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Posted on: 2012

Israeli occupation undermines Palestine’s environment and minimizes any possibility that it can implement sustainable development. Alarming unemployment rates, weak and inefficient institutions and high dependency on customs revenues and financial contributions from donor countries makes apparent the unsustainability of the Palestinian economy.

After 47 years of occupation, a silent Intifada is taking place in Jerusalem today, writes Kuttab [AFP]

In addition, the disastrous conditions of the water supply facilities – mostly due to laws enforced during the 1967 Israeli occupation – poses an alarming threat to Palestinians’ well being.  

Palestine represents a very unusual case regarding sustainable development. In order to address this topic, there are a number of issues that need to be considered, the most important being the lack of sovereignty and control over resources, the absence of legislation or policy plans for development of any kind and the growing importance of donor country funding to the economies of both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The lack of legislation and policies, especially with regard to sustainability, is linked to the Israeli occupation, which has ultimate power over the jurisdiction and geographic extension of any possible legislation, and is also a cause of political instability. The reality of the occupation therefore makes it necessary to take into account the inadequacy of many development indicators when applied to the Palestinian situation. This does not mean that we must exclude Palestine from development statistics, but merely that the indicators that are widely employed are not necessarily valid with regard to this country, and consequently another kind of development measurements must be considered.

Unemployment

The World Bank’s 2011 report on the current poverty situation on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip described the Palestinian situation as unique in the world. It noted that the country’s unemployment rates are the highest in the world, mostly due to the lack of opportunities, and concluded that the unemployment rates are closely linked to the occupation.

According to this report, 19% of the population was unemployed in 2011, despite the fact that according to official data, 780,000 people were working in Palestinian territory in the first quarter of 2011, an increase of 130,000 compared to the previous year. This means a decrease in unemployment rates of approximately 21.7%. Young men and women are particularly affected, since in 2009, the unemployment rate among young people was 10% higher than the overall unemployment rate.[1]

Social and environmental issues

The situation with regard to health services is daunting. There are 25 public hospitals across the territories, and the number of inhabitants per bed reaches 1,349. The poor condition of the medical facilities makes it inevitable that a large number of patients must be transferred to neighbouring countries for treatment. This resulted in an additional expense of almost 1,484,200,000 Israeli shekels (USD 403,702,400) in 2010, largely due to the lack of sound planning and proper management. In fact, if the existing resources were properly managed, the ministry would be able to build facilities equipped with state of the art medical technology, which would make such expensive transfers unnecessary.

Regarding water supply and sanitation, the 2007-11 Gaza Strip blockade had dire consequences, particularly the severe damage inflicted on the infrastructure. Almost all sewage and water pumps were out of operation due to lack of electricity and fuel; this caused a great shortage of water and also sewage overflow in urban áreas.[2] The blockade impeded the provision of spare parts, so the facilities were not repaired.

Agriculture accounts for 70% of Palestine’s total usage of water, followed by domestic (27%) and industrial uses. According to a World Bank 2009 report, the residential water supply for the West Bank was estimated at about 50 liters per capita per day.[3] In 2009, 60% of the population of the Gaza Strip lacked access to continuous water supply.[4] In the West Bank, only 13,000 m3 (out of 85,000 m3) of wastewater was treated in 2009, while in the same year the amount was 65,000 m3 (out of 110,000 m3), in the Gaza Strip.[5]

The same year, Amnesty International reported that up to 200,000 Palestinians in rural communities have no access at all to running water, and the Israeli army prevents them from even collecting rain water, while Israeli settlers have irrigated farms and swimming pools. In fact, the 450,000 settlers counted in this report use as much water as the total population of Palestine. In order to cope with water shortages and lack of infrastructure, many Palestinians have to purchase water of dubious quality from mobile water tankers, at very high prices.[6]

In 1993, the World Bank published a report entitled “Developing the Occupied Territories: An investment in Peace,” which described the provision of public services in the occupied territories as highly inadequate, since water, solid waste and wastewater facilities were practically non-existent. Poor waste management contributed to environmental degradation, and the causes go back to the Israeli Administration from 1967 to 1993. Progress in rebuilding  these facilities has been almost nonexistent, despite investments by many international donors, mostly due to the flaws and ambiguities in the Oslo Agreement, especially as it has been interpreted by the Israeli authorities. Escalating violence has further worsened this situation.[7]

When Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, it declared all water resources to be property of the State of Israel, and since then several military orders have minimized water development in Palestine, fixing pumping quotas, prohibiting rehabilitation of wells or drilling new ones without a permit and confiscating or even destroying all Palestinian pumping stations on the Jordan River. Israel, at the same time, increased its exploitation of the water resources of the West Bank, drilling 38 wells. As a result of this, by 1993 Palestinians had access only to 20% of the water of the aquifer system underlying the West Bank. The Oslo Agreement did nothing to improve the situation for Palestine. In fact, it was agreed that “existing quantities of utilization” were to be maintained, so Israel’s exploitation of 80% of the aquifer was formally endorsed.[8]

It is not yet clear what will be the effect of climate change on Palestinian territories, but some experts predict rising average temperatures and decreasing precipitation, which will endanger even more the precarious state of water supply both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[9]

According to a report published by the Research in the Middle East Institute, a number of Palestine and Israeli NGOs believe that “a comprehensive peace process would help in resolving the Israeli violations against the Palestinian environment. The current peace process was not seen as helping the environment.”[10] The environment clearly can’t wait for serious peace talks.

Legislation issues

Palestinian legislation is extremely complex and contradictory. Some laws, for example, date from the time of the Ottoman Empire and British Mandate, and also from Egyptian and Jordanian dominion via Israeli occupation, which included military orders that were not part of the legislation per se but are still in force. Laws adopted after the establishment of the National Authority in 1994 constitute only 12% of the applicable legislation.

The judicial and legislative situation is clearly linked to the political instability of the country. The separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for instance, stopped the debate over 50 proposed laws.

Also, the updated laws did not abolish the old ones, some of which are contrary to the geographical jurisdiction of the Arbitration Act as enforced by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Jerusalem. There is dire need of updated legislation regarding the private sector for example, in order to regulate, promote and strengthen the business environment, as well as with regard to health care.

It could be argued that the occupation is still playing a major role in thwarting effective legislation, weakening its ability to provide a framework for development.

In fact, both the legislative and the judiciary systems suffer from the continuing occupation, but also from the fact that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are split. This is one of the most important obstacles regarding sustainable development, since environmental policies are not available because of the lack of dialogue. Another factor that undermines sustainability is that the institutional weakness makes impossible to measure or improve the effectiveness of funding efforts by donor countries.

Donations, politics and sustainability

Different criteria regarding the allocation and administration of funds from donors are a constant source of conflict. Thus, the projects designated beneficiaries often fail to benefit from the funds from donor countries and enterprises. These conflicts are usually increased by the politicization of the services provided.

It should be noted that donors do seek to ameliorate this situation by promoting accountability and strengthening institutional transparency in Palestine, though the results are now being jeopardized by the increasing politicization of Palestinian society. In fact, many donations have the negative consequence of increasing dependence on this kind of funding, especially regarding donations with political goals such as the fund provided to the activities aiming at normalizing the relations with Israel. This kind of dependency also serves to undermine deep social values such as volunteerism, dignity and altruism. All of this has served to deepen social unrest.

Donors have also sought to enhance the capacity of different institutions in the Palestinian community, which was evident in a situation experienced by both civil society institutions and the Government. The improved technology institutions were able to obtain, such as computers and communications technology was not linked to a change in the working habits of either the employees or the managers of these institutions, especially in light of a politicized environment. The late adoption of merit criteria in employment has not yet been able to improve the efficiency of the public service.

Conclusion and recommendations

It is clear that under the Israeli occupation, sustainable development will be impossible in Palestine. In the immediate term however, In order to mitigate the hardship of the Palestinian population and help reduce political tensions, attention needs to be paid to the following:

  • To step up advocacy concerning the implementation of election laws as well as the adoption of proportional representation in order to increase participation.
  • To increase donor respect for the choices by the Palestinian society and abandon their policy of reinforcing the status quo by tying development assistance to political agendas.
  • To harmonize and align donor policies with national priorities and enhance their contribution to social harmony.
  • To revise existing laws and implement them in a manner that contributes to more inclusive and sustainable development.
  •  To enhance the institutions and Government’s accountability not only for donors but also in front of the public.
  • To pursue a clear distribution of roles and full coordination among development actors.
  • With regard to civil society, moreover, several measures should be undertaken, including:
  • Recognize NGOs as the legitimate voice of civil society institutions and no longer demand that they stay away from political roles.
  • Identify priorities based on needs and capacities assessment.
  • Support initiatives designed to strengthen Palestinian civil society and empower NGOs.
  • Coordinate donor strategies in order to support, empower and develop the civil society.http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/palestine2012_eng.pdf [1] See “Amid Palestinian statehood push, a grim World Bank report,” Christian Science Monitor, (14 September 2011),  <www.csmonitor.com>.[3] Wikipedia, Water supply and sanitation in the Palestinian territories, <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_supply_and_sanitation_in_Palestine>.[5] World Bank, op.cit.[7]  A. Gray, Environmental justice for Palestine, (23 March 2007), <www.countercurrents.org/pa-gray230307.htm>.[9] EMWIS, A war on water, (2009), <www.emwis.org>. http://www.socialwatch.org/node/14014
  • Source:
  • [10] See: < vispo.com/PRIME/enviro.htm>.
  • [8] Ibid.
  • [6] Amnesty International, Israel rations Palestinians to trickle of water, (27 October 2009), <www.amnesty.org>.
  • [4] UN News Centre, Gaza water crisis prompts UN call for immediate opening of crossings, (2009), <www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31927>.
  • [2] World Bank, Gaza Strip Water and Sanitation Situation, (2009,) <web.worldbank.org>.

  Full report

http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/palestine2012_eng.pdf

 

[1] See “Amid Palestinian statehood push, a grim World Bank report,” Christian Science Monitor, (14 September 2011),  <www.csmonitor.com>.

[2] World Bank, Gaza Strip Water and Sanitation Situation, (2009,) <web.worldbank.org>.

[3] Wikipedia, Water supply and sanitation in the Palestinian territories, <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_supply_and_sanitation_in_Palestine>.

[4] UN News Centre, Gaza water crisis prompts UN call for immediate opening of crossings, (2009), <www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31927>.

[5] World Bank, op.cit.

[6] Amnesty International, Israel rations Palestinians to trickle of water, (27 October 2009), <www.amnesty.org>.

[7]  A. Gray, Environmental justice for Palestine, (23 March 2007), <www.countercurrents.org/pa-gray230307.htm>.

[8] Ibid.

[9] EMWIS, A war on water, (2009), <www.emwis.org>.

[10] See: < vispo.com/PRIME/enviro.htm>.

 

Relevant Books on Gaza

Eyes in Gaza by Mads Gilbert

The Punishment of Gaza by Gideon Levy

Gaza-Kitchen-Palestinian-Culinary-Journey by Laila El-Haddad Maggie Schmitt

Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel’s War Against the Palestinians by Noam Chomsky

I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity by Izzeldin Abuelaish 

Gaza Narrates Poetry by Ahmed Miqdad 

A Month by the Sea: Encounters in Gaza Dervla Murphy

Meet Me in Gaza: Uncommon Stories of Life Inside the Stri by Louisa B. Waugh

Gaza Writes Back: Short Stories from Young Writers in Gaza, Palestine, by Refaat Alareer

The Book of Gaza: A City in Short Fiction (Reading the City) by Atef Abu Seif and Abdallah Tayeh

Footnotes in Gaza by Joe Sacco

 

Source:

http://www.socialwatch.org/

http://www.amazon.co.uk/

Posted on: Nov 2013

By Jonathan Cook

There are many things to fear in Gaza: Attacks from Israel’s Apache helicopters and F-16 fighter jets, the coastal enclave’s growing isolation, the regular blackouts from power shortages, increasingly polluted drinking water and rivers of sewage flooding the streets.gaza

Meanwhile, for most Palestinians in Gaza the anxiety-inducing soundtrack to their lives is the constant buzz of the remotely piloted aircraft – better known as “drones” – that hover in the skies above.

Drones are increasingly being used for surveillance and extra-judicial execution in parts of the Middle East, especially by the US, but in nowhere more than Gaza has the drone become a permanent fixture of life. More than 1.7 million Palestinians, confined by Israel to a small territory in one of the most densely populated areas in the world, are subject to near continual surveillance and intermittent death raining down from the sky.

There is little hope of escaping the zenana – an Arabic word referring to a wife’s relentless nagging that Gazans have adopted to describe the drone’s oppressive noise and their feelings about it. According to statistics compiled by human rights groups in Gaza, civilians are the chief casualties of what Israel refers to as “surgical” strikes from drones.

“When you hear the drones, you feel naked and vulnerable,” said Hamdi Shaqura, deputy director of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, based in Gaza City. “The buzz is the sound of death. There is no escape, nowhere is private. It is a reminder that, whatever Israel and the international community assert, the occupation has not ended. We are still living completely under Israeli control. They control the borders and the sea and they decide our fates from their position in the sky,” said Shaqura.

The Israeli military did not respond to Al Jazeera’s requests for comment.

Suffer the children

The sense of permanent exposure, coupled with the fear of being mistakenly targeted, has inflicted deep psychological scars on civilians, especially children, according to experts.

“There is a great sense of insecurity. Nowhere feels safe for the children, and they feel no one can offer them protection, not even their parents,” said Ahmed Tawahina, a psychologist running clinics in Gaza as part of the Community Mental Health Programme. “That traumatises both the children and parents, who feel they are failing in their most basic responsibility.”

Shaqura observed: “From a political perspective, there is a deep paradox. Israel says it needs security, but it demands it at the cost of our constant insecurity.”

There are no statistics that detail the effect of the drones on Palestinians in Gaza. Doctors admit it is impossible to separate the psychological toll inflicted by drones from other sources of damage to mental health, such as air strikes by F-16s, severe restrictions on movement and the economic insecurity caused by Israel’s blockade.

But field researchers working for Palestinian rights groups point out that the use of drones is intimately tied to these other sources of fear and anxiety. Drones fire missiles themselves, they guide attacks by F-16s or helicopters, and they patrol and oversee the borders.

A survey in medical journal The Lancet following Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s month-long attack on Gaza in winter 2008-09, found large percentages of children suffered from symptoms of psychological trauma: Fifty-eight percent permanently feared the dark; 43 percent reported regular nightmares; 37 percent wet the bed and 42 percent had crying attacks.

Tawahina described the sense of being constantly observed as a “form of psychological torture, which exhausts people’s mental and emotional resources. Among children at school, this can be seen in poor concentration and unruly behaviour.” The trauma for children is compounded by the fact that the drones also disrupt what should be their safest activity – watching TV at home. When a drone is operating nearby, it invariably interferes with satellite reception.

“”It doesn’t make headlines, but it is another example of how there is no escape from the drones. Parents want their children indoors, where it feels safer and where they’re less likely to hear the drones, but still the drone finds a way into their home. The children cannot even switch off from the traumas around them by watching TV because of the drones.”

Israel’s ‘major advantage’

Israel developed its first drones in the early 1980s, during its long occupation of south Lebanon, to gather aerial intelligence without exposing Israeli pilots to anti-aircraft missiles. Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University, said drones help in situations where good, on-the-ground intelligence is lacking. “What the UAV gives you is eyes on the other side of the hill or over the border,” he said. “That provides Israel with a major advantage over its enemies.”

Other Israeli analysts have claimed that the use of drones, with their detailed intelligence-collecting abilities, is justified because they reduce the chances of errors and the likelihood of “collateral damage” – civilian deaths – during attacks.

But, according to Inbar, the drone is no better equipped than other aircraft for gathering intelligence or carrying out an execution.

“The advantage from Israel’s point of view is that using a drone for these tasks reduces the risk of endangering a pilot’s life or losing an expensive plane. That is why we are moving towards much greater use of these kinds of robots on the battlefield,” he said.

‘Mistakes can happen’

According to Gaza human rights group al-Mezan, Israel started using drones over the territory from the start of the second intifada in 2000, but only for surveillance.

Israel’s first extra-judicial executions using drones occurred in 2004, when two Palestinians were killed. But these operations greatly expanded after 2006, in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal of settlers and soldiers from Gaza and the rise to power of the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas.

Drones, the front-line weapon in Israel’s surveillance operations and efforts to foil rocket attacks, killed more than 90 Palestinians in each of the years 2006 and 2007, according to al-Mezan. The figures soared during Operation Cast Lead and in its aftermath, with 461 Palestinians killed by drones in 2009. The number peaked again with 199 deaths in 2012, the year when Israel launched the eight-day Operation Pillar of Defence against Gaza.

Despite Israeli claims that the intelligence provided by drones makes it easier to target those Palestinians it has defined as “terrorists”, research shows civilians are the main victims. In the 2012 Pillar of Defence operation, 36 of the 162 Palestinians killed were a result of drone strikes, and a further 100 were injured by drones. Of those 36 killed, two-thirds were civilians.

Also revealing was a finding that, although drones were used in only five percent of air strikes, they accounted for 23 percent of the total deaths during Pillar of Defence. According to theEconomist magazine, the assassination of Hamas leader Ahmed Jabari, which triggered that operation, was carried out using a Hermes 450 drone.

Palestinian fighters report that they have responded to the constant surveillance by living in hiding, rarely going outdoors and avoiding using phones or cars. It is a way of life not possible for most people in Gaza.

Gaza’s armed groups are reported to be trying to find a way to jam the drones’ navigation systems. In the meantime, Hamas has claimed it has shot down three drones, the latest this month, though Israel says all three crashed due to malfunctions.

Last week, on the anniversary of the launch of Pillar of Defence, an Israeli commander whose soldiers control the drones over Gaza from a base south of Tel Aviv told the Haaretz newspaper that “many” air strikes during the operation had involved drones. “Lt Col Shay” was quoted saying: “Ultimately, we are at war. As much as the IDF strives to carry out the most precise surgical strikes, mistakes can happen in the air or on the ground.”

Random death by drone

It is for this reason that drones have become increasingly associated with random death from the sky, said Samir Zaqout, a senior field researcher for Al-Mezan.

“We know from the footage taken by drones that Israel can see what is happening below in the finest detail. And yet women and children keep being killed in drone attacks. Why the continual mistakes? The answer, I think, is that these aren’t mistakes. The message Israel wants to send us is that there is no protection whether you are a civilian or fighter. They want us afraid and to make us turn on the resistance [Palestinian fighters].”

Zaqout also points to a more recent use of drones – what has come to be known as “roof-knocking”. This is when a drone fires small missiles at the roof of a building to warn the inhabitants to evacuate – a practice Israel developed during Operation Cast Lead three years earlier, to allay international concerns about its repeated levellings of buildings with civilians inside.

In Pillar of Defence in 2012, 33 buildings were targeted by roof-knocking.

Israel says it provides 10 minutes’ warning from a roof-knock to an air strike, but, in practice, families find they often have much less time. This, said Zaqout, puts large families in great danger as they usually send their members out in small groups to be sure they will not be attacked as they move onto the streets.

One notorious case occurred during Cast Lead, when six members of the Salha family, all women and children, were killed when their home was shelled moments after a roof-knocking. The father, Fayez Salha, who survived, lost a case for damages in Israel’s Supreme Court last February and was ordered to pay costs after the judges ruled that the attack was legitimate because it occurred as part of a military operation.

A US citizen who has lived long-term in Gaza, who wished not be named for fear of reprisals from Israel, said she often heard the drones at night when the street noise dies down, or as they hover above her while out walking. “The sound is like the buzz of a mosquito, although there is one type of drone that sometimes comes into view that is silent,” she said.

She added that she knew of families that, before moving into a new apartment building, checked to see whether it housed a fighter or a relative of a fighter, for fear that the building may be attacked by Israel.

Shaqura said the drones inevitably affect one’s day-to-day behaviour. He said he was jogging early one morning while a drone hovered overhead.

“I got 100 metres from my front door when I started to feel overwhelmed with fear. I realised that my tracksuit was black, the same colour as many of the fighters’ uniforms. I read in my work too many reports of civilians being killed by drones not to see the danger. So I hurried back home.”

 

Relevant Books on Gaza

Eyes in Gaza by Mads Gilbert

The Punishment of Gaza by Gideon Levy

Gaza-Kitchen-Palestinian-Culinary-Journey by Laila El-Haddad Maggie Schmitt

Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel’s War Against the Palestinians by Noam Chomsky

I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity by Izzeldin Abuelaish 

Gaza Narrates Poetry by Ahmed Miqdad 

A Month by the Sea: Encounters in Gaza Dervla Murphy

Meet Me in Gaza: Uncommon Stories of Life Inside the Stri by Louisa B. Waugh

Gaza Writes Back: Short Stories from Young Writers in Gaza, Palestine, by Refaat Alareer

The Book of Gaza: A City in Short Fiction (Reading the City) by Atef Abu Seif and Abdallah Tayeh

Footnotes in Gaza by Joe Sacco

 

Source:

http://www.aljazeera.com/

http://www.amazon.co.uk/

Posted on: July 14, 2014

By Lisa Hajjar

In view of Israel’s assertions that it has not occupied the Gaza Strip since 2005, Jadaliyya re-posts an analysis of this claim authored by Lisa Hajjar, initially published in 2012.gaza strip

Yes, the Gaza Strip is still occupied. Despiteofficial Israeli remonstrations that the unilateral disengagement of 2005, which removed Israeli military bases and Jewish settlers, transformed Gaza into “no longer occupied territory,” neither those changes nor anything that has transpired since has ended the occupation.

“Occupation” is a legal designation of an international nature. Israel’s occupation of Gaza continues to the present day because (a) Israel continues to exercise “effective control” over this area, (b) the conflict that produced the occupation has not ended, and (c) an occupying state cannot unilaterally (and without international/diplomatic agreement) transform the internationalstatus of occupied territory except, perhaps, if that unilateral action terminates all manner of effective control.

Sui Generis Nonsense

The irony of Israel’s assertion that Gaza is no longer occupied can be best appreciated when one considers Israel’s earlier position that Gaza and the West Bank were not occupied in 1967. Israeli officials claimed that the status of these areas was sui generis because, at the time of conquest, they were controlled by but not sovereign to Egypt and Jordan, respectively. “Occupation,” according to Israel, only pertains to areas that were recognized sovereign territory of the displaced states. Hence the premise, never accepted by the international community, was: no sovereignty, therefore no occupation. Rather, Israel insisted that Gaza and the West Bank were “administered” territory. The other premise of the original “not occupied” position was that Israel could lay claim to all or parts of these lands because they compose the remainder of Eretz Israelto which the Jewish people have historic and/or biblical rights.

The motivation for projecting the notion that the status of the Palestinian territories was sui generis was political: If Israel were to accept the international consensus that it was an “occupant,” it would be constrained from permanently seizing or settling territory acquired by force. Instead, Israeli officials constructed an edifice of ornate legal reasoning to legitimize territorially expansive policies. Of course, Israel had no aspiration to assert permanent control over the Palestinian residents of these putatively sui generis territories, so the people were regarded as occupied.

The concept of sui generis territory may be fitting for some places (like Antarctica). However, it is irrelevant and erroneous in the case of territory that was militarily occupied as a result of armed conflict, as Gaza and the West Bank were. The claim that the occupation of Gaza ended in 2005, and that its status is now sui generis, should be assessed in light of Israel’s earlier attempts to legally license unilateral policies implemented in defiance of international law.

Those who assert the sui generis status of Gaza today willfully ignore the criteria for what anactual end to an occupation requires. Not only does it require an end to the conflict, but also the reestablishment—or in the Palestinian case the establishment—of sovereignty through which the “previously” occupied population can exercise and enjoy the right of self-determination. (The also-and-still-occupied Golan Heights was Syrian territory, so an end to that occupation would entail the restoration of Syrian sovereignty.)

Annexation of occupied territory, while contrary to the international proscription against the acquisition of land by armed force, could be an alternative if that outcome were an internationally recognized means to bring the conflict to an end. It would require that the occupied population be afforded their right of self-determination by becoming citizens of the annexing state.

Occupied Territory under International Humanitarian Law

Territory that was militarily conquered remains occupied until sovereignty supplants foreign control. As long as the Gaza Strip is non-sovereign, it is occupied, and as long as it is occupied its relationship to Israel continues to be governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), which forms part of the laws of war. In addition to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, these laws include the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocols I and II of 1977. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, which governs territories militarily conquered by a foreign government, the civilian population who resides there is legally designated “protected persons.”

The laws of war are lex specialis, that is, “special law.” What is “special” is conflict, and its opposite, the “not special,” is peace. (IHL pertains to the conduct of armed conflict, jus in bello,and is agnostic about the lawfulness of causes that initiate armed conflict, jus ad bellum.)

An occupation, even a prolonged one, is a continuation of conflict, and, therefore, IHL remains in effect until peace has been restored. This point of customary international humanitarian law is explained in unambiguous terms in the Prosecutor v. Tadic decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:

International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached…Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.

Any proposition that there is a sui generis third option—neither sovereign nor occupied but nevertheless in a continuing state of conflict—is a spurious interpretation of law. As Mark Levine and I have written elsewhere,

The designation sui generis literally places the West Bank and Gaza and their populations into a state of exception, outside the reach of IHL and thus open to any and all policies Israel may choose to impose, without fear of violating—at least according to Israel’s interpretations—international human rights and humanitarian norms.

Proclamations that the occupation ended in Gaza in 2005 because Israel removed its fixed military presence and civilian settlements are political arguments. This is equally the case whengovernment lawyers and legal scholars make them. Even if one was to bracket or ignore the legal in favor of the political, there has been no end to Israel’s capacity to exercise “effective control” over Gaza.

Effective Control Criteria

What constitutes measures of effective control in the context of Gaza? In 2007, John Dugard, then UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, explained that the manifestations of Israel’s continuing effective control include: (a) substantial control of Gaza’s six land crossings; (b) control through military incursions, rocket attacks and sonic booms, and the declaration of areas inside the Strip as “no-go” zones where anyone who enters can be shot; (c) complete control of Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters; and (d) control of the Palestinian Population Registry, which has the power and authority to define who is a “Palestinian” and who is a resident of Gaza.

To these must be added Israel’s continuing capacity to invade Gaza, arrest residents, and transport them into Israel. In the wake of Israel’s unilateral disengagement, which included the dissolution of the military court at the Erez base on the edge of Gaza, the Knesset enacted the 2006 Criminal Procedure Law to allow for the prosecution of Gazans in Israeli civil courts, and their imprisonment inside Israel. Moreover, on the very day Israel implemented the completion of its unilateral disengagement plan (12 September 2005), the military issued detention orders for two Gazans under the 2002 Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. That Israeli law (modeled on the military order issued by US President George W. Bush on 13 November 2001) was originally promulgated to provide legal cover for the imprisonment of kidnapped Lebanese nationals who were to be used as “bargaining chips” in exchange for Israeli prisoners of war and the remains of those who had been killed in Lebanon. Since 2005, that law has been used primarily to administratively detain (i.e., imprison without trial) Gazans.

According to Addameer, the Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, as of 1 November 2012, 445 Gazans were imprisoned in Israel. The International Committee of the Red Cross reports a higher figure of 550.

Since 2007, when Dugard offered up his authoritative calculus, much has changed, but none of these changes support the contention that Israel does not exercise effective control over Gaza. Sara Roy, in a recent Boston Globe article, offers examples of how, despite the absence of a military administration, Israel continues to control what happens “on the ground” on a daily basis. She writes:

Israeli-imposed buffer zones—areas of restricted access—now absorb nearly 14 percent of Gaza’s total land and at least 48 percent of total arable land. Similarly, the sea buffer zone covers 85 percent of the maritime area promised to Palestinians in the Oslo Accords, reducing 20 nautical miles to three, where waters are fouled by sewage flows in excess of 23 million gallons daily.

Assaf Kfoury, who traveled into Gaza as part of an academic delegation in October, summarizessome of the well-documented elements of Israel’s ongoing effective control. He writes:

The Gaza Strip is hemmed in from all sides. The Israeli naval blockade prevents all transport of people and goods from the sea. The land border with Israel is tightly sealed. Rafah at the southern edge of the Strip…is the only and hard way in and out, via Egypt, for the vast majority of Palestinians. Israel controls the Erez crossing, strictly monitoring entry of international aid workers, journalists, and a trickle of Palestinians…Over past decades and years, Palestinian industry has been systematically sabotaged in favor of Israeli industry, including industry (or whatever is worthy of the name) in Gaza, whose economy is essentially controlled by Israel. Most alarming is a recent UN report, Gaza in 2020, which suggests that Gaza will no longer be a “livable place” in 2020.

Kfoury also offers some examples of Israel’s effective control that he witnessed firsthand.

Turning one’s back to the misery inland, and looking out to the Mediterranean and its shimmering waters, should normally be a soothing escape, but not in Gaza. Our mornings over breakfast at the hotel were punctuated by gunfire from somewhere off shore. These were not dynamite sticks that kids or poor people detonated underwater to collect large quantities of stunned fish, as I initially thought, but gunfire from Israeli patrol boats warning fishermen to stay inside the three nautical-mile limit. On the morning we left the Strip, we were told that two fishermen who went beyond the limit were killed the day before.

These effective control measures and their adverse humanitarian consequences preceded the 2005 unilateral withdrawal and have continued since. Indeed, they were and remain the stock and trade of Israel’s occupation of Gaza.

Sui Generis Nonsense as a License To Kill

Israel did not formulate the “no longer occupied” position in 2005, or even in the immediately preceding years. Rather, the building blocks of this position began to pile up in the 1990s as a result of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Under the terms of the Oslo Accords, the Israeli military redeployed from Palestinian population centers, the Civil Administration was dissolved although the military courts continued to function on relocated bases in the territories, and a non-sovereign Palestinian Authority (PA) was established.

These political changes prompted Israel to modify its position that the legal status of the West Bank and Gaza was “administered” territory. Officials asserted that areas under the semi-autonomous control of the PA had become differently non-sovereign and, importantly, “foreign.” This became highly significant following the breakdown of negotiations in July 2000 and the start of a second intifada in September whose immediate trigger was Ariel Sharon’s provocative campaign stunt to go with 1,000 armed guards to the Haram al-Sharif.

In response to Palestinian protests, Israel loosened the military’s rules of engagement and quickly began using heavy weapons, including tanks and helicopter gunships. Under international consensus-based interpretations of IHL, massive use of military force by an occupying state against civilians in occupied territories (i.e., protected persons) would be categorically illegal.

Israeli officials justified the use of high-end military force by asserting that policing and riot control tactics were no longer an option because the military was “out” of Palestinian areas, and because Palestinians possessed (small) arms and thus constituted a foreign “armed adversary.” Officials described the second intifada was an “armed conflict short of war,” and asserted Israel’s right of self-defense to attack an “enemy entity,” while denying that those stateless enemies had any right to use force, even in self-defense. Noura Erakat elaborates on these issues here.

In November 2000, two months into the increasingly and reciprocally violent second intifada, Israel became the first state in the world to publicly proclaim a policy of “preemptive targeted killing.” (Israel had engaged in extra-judicial assassinations in the territories since the first intifada,but until then had denied the policy.) Officials formulated a position to assert the legality of preemptive targeted killing on the following bases: (1) Palestinians were to blame for the hostilities, which constituted a war of terror against Israel, (2) the laws of war permit states to kill their enemies, (3) targeted individuals were “ticking bombs” who had to be killed because they could not be arrested and were ostensibly poised to inflict imminent harm, and (4) killing terrorists by means of assassination is a legitimate form of national self-defense. The death of untargeted civilians was termed, in accordance with the discourse of war, “collateral damage.”

In 2001, two petitions were submitted to Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ) to challenge the legality of the targeted killing policy. The Court declined to accept these petitions, arguing that the “choice of means of warfare, used by the [state] to preempt murderous terrorist attacks, is not the kind of issue the Court would see fit to intervene in.” However, the following year the HCJ reconsidered its non-justiciability position and accepted the petition submitted by the Public Committee against Torture in Israel and LAW: The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment.

The HCJ targeted killing ruling, rendered on 15 December 2006 and written by former Chief Justice Aharon Barak, begins with a section on the “factual background” which states: “A massive assault of terrorism was directed against the State of Israel, and against Israelis, merely because they are Israelis.”

Because targeted killings conducted in Gaza and the West Bank were part of the same policy, the litigation made no distinction between them. Neither did the HCJ judgment; rather these locales were referred to as “the area” and “outside the bounds of the state,” thereby evading the question of whether Palestinians are still “occupied” and thus “protected persons.” The “armed conflict” at issue is described as between Israel and “terrorist organizations,” and the decision claims that there has been “a continuous situation of armed conflict…since the first intifada.” The significance of this conflation of Gaza and the West Bank illustrates the flimsiness of the post-2005 proposition that Gaza differs from the West Bank in a purportedly no-longer-occupied sui generis way.

Siege as War by Other Means

Following the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections that Hamas won, a conflict erupted between Hamas and Fatah that left Hamas in control of Gaza and the Fatah-dominated PA relegated to the West Bank. On 19 September 2007, Israel declared that Gaza had become a “hostile territory,” a term that does not appear in any of the treaties that compose IHL. In a statement issued that day by the Ministerial Committee on National Security Issues, Israel stated its intention to continue“military and counter-terrorist operations against the terrorist organizations.”

The same statement announced:

Additional sanctions will be placed on the Hamas regime in order to restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity. Restrictions will also be placed on the movement of people to and from the Gaza Strip. The sanctions will be enacted following a legal examination, while taking into account both the humanitarian aspects relevant to the Gaza Strip and the intention to avoid a humanitarian crisis.

Immediately following that announcement, a group of human rights organizations petitioned the HCJ. They charged that the restriction or limitation of the supply of fuel and electricity to Gaza was illegal behavior by an occupying state because it would constitute collective punishment. Moreover, it would have serious adverse humanitarian consequences including affecting essential services like the functioning of hospitals and the treatment of water and sewage.

The HCJ’s decision put sole onus on Hamas for posing a danger to Israeli security, and dodged the charge of illegal collective punishment by credulously accepting official statements about the fine-grained monitoring of humanitarian needs of “inhabitants” in the Strip. The Court endorsed the state’s decision to limit these resources as part of its fight against terrorism. In doing so, the HCJ relied on the spurious assertion that Gaza is no longer occupied. Like the earlier targeted killing decision, the HCJ concluded that the only relationship Israel now has with Gaza is a belligerent conflict with Hamas. In this decision, the HCJ averred that the state has none of “positive duties” of an occupying state, only “negative duties” of a belligerent not to inflict deliberate humanitarian harm on civilians.

Contrary to claims of humanitarian attentiveness, since 2007 Gaza has suffered a humanitarian crisis of staggering magnitude. Foodstuffs were restricted as a matter of policy, allowing in only so much (calculated in a ratio of gross calories to total population) to avoid massive malnourishment. The siege, enforced through a land-and-sea blockade and the aerial bombing of smuggling tunnels linking the Strip to the Sinai, deprived the population of access to medical supplies, building equipment, and all manner of essential goods.

The humanitarian impact of these deprivations intensified massively as a result of the wreckage and ruination of Operation Cast Lead, the full-scale military assault on Gaza in the winter of 2008-2009. By the summer of 2012, as the siege was entering its sixth year, the UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs reported that forty-four percent of Gazans are food insecure; a severe fuel and electricity shortage results in outages of up to twelve hours a day; and the economy has been so crippled that the GDP per capita is at least seventeen percent lower than in 2005 and the unemployment rate, especially for youth, is higher than ever.

UN human rights experts, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other authoritative sources have condemned the siege as illegal. The crux of these condemnations is the fact thatGaza is still occupied.

Why Does It Matter That Gaza Is Still Occupied?

International law is not a panacea for the harms and ills of conflict. However, international law provides a standard against which empirical realities can be judged and an instrumental means through which consequences for violations can be pursued. For stateless peoples, including those living under occupation, international law is exceptionally important because they have no national law-based alternative to assert, let alone exercise, their right of self-determination. International law provides the point of reference for that and all the other rights they can claim by virtue of being humans.

Palestinians may achieve their rights (or not) through political, diplomatic or military means. But that does not alter the fact that as long as the occupation continues—which it will until there is peace and sovereignty and self-determination—what happens in Gaza and in the West Bank are matters of international law, and therefore of international concern.

If international law did not matter, Israel would not have gone to such lengths to concoct alternative interpretations in order to cover its intentions and policies in the territories from the time they were conquered in 1967 until today. Those concocted interpretations defy international consensus and authoritative interpretations of international law.

I believe that it is important for people to understand that gap between what international law demands or allows and what Israel does and asserts as its right vis-à-vis Palestinians and the territories occupied since 1967. Why? Because understanding international law is a means of showing respect for the humanitarian norms and human rights that were hard fought to establish. Understanding is a step to making international law into an effective standard and instrument for rights and for justice. Absorbing and spreading that understanding is more than some abstract “cause;” it is a project and an invitation to make the law matter to the lives of those who need it most, and to the lives of those who disregard and violate it.

 

Relevant Books on Gaza

Eyes in Gaza by Mads Gilbert

The Punishment of Gaza by Gideon Levy

Gaza-Kitchen-Palestinian-Culinary-Journey by Laila El-Haddad Maggie Schmitt

Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel’s War Against the Palestinians by Noam Chomsky

I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity by Izzeldin Abuelaish 

Gaza Narrates Poetry by Ahmed Miqdad 

A Month by the Sea: Encounters in Gaza Dervla Murphy

Meet Me in Gaza: Uncommon Stories of Life Inside the Stri by Louisa B. Waugh

Gaza Writes Back: Short Stories from Young Writers in Gaza, Palestine, by Refaat Alareer

The Book of Gaza: A City in Short Fiction (Reading the City) by Atef Abu Seif and Abdallah Tayeh

Footnotes in Gaza by Joe Sacco

 

Source:

http://www.jadaliyya.com/

http://www.amazon.co.uk/

 

Posted on: January 2015

Hani Uliwa’s deadpan eyes move slowly across the cement rubble that was once his family’s living room. His movements are stilted. His greying skin wears the battered scars of a troubled life. A deep sigh is released before the 44 year old begins to explain what life has been like living as a refugee in the Gaza Strip. refugee front

Obligated to cut short his education to support his family, Hani’s working life started at 17 years of age, labouring in construction in Israel. But during the second intifada, in 2000, he was forced back to Gaza where the only paid employment he could find was setting himself up as a taxi driver, using his savings to buy a car.

”I used to earn a monthly income of US$ 1,200 when I worked as a labourer, but then earned US$ 200 as a taxi driver. This drastic decrease in income made it very hard for me to make ends meet,” Hani says.

There are many mouths reliant on Hani. In 1990, at age 20, he was married. He now has eight sons and one daughter aged between five and 24.

Muna, Hani’s 40-year-old wife, says that life is very difficult in Gaza, particularly following the demolition of the family home during the recent conflict. “Fortunately, my family managed to survive the heavy bombing in Toufah Area, Gaza City, and took refuge in al-Yarmouk area. First, seven days at my brother-in-law’s home, then at an UNRWA shelter in Beach Camp. Finally, at an UNRWA Collective Centre at Zaitoun Prep Girls School.

“When we arrived at the Collective Centre, we had nothing except for the clothes we were wearing. We received mattresses and blankets, some clothing and other basic supplies.”

In early November 2014, after shelter assessments declared their home destroyed, the family received US$ 1,500 from UNRWA – US$ 1,000 transitional shelter cash assistance and a US$ 500 reintegration package.

“We managed to rent a flat close to our demolished home and we bought a washing machine and kitchen kits to have the minimum requirements for living in the new apartment,” Muna said.

Since the deadly summer conflict broke out in July 2014, the family has remained reliant on UNRWA services to meet their basic needs. This includes utilizing UNRWA food, health, education and social service support – a programme that has spiraled from supporting 80,000 Palestine refugees in Gaza in 2000, to over 867,000 registered beneficiaries since 2014.

With the seven-year Israeli-imposed blockade crippling local industry, the Uliwa family now depend exclusively on the UNRWA food assistance programme for daily food needs. Hani’s modest self-employment as a taxi driver was cut short when his car was destroyed in the summer conflict; however, he has been able to secure employment working as a bus driver for a private school and earns US$ 120 per month. Thousands of others in Gaza are not so lucky.

Prior to the summer hostilities, the unemployment rate in Gaza surged to a record high 44.5 per cent in the second quarter of 2014 according to data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Almost half of all refugees are unemployed (45.5 per cent); the highest level ever reported in the UNRWA PCBS-based records.

Hani wastes little time explaining how precarious day-to-day life has become for his family. “Electricity is a concern for everyone in Gaza. It poses additional challenge to our weary family, I am unable to warm my children in this urgent and hard winter; my children need electricity to study, and it is very hard living conditions without electricity,” he says.

Despite these hardships, Hani’s wife Muna is trying to remain optimistic for the sake of her children. “The only dream I have now is to see my home rebuilt and to move to a normal life again, with a permanent job for my husband,” she says.

 

Relevant Books on Gaza

Eyes in Gaza by Mads Gilbert

The Punishment of Gaza by Gideon Levy

Gaza-Kitchen-Palestinian-Culinary-Journey by Laila El-Haddad Maggie Schmitt

Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel’s War Against the Palestinians by Noam Chomsky

I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity by Izzeldin Abuelaish 

Gaza Narrates Poetry by Ahmed Miqdad 

A Month by the Sea: Encounters in Gaza Dervla Murphy

Meet Me in Gaza: Uncommon Stories of Life Inside the Stri by Louisa B. Waugh

Gaza Writes Back: Short Stories from Young Writers in Gaza, Palestine, by Refaat Alareer

The Book of Gaza: A City in Short Fiction (Reading the City) by Atef Abu Seif and Abdallah Tayeh

Footnotes in Gaza by Joe Sacco

 

Source:

http://www.unrwa.org/

http://www.amazon.co.uk/

Posted on: January 20, 2015

By Dan Cohen

“We are all under unbelievable amounts of psychological pressure. If anyone breaks down and goes crazy in the street, no one will blame them,” Belal El-Shafi, 24, from Nuseirat refugee camp told me. Married with one child, El-Shafi works as a dishwasher in the Lightroom restaurant in Gaza City though he has advanced training as a nurse. gaza stripHe earns a meager living that affords a single room and food for his family. “I want to leave Gaza but I would go with my own dignity,” El-Shafi remarked. “We’re not living — this is not a life.”

As a foreign journalist, the process of exiting the Gaza Strip is a jarring one — not for the difficulty, but for the ease. Palestinian friends and colleagues of mine who live in Gaza are unable to leave the bombed-out ghetto — they are effectively sentenced to live and die in Israel’s open-air-prison. In stark contrast, I seamlessly pass from the dense, rubble-covered cityscape of the Gaza Strip to unobstructed views of abundance in southern Israel — where many of my friends’ relatives were expelled from several decades ago.

Since the conclusion of the summer’s devastating war in Gaza, the pressure on residents to leave the rubble-covered ghetto has become unbearable. Between the slash-and-burn Israeli assaults — another of which appears to be inevitable — and the Israeli-Egyptian siege that suffocates the economy and severely restricts the entry of basic necessities, there is little hope among the 1.8 million Palestinians living inside Gaza.

Most of those who wish to escape the Gaza Strip will run up against the iron wall of Israel’s siege. The Middle East’s most well-armed navy maintains a blockade on Gaza’s Mediterranean coast and the southern border is controlled by Egypt, which destroys the once-thriving tunnel economy that sustained life in Gaza. The northern and eastern borders are controlled by a system of concrete walls and fences that are lined with intermittent pillboxes mounted with remote control machine guns, surveilled by high-tech cameras and patrolled by trigger-happy soldiers.

“If I walk to close to the border, Israeli soldiers will shoot me,” 18-year-old Ezzeldeen Awad Obaid said with a nervous laugh.

Indeed, Israel carries out what it has euphemistically termed a “distancing procedure,” in which soldiers open fire on any Palestinian who walks within 300 meters of the fence. In practice, soldiers have frequently shot at Palestinians beyond that distance.

Against this severe reality, the desire to look elsewhere for a better future is ubiquitous, especially among young people. Some are torn between the desire for a decent livelihood and the urge to stay in Gaza as an act of resistance.

I met 18-year-old Yusef Abu Kader in a lot in Gaza City where he was collecting scrap metal that earned him a few dollars each day. “I’d leave Gaza in the morning,” he told me without blinking.

I asked Abu Kader why he thinks Israel creates unbearable conditions that compel him to think about life abroad, however, he instinctively replied, “I will never leave Gaza. I’ll never give it to the Israelis. This our land. This is our home.”

In greater numbers than ever, Palestinians are risking their lives to flee the Gaza Strip through tunnels — sometimes with deadly outcomes. Hundreds of migrants drowned when rival smugglers attacked their boat this summer. The authorities of Egypt’s junta have imprisoned hundreds of others before deportation back to the Gaza Strip.

In an email, the Israeli historian and professor with the College of Social Sciences and International Studies at the University of Exeter Ilan Pappe explained how these methods have been deployed for decades to advance Israel’s colonization of Palestine:

“In many ways the Israeli brutality in Gaza is a unique case in the overall Israeli strategy since 1948, but only in its duration and intensity — not in the method,” Pappe said. “A softer version of decreasing numbers of Palestinians in areas coveted by Israel is by strangulation – not with the same means employed in Gaza but through belts of colonization, or as it is called in Israel – Judaization – have led to immigration of Palestinians from the Galilee and parts of the West Bank.”

The strangulation effect is felt by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip across the socioeconomic spectrum.

“The huge scale of destruction and killing has made life intolerable for a lot of people here. Anyone who has the chance to leave will understandably take it,” Mohammed Suliman, a former researcher at the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights from Gaza City, explained. “If you are fortunate enough [to leave Gaza], people look at you with envy because you are a lucky person — a survivor.”

Suliman, 25, earned a full-ride scholarship to pursue a Ph.D. in Sociology at the University of South Australia beginning in the 2015 spring semester. Yet he will miss at least part of the semester due to a seemingly insurmountable myriad of travel restrictions imposed on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

After having earned a scholarship — no small feat in itself — Suliman must obtain a visa from the Australian embassy in Tel Aviv because there is no embassy in Gaza nor is there an embassy capable of providing a visa in the West Bank. In order to do that, he must mail hard copies of his transcripts to Australia. But there is no post office in Gaza. So his transcripts must be mailed from an office in Gaza to the West Bank and then to Israel, where they will finally be sent to Australia.

In order for Suliman’s wife, Leila Najjar, 24, to obtain an Australian residency visa, the couple must prove that she has health insurance. But even after Suliman and Najjar managed to raise funds from abroad for insurance, the donors refused to send the money to Gaza because of the risk of being prosecuted for ties to terrorist organizations.

“After I get my visa, the real problem starts: How to leave Gaza.” Suliman explained. “I am allowed to leave, but how can I practically?”

The only exits from Gaza are through Egyptian-controlled southern Rafah crossing or through the Israeli-controlled Erez crossing, both of which require lengthy application processes to travel through.

After General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi seized power in Egypt through a coup and a sham election, his regime embraced a policy of collective punishment to Gaza, strangling the coastal enclave from the south in hopes of toppling a government it viewed as the Palestinian cut-out of the Muslim Brotherhood. “They punish the people for the supposed mistakes of their government. I am someone who is paying the price for mistakes of political actors,” Suliman said.

With the Rafah border closed except for rare instances, Suliman has no viable means of leaving Gaza. “I just have to wait and pray that it opens,” he remarked. If the crossing does open — typically this happens for a few hours a day — he must have the right connection because of the sheer number of people.

“There are tens of thousands who want to travel — I’m not the only one,” Suliman explained. Without a connection, he must book a day to travel two months in advance, which almost guarantees he misses part of the academic semester in Australia.

The other alternative for Suliman and Najjar is to travel through the Erez crossing in the north. Not allowed to travel from Israel’s Ben-Gurion International Airport, they would have to pass through Israel, the West Bank, to Jordan and finally to Australia. To cross Erez, Suliman has to apply to the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Gaza or a human rights organization.

They told me, ‘You can’t just apply. What’s your reason to come through Israeli land?’”

If Suliman receives a positive response from Israel — assuming there is no hold-up with Israeli intelligence and security — he then must apply for a travel permit from Jordan. Barring some small miracle, he is certain he will miss at least part of the semester.

“I can’t complain because this is all I know,” Suliman said with a look of resignation. “I just accept it and deal with it, you know?”

For the few lucky enough to leave Gaza, returning home after building a life abroad is an unknown. “I thought there would be no way for me to live away from Gaza forever but I don’t really know what’s going to happen,” Suliman said.

Stories like Suliman’s remind me the ordeals of countless Latin-Americans I met in the United States who migrated because of economic conditions with the intention of returning, yet after setting roots, never did. As an observer, I can’t help but wonder if those who say they would return to Gaza might have different feelings down the road.

As arduous as his trip to Australia promises to be, Suliman is among the lucky ones. Though Gaza’s population is among the most educated in the world, residents with advanced degrees in the arts and sciences are increasingly taking up menial jobs as waiters and taxi drivers. Since this summer’s war, the unemployment rate has shot above 55%.

Khalil Hijazi, 24, studied physical therapy in Al-Azha University and completed a year-long internship in a hospital. After his internship ended, he received unemployment payment through the United Nations Relief Agency for Palestinians in the Near East (UNRWA) for three months.

During Israel’s war on Gaza this summer, Hijazi volunteered at al-Shifa hospital for 30 days. After the war, he found it impossible to obtain work, even as a volunteer. He was thus forced to accept the humiliation of taking money from his parents to survive. Eventually, he took a job as a taxi driver.

Leaving Gaza remains a distant dream for Hijazi, who has never traveled outside. He is eager to get a master’s in physical therapy in Egypt, then travel to Europe to make a living. But under the current conditions of siege and regular wars, his ambitions are obstructed.

Despite the unprecedented devastation of the summer war on Gaza, there are those who remain determined to stay in Gaza no matter the cost. “More people are deciding to leave for good because of this hell we’re in,” said 20-year-old Shaima Ziara. “But you’ll find people who tell you ‘no, this is our country.’ We’re staying here because it’s our job to fight for it.”

A senior at the Islamic University of Gaza, Ziara studies English Literature, a pursuit that she views as a form of resistance against Israel’s colonial project.

“Communicating to the world is one of the most important forms of resistance,” she said. “During the last war, we saw the world’s reaction to the assault on Gaza. There were huge demonstrations around the world. This is something we did not see in the wars of 2012 and 2008/2009.”

Ziara credits international displays of solidarity with Gaza to the embrace of social media platforms by Palestinians who have survived successive Israeli assaults and were able to provide a shocking portrayal of reality there. “We can give them another source of information other than the mainstream media that manipulates and twists the truth,” she said. “We want to enable ourselves to defend it by any means possible — by education, improving our mentality and our abilities to communicate to the world our story.”

Last month, a group of Palestinian children orphaned during the war on Gaza received permits to visit Israel, only to be stymied at the last minute by Gazan authorities at the Erez border crossing. The visit was hyped by Israeli government linked publicists as a humanitarian gesture towards the suffering population of Gaza. Yet as the Electronic Intifada’s Ali Abunimah revealed, the children were being exploited as tools in a stunningly cynical government propaganda stunt that was deployed “to show a positive face of Israel” and “to gain points in the hostile world opinion.” With little understanding of the scheme that they had been corralled into, their children returned to parentless homes with their trauma compounded.

Relevant Books on Gaza

Eyes in Gaza by Mads Gilbert

The Punishment of Gaza by Gideon Levy

Gaza-Kitchen-Palestinian-Culinary-Journey by Laila El-Haddad Maggie Schmitt

Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel’s War Against the Palestinians by Noam Chomsky

I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity by Izzeldin Abuelaish 

Gaza Narrates Poetry by Ahmed Miqdad 

A Month by the Sea: Encounters in Gaza Dervla Murphy

Meet Me in Gaza: Uncommon Stories of Life Inside the Stri by Louisa B. Waugh

Gaza Writes Back: Short Stories from Young Writers in Gaza, Palestine, by Refaat Alareer

The Book of Gaza: A City in Short Fiction (Reading the City) by Atef Abu Seif and Abdallah Tayeh

Footnotes in Gaza by Joe Sacco

 

Source:

http://mondoweiss.net

http://www.amazon.co.uk/

Posted on: February 15, 2015

By William Booth

Khan Younus: In almost every way, the Gaza Strip is much worse off now than before last summer’s war between the Israeli regime and Hamas. Scenes of misery are one of the few things in abundance in the battered coastal enclave.destroyed villages

Reconstruction of the tens of thousands of homes damaged or destroyed in the hostilities has barely begun, almost six months after the ceasefire. At current rates, it will take decades to rebuild what was destroyed.

The economy is in deep recession; pledges of billions in aid have not been honoured; and Hamas, which controls the enclave, refuses to loosen its grip.

Diplomats, aid workers and residents warn of a looming humanitarian crisis and escalation of violence.

“After every war, we say it cannot get worse, but I will say this time is the worst ever,” said Omar Sha’aban, a respected Gaza economist. “There is no sign of life. Trade. Import. Export. Reconstruction. Aid? Dead. I’m not exaggerating when I tell my friends abroad: Gaza could collapse, maybe soon.”

At night, Gaza twinkles with thousands of campfires. Electricity is often available only six hours a day.

About 10,000 Gaza residents are still sleeping on the floors of UN-run schools. Many more are living in caravans or tents, or huddling in their bombed-out apartments. All told, 100,000 people remain displaced.

He went blue,” said Moeen Khassi, the grandfather of a 5-month-old who died in his sleep in freezing temperatures in a gutted home near the former front lines. The family blamed the cold.

The 50-day Israeli war on Gaza left more than 2,100 Palestinians dead, almost 70 per cent of them civilians, according to the United Nations. Seventy-two Israelis were killed, most of them soldiers.

Cash assistance from the United Nations to displaced refugee families has stopped. The programme ran out of money last month.

With great fanfare, donors promised in October at a conference in Cairo to give $5.4 billion to the Palestinians, much of it for reconstruction. But virtually none of the pledges have been honoured, according to UN officials in Gaza.

East of the crowded Gaza city of Khan Younus, Adnan Abu Daqqa and his extended family live in tents left over from a previous war. He can’t remember which one. “You never throw anything away in Gaza,” said the 57-year-old farmer.

During the summer war, he said, Israeli tanks left trails across his farm. The family’s home is in ruins, levelled by Israeli explosives, he said. “We had animals, rabbits, goats, a horse.”

He held up a bridle. Where is the horse? He pointed to the sky.

He and the relatives he lives with, including six grown sons and their families, got $2,000 in war reparations from Hamas. His wife cooks food on an open fire. The children play in the rubble.

The Israeli regime has maintained a partial trade and travel blockade against Gaza since Hamas took over in 2007. These days, in a deal struck by the Israeli regime, the Palestinian National Authority and the United Nations after last summer’s war, families and their dwellings are assessed for damage by the United Nations, lists are provided to the Israeli military for clearance, and truckloads of steel bars and cement are allowed into Gaza.

In December, the most recent month for which figures are available, 2,259 truckloads of building materials entered Gaza. The United Nations estimates that to cover housing reconstruction and repair within three years, it would take 735 truckloads per day, seven days a week.

The Israeli regime restricts and monitors imports into Gaza.

“All this does is prevent civilians in Gaza from rebuilding,” said Sari Bashi, director of the Israeli human rights group Gisha. “The restrictions will have minimal to zero impact on Hamas tunnelling. They can rebuild using recycled materials.”

Gaza factories were hit especially hard during the war. One of the largest private employers in Gaza is the Alwada ice cream, potato chip and cookie factory. Its top two floors were gutted, damaged by Israeli shelling.

“We haven’t gotten a penny from the UN, NGOs, the Palestinian [National] Authority or Hamas,” said Alwada’s executive manager, Manil Hassan.

Company officials estimated the damage at $24 million. They tried to sue in Israeli courts but were denied jurisdiction. Hassan said the company could rebuild, if the Israeli regime would allow spare parts and a couple of Italian and Danish technicians to visit.

“We need them to show us how to fix their stuff,” Manil said, referring to the factory’s foreign-made equipment.

The factory has restarted two assembly lines to make cookies but is operating at a third of its capacity.

“Ice cream will have to wait,” Manil said.

Palestinians in Gaza say they are trapped more than ever in what they call an open-air prison. The Israeli regime restricts exits, allowing medical patients, business traders and some special humanitarian cases to cross.

For Gazans, the main portal to the greater world is the Rafah crossing into Egypt, which has been mostly closed since last summer’s war.

Mohammad Abu Anza, 19, was trying last month to get to the Cairo airport. He was awarded a scholarship to study engineering at a university in Algeria.

At the end of January, the crossing was open for three days. Desperate travellers pressed onto the buses to make it to the Egyptian side. On the third day, Anza won a seat on the 10th bus in line to leave. The Egyptians only allowed seven buses that day. Anza said he would try again, but then he turned away, because it looked as if he wanted to cry.

 

Relevant Books on Gaza

Eyes in Gaza by Mads Gilbert

The Punishment of Gaza by Gideon Levy

Gaza-Kitchen-Palestinian-Culinary-Journey by Laila El-Haddad Maggie Schmitt

Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel’s War Against the Palestinians by Noam Chomsky

I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity by Izzeldin Abuelaish 

Gaza Narrates Poetry by Ahmed Miqdad 

A Month by the Sea: Encounters in Gaza Dervla Murphy

Meet Me in Gaza: Uncommon Stories of Life Inside the Stri by Louisa B. Waugh

Gaza Writes Back: Short Stories from Young Writers in Gaza, Palestine, by Refaat Alareer

The Book of Gaza: A City in Short Fiction (Reading the City) by Atef Abu Seif and Abdallah Tayeh

Footnotes in Gaza by Joe Sacco

 

Source:

http://gulfnews.com

http://www.amazon.co.uk/

Posted on: June 2007

By The United Nations – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) occupied Palestinian territory.apartheid wall

This report examines the humanitarian, social and economic consequences of the Barrier on East Jerusalem. The construction of the Barrier, in conjunction with other restrictions, has meant that Palestinians living in the West Bank can no longer travel freely into East Jerusalem, the city that has been the religious, social and economic centre of their lives for centuries.

A 168 km long, concrete and wire section of the Barrier separates East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. The Government of Israel (GOI) states that the purpose of this barrier is to protect Israeli citizens from terrorist attacks, mostly in the form of suicide bombings.

In 1967, the GOI annexed East Jerusalem and 64 square kilometres of surrounding West Bank land, unilaterally defining this area as the expanded Jerusalem municipality. Almost immediately, the GOI began building settlements in this area, despite these actions being illegal under international law1. While the Barrier provides physical security for Israel, it also encircles these settlements, connecting them to Israel, and ensuring that Israeli settlers have free, unimpeded access to Jerusalem. At the same time, the Barrier weaves around and between East Jerusalem and West Bank towns and villages. In some cases it cuts through Palestinian communities, dividing neighbourhoods from each other. In other cases, villages that were once closely connected to Jerusalem now lie on the West Bank side of the Barrier, physically separated from the city.

The report’s findings demonstrate how the Barrier has significantly affected Palestinian life:

• Palestinians from the West Bank require permits to visit the six specialist hospitals inside Jerusalem. The time and difficulty this entails has resulted in an up to 50% drop in the number of patients visiting these hospitals.

• Entire families have been divided by the Barrier. Husbands and wives are separated from each other, their children and other relatives.

• Palestinian Muslims and Christians can no longer freely visit religious sites in Jerusalem. Permits are needed and are increasingly difficult to obtain.

• School and university students struggle each day through checkpoints to reach institutions that are located on the other side of the Barrier.

• Entire communities, such as the 15,000 people in the villages of the Bir Nabala enclave, are totally surrounded by the Barrier. Movement in and out is through a tunnel to Ramallah which passes under a motorway restricted for Israeli vehicles only.

To read the full report click here

Source:

http://www.ochaopt.org

 

 

 

Posted on: 02/03/2014

The Electronic Intifada’s contributor Patrick O. Strickland and New York-based graphic designerRachele Lee Richards have produced this powerful infographic that highlights the systematic violence against Palestinian children.

More than 1,400 children killed by Israeli soldiers, settlers since 2000.

More than 1,400 children killed by Israeli soldiers, settlers since 2000.

Strickland contributed the following text to accompany the infographic.

Systematic violations

The photograph, taken by Dylan Collins, showssix-year-old Mousab Sarahnin, who lost his eye when an Israeli soldier shot him in the face with a steel-coated rubber bullet on 27 September 2013. According to witnesses and Defence for Children International – Palestine Section (DCI-PS), Mousab was walking with his family in Fuwwar refugee camp when he was shot — and was nowhere near demonstrations or clashes.

The statistics regarding Palestinian children in our infographic are taken from DCI-PS. The other statistics are derived from a July 2013 report published by the Israeli human rights group Yesh Din: they paint a picture of total impunity for Israeli soldiers and settlers who harass and attack Palestinian children on a daily basis.

Not visible on the infographic is the alarming fact that 19 of the twenty cases in which Israeli soldiers used Palestinian children as human shields took place after Israel’s own high court ruled that it was illegal. Nonetheless, there are no documented cases of soldiers being reprimanded with jail time for this action.

“Show the world what the army does to children”

Due to size constraints, other gross violations against children are absent, such as instances of children killed by Israeli drones or the number of those threatened with sexual abuse by police officers and soldiers.

In Israel’s own education system, on the other hand, textbooks depict Palestinians as “refugees, primitive farmers and terrorists,” as reported in The Guardian in 2011. The same textbooks attempted to morally justify the killing of Palestinians as necessary for Israel’s establishment.

Furthermore, nearly half of Jewish Israeli high school students aged 16 and 17 stated that they would refuse to have an Arab teacher, according to an August 2013 poll published in the Israeli daily Haaretz.

While Israel’s political establishment continually attempts to demonize Palestinian children, the sad fact is that it tries to hide its own cultivation of hate in the education system. At the same time, the Israeli army is engaged in an ongoing process of dehumanizing and brutalizing Palestinian children.

As Sheikh Jibreen Saharnin, six-year-old Mousab’s uncle, told The Electronic Intifada in October, “Take photos. Send it everywhere in the world. Show the world what the Israeli army does to children.”

Source:

http://electronicintifada.net

Posted August 3, 2012 in www.electronicintifada.com

JERUSALEM (IRIN) At a glance, the latest data on food security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip — released by the Food and malnutritionAgriculture Organization, the World Food Programme and the UN agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) in July — seems to warrant optimism.

The year 2011 was the second straight year in which the number of those living in food insecurity declined in the West Bank and Gaza. In the Gaza Strip, the percentage dropped from 60 in 2009 to 44 in 2011; in the West Bank, food insecurity rates have decreased 5 percent in the same two-year period to 17 percent.

But, as UNRWA itself admits, a deeper look into the numbers is less encouraging.

In the West Bank, Palestinians who live in refugee camps have actually experienced a rise in food insecurity — from 25 percent in 2009 to 29 percent in 2011. One quarter of Palestinian households in Israeli-controlled Area C are food insecure — 8 percent more than the West Bank average. Herders’ families in Area C (which covers more than 60 percent of the West Bank) are in a precarious situation, with 34 percent suffering from food insecurity.

And while food insecurity stands at just under 30 percent in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip combined, the World Health Organization reported in May 2012 that 50 percent of infants and children under two in the West Bank and Gaza have iron deficiency anemia. According to the same WHO report, malnutrition and stunting in children under five “is not improving” and could actually be “deteriorating” (“Health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory”

Dramatic changes

The second intifada saw dramatic changes in Palestinians’ eating habits. Israeli-imposed movement restrictions on both people and goods strangled the economy; Palestinians’ inability to access farmland due to Israeli prohibitions and the construction of Israel’s wall in the West Bank led to reduced agricultural output. Under these pressures, Palestinians increasingly came to rely on cereals, pulses, potatoes, vegetable oil and sugar rather than more costly and more nutritious foods like protein-rich fish and meat, fresh fruits and vegetables.

In 2003, at the height of the second intifada, the Food and Agriculture Organization reported that meals in the West Bank and Gaza Strip often consisted of just tea and bread. Despite these dire circumstances, the FAO did not recommend increased food aid. Instead, the organization stated that the most pressing issue, economic access — or the ability to buy food — must be addressed. In the short term, that meant job creation; in the long term, it meant investment in agriculture.

Yet, almost a decade later, critics say that most aid organizations remain focused on temporary, short-term solutions rather than the underlying problems.

Decline in agriculture

Haneen Ghazawneh, a researcher at the Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) in Ramallah, said international aid was still “going [more] to emergency assistance and food aid and less to development projects,” contributing to “the decline in agriculture.”

Ghazawneh also takes issue with the latest food security data.

“When we talk about economic access [to food] that means having permanent jobs,” she explained. “My worry about these recent reports is that they exclude East Jerusalem, [where] people have very limited [work opportunities].”

She also said the apparent gains in parts of the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority is nominally in control of many affairs, may be illusory.

In the West Bank, many of those who are food secure are on the PA payroll, said Ghazawneh. But much of the PA’s funding comes from foreign aid, leaving employees vulnerable to changes in the political climate and the global economy — as was the case in July, when the PA could pay only half of employees’ salaries.

“We’re talking about the workers who are the most secure, who have permanent jobs, and they are uncertain,” she said. “The situation is not sustainable at all.”

As many Palestinians have increasingly embraced a culture of consumption and debt, some have bought houses and cars they cannot afford. If salaries suddenly stop coming and people fall behind on their loan payments, the banks could have problems. And this, perhaps, could fuel a larger financial crisis that would have an impact on food security.

 

Source:

http://electronicintifada.net

Posted  in July 31, 2014.

By Hashem Said

Beyond the immediate loss in Gaza — destruction of property, infrastructure, and the deaths of more than 1,600 people, mostlypalestinian minor civilians — Israel’s onslaught will have long-term mental and physical effects on the Palestinian children who survived weeks of airstrikes and naval and tank shelling.

Many of them watched as family members were killed and homes, schools and mosques bombarded. Others suffered life-altering injuries. Israel’s military campaign may also affect the unborn, as mothers and fathers struggle with traumatic stress, health experts warn.

Psychological impact

Even before the current military offensive, young Gazans bore the mental scars of years under siege and previous episodes of bombardment. After the 2012 war, the rate of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among children in Gaza doubled, according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which provides assistance for Palestinian refugees. Mental health experts fear that the latest bombardment may create detrimental repercussions too difficult for children to overcome.

Dr. Jesse Ghannam, clinical professor of psychiatry and global health sciences at the University of California at San Francisco School of Medicine

Palestinian children in Gaza are exposed to more violence in their lifetime than any other people, any other children, anywhere in the world. If you look at children right now who are 10 years old, they’ve been through Cast Lead in 2008 and 2009, the invasion in 2012 and now the invasion and destruction in 2014, in addition to the siege. If you look at the statistics, for example, even before Cast Lead, 80 percent of Palestinian children in Gaza have witnessed some sort of violence against them, a friend or a family member. And now you’re getting to the point where probably close to 99 percent of children in Gaza are being exposed to a level of violence where they have seen family members be killed, murdered, burned alive. There’s nothing like the levels of traumatic exposure that any child in the world has ever been exposed to on a chronic and daily basis.

We can rebuild a broken bone, but when it comes to rebuilding someone’s psychological integrity, this is something that the people in the West and the Israelis don’t understand. They’re creating psychological damage for these kids that will be with them for the rest of their lives.

The psychological damage makes it difficult to function, to be successful in school, to have relationships with friends and family, to take care of yourself and at a more profound and deeper level — when we’re talking about creating a solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the West wanting peace between the Israelis and Palestinians — they aren’t growing up interested in peace and wanting to make things better. They just grow up deeply traumatized and very distraught and angry.

Brad Parker, international advocacy officer and attorney, Defence for Children International, Palestine

Children in Gaza are traumatized. They’re suffering trauma from killing that they witnessed, maiming that maybe they themselves suffered, the injuries that they see around them. They’re traumatized by loss of their family members, by the fact that their homes have been destroyed, that they’re displaced and living in a shelter with a bunch of strangers.

With conflicts and displacements, there tends to be an increase in instances of child abuse and violence and things that make children even more vulnerable to abuse and other violations of their rights. The bombing is one thing, but it leads to a variety of other challenges for child protection.

Dr. Jennifer Leaning, director, FXB Center for Health and Human Rights at Harvard University

You’ve got a situation where grandparents, parents and uncles are already very stressed, and that would show in a number of ways: depression; certain clampdowns of emotions; and a tendency to get very upset at small incidents.

All of this really has an impact on kids growing up. They’re realizing that their entire structure for safety and protection is not doing very well.

I would say that in all studies of disaster and in war crisis, the fundamental feature that protects the children from serious psychological stress is their certainty and their confidence that their parents or grandparents will be able to protect them and hold them. If they can get the sense that the parent is OK, then they will be able in the long-term. In the short term they may be upset, but in the long term they will be OK.

You have now complete disruption of the very structures for psychological stability of the parents, and grandparents are also suffering greatly.

It will be important for — as soon as possible — stability to be restored and the parents to get it together for themselves to create a sense of confidence in themselves for their children. But I think the odds of that are not high for two reasons: One is there’s going to be ongoing violence and lingering uncertainty for some time in Gaza, even if there is hopefully a cease-fire that can be arranged. The worry will continue on the part of the adults and the children will remain terrified and unable to relax, literally and figuratively, in the arms of their family.

And then secondly, the parents and grandparents and others themselves, are in no psychological position to be able to convey that umbrella of hope and safety for the children. The resilience of the Palestinian population in general is not going to be as deep or robust as any of us want it to be and certainly as they would want it to be, just because this have been extraordinary series of acute stress on top of chronic stress.

Dr. Jumana Odeh, director, Palestinian Happy Child Centre

It’s tough for our children here in the West Bank too. For example, if a child with autism comes with his parents to be treated, they have to deal with several checkpoints first. It’s not easy to get around, and lately it has become more complicated. So this affects them and their parents.

I also noticed lately that some kids — say, one with Down syndrome — are afraid to move because they fear being burned alive like Mohamed Abu Khdeir. So everybody knows that seeing traumatic, bloody or sad events — even through television — can traumatize children. They watch it on TV, they see it going from one place to another crossing checkpoints, and they hear it from their parents, from their grandparents. If we talk about PTSD, here it is a continuous PTSD, and this is the most dangerous and the most painful, because we don’t know how this will affect the future generations. It is difficult to think of the future when children are under fire, especially in Gaza. There’s no place to run, no place to hide.

 Physical impact

For more than 7,300 people, including many children, recovering from injuries will be challenging, as the siege on Gaza also affects medical facilities. Leaning warns that many of the injured won’t survive, adding to the 300-plus children killed, or will be left with chronic complications.

Leaning: The hospitals there are valiantly overwhelmed and short of supplies, and in those situations they inevitably have to perform triage. They can operate only on people whose injuries are within the skill set of the doctors and the capacity operating rooms have and nurses to treat.

There are people who are coming into these hospitals with traumatic wounds from the bombings and machine-gun fire, who in a well-equipped and highly skilled or emergency area in the West would survive. But in these hospitals, they won’t survive because there’s just not the capacity to care for these extremely extensive wounds. There are more people dying of wounds in Palestine now than there would be if they had a stable and fully equipped trauma center.

The wounded range from being rather minor to chronic. And the Gaza Strip at the moment does not have the capacity to handle chronic wounds. You can’t keep people in the hospital for long because it’s overrun by new injuries. Nursing care is very short.

A number of these people who are wounded are going to have difficulty surviving over the longer run. They may have left with wounds to be cared for at home, but taking care of those injuries is a skill situation. Another point is that people need to be in one place to heal. They are running from places. That’s very difficult, and there are very few safe havens for people where they could rest for a week and have their bones knit or their abdominal wounds begin to close or their head injuries not reopen. I worry that there is going to be a significant number of people with longer-term disabilities because they have not been treated adequately or taken care of enough in the immediate term.

The number of dead and the number of wounded convey a false impression that the wounded are going to be OK.

Ghannam: Palestinian children in Gaza are on what the Israeli military leadership has called a starvation diet. You have almost 80 percent of Palestinian children living on less than $1 a day. They’re at levels of what we would call poverty and extreme poverty, with extensive food insecurity. That’s just another way of saying that most Palestinian children in Gaza go to bed hungry every day, so their caloric intake has been significantly reduced since the siege began within the last seven years. In addition to the reduced number of calories they take in, the kind of nutrients they’re getting is also decreased, so what we see is this medical phenomenon called stunting, which results in lower birth weights for Palestinian children. Their average birth weight is going down. Their height and weight are below what you would consider basic international norm values for children that age.

People pay attention to Gaza only when bombs are dropping on their heads, but when I was there in December, I was devastated to see the kind of food insecurity, the lack of nutrition, the kind of starvation that Palestinian children have to suffer on a daily basis. And this is an Israeli policy. The policy is to let in only so much food. Not enough to kill people, but it’s a slow death. You see it in Palestinian children.

 Impact on the unborn

In addition to Gaza’s children who are experiencing the war, even children who are not born yet may suffer. Radioactive materials in Israeli bombs may cause birth defects and abnormalities for years to come, according to researchers who studied Israel’s previous military campaigns in Gaza.

Paola Manduca, professor of genetics, University of Genoa, Italy

In Gaza we learned that among the population with children born with birth defects, if you compare them with those who are born normal, regardless of other factors, in the ones with birth defects the mothers reported exposure to white phosphorus, white phosphorus and bombing or bombing in Cast Lead in 67 percent of the cases.

One very important thing we learned from a study conducted two years after Cast Lead was that children born two years after the operation — therefore the mothers in the next year or so before becoming pregnant were not directly exposed to ammunition — still were constant correlation. That can be because the mothers were continuously exposed to a toxicant, which is compatible with the fact that the mothers have been staying in the same place as when Cast Lead occurred. Most of the people have fixed their houses or cleaned the mat from the rubble and used the materials to rebuild them.

There’s not much space in Gaza to go and build somewhere else. So if contaminants were in the ground, the contaminants would have stayed there. Of course, contaminants that may have been there will stay in the environment and in the body of the people who got contaminated, which persist in the organisms and stay in the organisms.

We already studied and knew that toxicants and teratogens — that is, substances that can cause reproduction malformation — were present in the land and in the weaponry used in Gaza. These metals were at one point in people who were wounded by different kinds of metals. So we studied, and eventually, if the children with malformation were in fact contaminated by teratogen or toxicant metals, we found very specific contamination for some elements in children with birth defects different from the children born premature and different from the normal births. High levels known to be teratogenic were found in the birth defects of children that were not found in premature children.

Source:

http://america.aljazeera.com

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