively annexed to Israel. [vi]

Included in the area cut off by the Wall are 71 illegal Israeli settlements and 33 Palestinian communities. The Palestinian communities are home to approximately 11,000 people and they are completely isolated from other areas of the West Bank.  All residents of these communities over the age of 12 must obtain special residency permits from the Israeli military in order to remain in their homes.  Residents can only enter and leave their communities through gates in the Wall that are controlled by the Israeli military which does not open them regularly.  Because these are small and rural communities most of them do not have their own hospitals, schools, clinics, and stores and therefore rely on other nearby towns for these services.  The Wall severely limits access to other towns and thus also cuts off access to these vital services.[vii]

Agricultural land belonging to more than 150 West Bank communities, which are home to approximately 200,000 people, has also been de facto annexed to Israel as a result of the construction of the Wall.  In theory this land can be accessed through 73 gates that have been built along the length of the Wall.  However, 70 percent of the gates in the Wall are only open for a few weeks each year during the annual olive harvest.  Only 11 gates are open on a daily basis and 10 more are open on a weekly basis.  Even if these gates were open more regularly access to land that has been cut off would remain restricted by permit requirements.  All of the land in these areas was declared a closed military zone in 2003 and all people wishing to enter these areas (including land owners) must obtain special permits from the Israeli military.  According to OCHA only 40% of requests to the military for permits to allow entry to these areas receive a positive response.[viii]  The limits on access to these areas have decreased farming in these areas by over 80 percent.[ix]

Are Jerusalem residents able to move freely?

After occupying East Jerusalem in 1967 Israel annexed the city, although this annexation has not been recognized or accepted by the international community which continues to view East Jerusalem as part of the occupied Palestinian territory.  Palestinian residents of Jerusalem refused to accept the annexation of Jerusalem and therefore did not take full Israeli citizenship.  Instead, Palestinian Jerusalemites are considered “Permanent Residents” of Jerusalem. However, their status as residents of the city is anything but permanent.

Since 1967 over 14,000 Palestinians have had their residency rights in the city revoked.[x]According to Israeli law the residency right of Palestinian Jerusalemites can be revoked if they leave Israel for a period of 7 years, if they gain permanent residency status in another country, if they gain citizenship status in another country, if they are declared a threat to national security, or if their center of life (job, home, etc.) as defined by the Israeli government is not in the city.  Students studying abroad, individuals who leave Israel to pursue work opportunities, and Jerusalemites who gain employment in the West Bank have all had their Permanent Resident status revoked.  Losing Permanent Resident status means losing their right to visit or live in Jerusalem.[xi]  These same restrictions do not apply to Jewish Israeli residents of Jerusalem.

In 2002 Israel also frozen the family reunification process through which Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza could gain Jerusalem residency rights if they married a Palestinian from Jerusalem.  The Military Order that put in place this freeze was transformed into “The Nationality and Entry into Israeli Law” in 2003.  This law makes it nearly impossible for Palestinian from the occupied Palestinian territory who are the spouses of Palestinian Jerusalemites (or Palestinian-Israelis) to gain citizenship.  The effect of this law is that Palestinians from Jerusalem who marry Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza must move out of Jerusalem if they wish to live with their spouse, but if they move they risk losing their Jerusalem residency rights.

Therefore, while Palestinian residents of Jerusalem can travel more freely than Palestinians from other parts of the occupied Palestinian territory most of the time, their ability to change their place of residence and to leave Jerusalem for an extended period is severely limited.  

How is movement restricted in Gaza?

The movement of both goods and people into and out of Gaza was strictly limited in 2005 when Israel unilaterally withdrew its settlers and redeployed its troops from Gaza. In that year Israel severely cut back the number of exit permits that it gave to Palestinians wishing to leave Gaza.  These restrictions were strengthened in 2006 after Hamas’ victory in that year’s parliamentary elections. After Hamas won the elections Israel and the international community put in placesanctions[xii] against the Hamas run Palestinian Authority.  These sanctions included limitations on imports to and exports from all of the occupied Palestinian territory.

In 2007 following the Hamas-Fatah split which saw Hamas seize control of the Gaza Strip, sanctions against the Palestinian Authority were ended in the West Bank, but strengthened in Gaza. These strengthened sanctions effectively placed a blockade over Gaza, severely limiting exports and imports and banning nearly all travel by residents of Gaza. Between 2007 and 2010, even basic necessities such as cooking gas, water filtration equipment, toilet paper, tooth paste, clothes, noodles, candy, and spices were blocked from entering Gaza. In 2010, the Israeli government announced an “easing” of the blockade and allowed for limited increases in imports such as clothing and food. However, severe restrictions on the import of many goods including the raw materials necessary for industrial production, construction materials, medical supplies, fuel, and many consumer goods were never lifted, and there was no easing on the restrictions imposed over exports from Gaza.

The movement of people into and out of Gaza is also severely restricted.  Prior to the outbreak of the second Intifada approximately 26,000 people were allowed to leave Gaza each day via the Erez crossing.  During the first half of 2013 only 200 people on average crossed Erez each day.[xiii]  Students are denied exit to study abroad.  Patients needing medical treatment not available in Gaza are delayed or blocked from reaching care.  People with families in other parts of the occupied Palestinian territory are blocked from seeing their relatives.  People wishing to leave to pursue work in other places are blocked from doing so.  Nearly all access to the outside world for the residents of Gaza is blocked.

What is the impact of the blockade on people in Gaza?

The blockade has had a devastating impact on the Gaza population, affecting all aspects of life.  According to UN OCHA[xiv], as of June 2013:

• Less than 200 people per day were allowed out of Gaza via Israel in the first half of 2013.
• Less than one truckload of goods per day were allowed out of Gaza during the first half of 2013.
• 57 percent of Gaza households are food insecure, and approximately 80 percent receive some form of food assistance.
• 35.5 percent of those able and willing to work are unemployed – one of the highest unemployment rates in the world.
• Due to fuel shortages, there are power outages for up to 12 hours per day in most areas of Gaza.
• Only 25 percent of households in Gaza receive running water every day, and then only for a few hours.
• Over 90 percent of the water extracted from the Gaza aquifer is unsafe for human consumption, while needed filtration equipment cannot be imported to Gaza.
• Nearly 90 million liters of untreated or partially treated sewage is dumped into the sea off of Gaza every day while equipment needed to build new or maintain existing treatment facilities are banned from entering Gaza.

It must be emphasized that, despite the terrible human suffering caused by the blockade, the situation in Gaza should not be viewed as a humanitarian crisis that can be resolved through the provision of international aid and assistance. Rather, the current situation in Gaza is a political crisis that can only be resolved through political action. All of the impacts outlined above are the direct result of Israeli actions and policies, and ending the crisis in Gaza therefore requires ending the blockade and Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinian territory, which are at the root of the crisis.   

Since the Israeli military’s redeployment of its forces outside of Gaza are there any restrictions on movement in Gaza?

Movement in Gaza is restricted in what is known as the “restricted access area”.  The Gaza “restricted access area” (often referred to as the buffer zone) is an area along the Wall that has been built between Gaza and Israel.  In this area Palestinians can be shot on sight by the Israeli military.[xv] The restricted access area was first created during the second Intifada when Israel began enforcing a 150-meter no-go zone along the Eastern border of Gaza. At that time Israel also began systematically demolishing homes and structures in areas near the Gaza borders in the north and south of the Gaza Strip. In May 2009, the Israeli military announced an expansion of the restricted access area in leaflets they dropped on Gaza from the air.  These leaflets warned people that anyone coming within 300 meters of the border could be shot. Additional homes and structures in this area were subsequently destroyed. In addition to the official 300-meter restricted access area, Israeli forces conduct regular raids one and two kilometers into Gaza and constantly monitor all areas up to two kilometers into Gaza. The land included in the restricted access area accounts for 17 percent of the total Gaza land area and includes 35 percent of Gaza’s agricultural land.[xvi]

How are corporations complicit in helping Israel restrict Palestinians freedom of movement?

Israel’s restriction of Palestinian movement is made possible through support provided by a number of international corporations.  These corporations include:

Hewlett Packard – Hewlett Packard (HP) produces the biometric ID systems used to track and control Palestinian movement.  The IDs produced using HP technology are similar in nature to the passbooks produced by Polaroid during the Apartheid era and used by the Apartheid government to control the movement of Black South Africans.

All Palestinians wishing to enter Israel must apply to the Israeli military authorities for a magnetic biometric ID card. Each electronic ID card contains biometric, personal, and security information. While only a fraction of Palestinians who apply for permits actually receive them, each applicant’s information is kept and stored in a database held by the Israeli authorities. Over the years, Israel has accumulated this information into a population registry that contains information about every Palestinian in the occupied Palestinian territory over the age of 16. Biometric data is collected as part of the BASEL system, a biometric access control system, which is installed in major Israeli checkpoints in the occupied West Bank. This system is used to restrict Palestinian movement across checkpoints inside the West Bank and to grant or deny special movement privileges (see for example this UN Report).

EDS Israel, now part of HP Enterprise Services, is responsible for developing, integrating, and maintaining the BASEL system.[xvii]

Elbit Systems – Elbit Systems is directly involved in many Israeli military operations and has developed technologies specifically suited for the control and repression of the civilian Palestinian population. In addition to manufacturing weapons, Elbit and its subsidiaries Elbit Electro-Optics (El-Op) and Elbit Security Systems (Ortek) have been contracted to supply surveillance systems such as the LORROS (Long-Range Reconnaissance and Observation System) for use along the length of the Wall. Grassroots International has estimated that Elbit makes over $2 million per kilometer from the construction of the Wall.  This makes Elbit one of the major profiteers from the construction of the Wall.[xviii]

What can you do?

Demand an immediate end to movement restrictions in Palestine: Although the US government is aware of the impact that Israeli imposed movement restrictions have on Palestinians, it has not taken any effective actions to demand change.  Contact your government representatives and the State Department and demand that they call for change. Ask that they:

1. Call for the dismantling by Israel of the Wall in the West Bank in fulfillment of the International Court of Justice’s 2004 ruling which declared the Wall illegal.
2. Demand that Israel allow Palestinians to move freely between communities inside the occupied Palestinian territory, between the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, and internationally.
3. Call for the removal of the 549 roadblocks, checkpoints, gates, and other barriers used to restrict Palestinian movement in the West Bank.

Demand an immediate end to the siege on Gaza:  U.S. government policy officially supports Israel’s continued siege on Gaza and the Isolation of Hamas.  This is a situation that must end.  Contact your government representatives and the State Department and demand that they call for an immediate change in U.S. government policy and support both the complete end to Israel’s siege on Gaza and engagement with Hamas.  The siege is illegal and immoral and must end.  Additionally, if any solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict is going to be found all political factions including Hamas must be at the table and involved in reaching an agreement.  U.S. policy must change.

Join the Palestinian led BDS movement:[xix] Support or organize a BDS campaign against either of the companies listed above or other companies that support Israel’s occupation or violence in Palestine and Israel.  One of the fastest growing boycott campaigns is one that targets Hewlett Packard because of the role that it plays in facilitating the restriction of Palestinian movement.  The “Coalition to Stop HP”[xx] has organized a national campaign which asks both individuals and groups to boycott HP.  More information about this campaign and HP can be found on the Global Exchange website.[xxi]  Other campaigns in the U.S. that you can support include the Caterpillar Boycott, SodaStream Boycott, Veolia Boycott and more[xxii].

Reference:

[i] http://www.btselem.org/legal_documents/emergency_regulations

[ii] http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/checkpoints_and_forbidden_roads

[iii]http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_movement_and_access_report_september_2012_english.pdf

[iv] http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/checkpoints_and_forbidden_roads

[v]http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_fragmented_lives_annual_report_2013_english_web.pdf

[vi] Ibid

[vii] http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier

[viii]http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2013_05_24_english.pdf

[ix] http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier

[x] http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_statistics

[xi] http://www.civiccoalition-jerusalem.org/system/files/palestinians_-_residence_in_their_home_final.pdf

[xii] http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/17/us-palestinians-funds-idUSL8196756120070617

[xiii]http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_gaza_blockade_factsheet_july_2013_english.pdf

[xiv]http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_gaza_blockade_factsheet_july_2013_english.pdf

[xv] http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_special_focus_2010_08_19_english.pdf

[xvi] http://www.mezan.org/upload/13210.pdf

[xvii] https://wedivest.org/c/57/hp#.Uq4R3eIa5pE

[xviii] http://www.globalexchange.org/economicactivism/elbit/why

[xix] https://afsc.org/story/boycott-divestment-and-sanctions-explained

[xx] http://www.globalexchange.org/economicactivism/hp/joinus

[xxi] http://www.globalexchange.org/economicactivism/campaigns/hp

[xxii] http://www.endtheoccupation.org/section.php?id=203

[xxiii]https://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/AFSC%20Principles%20for%20a%20Just%20and%20Lasting%20Peace_0.pdf

 

Source:

http://afsc.org/

Posted on: 06/25/2014

By Ali Abunimah

France today advised its citizens and companies against doing business with Israeli settlements in occupied territories.

The government warned that firms could face legal action tied to “land, water, mineral and other natural resources” as well as “reputational risks.”

The step could have implications for the Israeli economy far beyond activities limited to Israeli settlements themselves.

The Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee (BNC) welcomed the move.

Spain, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Luxembourg are expected to publish similar guidance in coming days in what appears to be a coordinated move by European states.

The French warning follows similar steps by the UK and Netherlands, prompted by an advocacy effort by civil society groups and members of the European Parliament.

“Risks”

The new guidance published by the French foreign ministry states that “The West Bank, including East Jerusalem, Gaza and the Golan Heights are territories occupied by Israeli since 1967. The settlements are illegal under international law.”

As a consequence, “there exist risks tied to economic and financial activities in the settlements. Financial transactions, investments, purchases, procurements as well as other economic activities in the settlements or benefitting the settlements, entail legal and economic risks tied to the fact that the Israeli settlements, according to international law, are built on occupied territories and are not recognized as being part of the territory of Israel.”

The French warning is worded in language almost identical to that issued by the UK last December, suggesting a high degree of intergovernmental coordination.

Broad implications

While some may spin the warning as affecting only the settlements and not the Israeli economy more broadly, the phrase “benefitting the settlements” – which appears in both the UK and French statements – could be significant.

It signals that firms may also be wise to steer clear of business transactions or activities that may not necessarily be located within settlements themselves.

An example of this in practice was the decision of Dutch pension giant PGGM earlier this year todivest from all five of Israel’s main commercial banks.

While the move was prompted specifically by the banks’ “unethical” involvement in settlement activities, PGGM concluded that it was impossible to separate out the banks’ settlement-related and non-settlement-related business activities.

At the time, Palestinian activist Omar Barghouti called the PGGM decision “unprecedented” in its scope since the pensions giant divested from all Israeli banks, not just their operations within the occupied West Bank.

Given that the economy of the settlements is deeply intertwined in the rest of the Israeli economy, the “benefitting the settlements” clause may encourage cautious firms to follow the precedent set by PGGM and avoid involvement with any Israeli firms with substantial business interests in the colonization of Palestinian land.

This has been a point made by the European Coordination of Committees and Associations for Palestine (ECCP) coalition, which has called on the EU to urge firms to “cease all trade with Israeli export companies that operate inside illegal Israeli settlements, since trade with such companies provides capital to businesses involved in the maintenance and expansion of Israeli settlements.”

Palestinian welcome

Zaid Shuabi, a spokesperson for the BNC, the Palestinian civil society coalition that leads theboycott, divestment and sanctions movement, welcomed the news in an emailed statement.

“European governments are continuing to react to Israel’s intransigence and the groundswell of public support for Palestinian rights by taking action against Israel’s settlement regime,” Shuabi said.

“European businesses such as G4S, Veolia, JCB and Alstom play a key role in Israel’s settlement enterprise. We urge other European countries to follow the example set by France, the UK and the Netherlands and take similar action.”

While he hoped that today’s announcement would “encourage French businesses to abandon their complicity in Israel’s illegal settlement enterprise,” Shuabi added that “France, the EU and all European states must do much more to end the involvement of European businesses in Israeli human rights abuses, including by explicitly prohibiting business relations with Israeli public and private entities in the occupied Palestinian territory, and by ensuring that companies involved in war crimes are brought to justice.”

Source:

http://electronicintifada.net/