This article was written 2006.

” Palestinian women do not represent only tradition. They may stand as symbols of progress. But, it may be argued, this
 does not allow women to escape the burden of representing authentic culture; it simply expands the parameters and contents of authenticity”1 

The signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements (the “Oslo Agreement”) by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on 13 September 1993 heralded the drawing of a new and potentially and self-determination. Yet this event, symbolically important as it undoubtedly was, also opened the way for a set of complexities, particularly as far as Palestinian women are concerned.

This paper will explore some of the ways in which women have responded to change in the post-Oslo period by distinguishing between the ideal of what they are entitled to expect in a future Palestinian state and the reality of their present lives. Taking into consideration how political institutions represent the interests of women and how women are working to improve their own status, I will argue that the transition from an ad-hoc, non-governmental women’s movement into formal participation in the embryonic government has been an unsatisfactory process.

Palestinian society can be defined in terms of contradictory trends, the first “traditional” and “religious” and the second “secular” and “democratic”. While an attachment to traditional practices does not preclude the development of democracy, it has had a distorting effect on the emergence of a modern polity. Rather than accommodating the diversity of social experience, the system has fallen prey to manipulation by powerful, conflicting interest.

Women, who tend to be regarded as conservators of tradition, have been among the principal victims.

The plight of Palestinian women can also be viewed in terms of national liberation discourse. Like their Algerian counterparts in the 1950s and 60s, the Palestinian liberation movement “resisted significant changes in personal values women were expected to uphold. The preoccupation with women’s honor as part of the definition of a respectable wife was not challenged…While the mobilization of women in the struggle was needed; it had to be reconciled with the equally important task of cultural preservation. The result were contradictory expectations of women, who were to take on new public tasks in the struggle, but without challenging the old value systems or the roles they played in the personal arena”2. 

Analysts of the Palestinian women’s movement concur that women experienced empowerment as a result of their involvement in the Intifada. But although women from all segments of the society were mobilized to take part. Both spontaneously and by way of political organization, their gains were not able to be sustained. In the wake of the peace process, Palestinian women leaders “find themselves outside the male-dominated political circles where official policy regarding the future of autonomy in Gaza and the West bank is being determined”3.

We can gain some inkling of a vision for the future from the various statements by the Palestinian leadership over the years. The Declaration of Independence, for example, asserts that Palestinian will be entitled to pursue complete equality of rights. Governance “will be based on principles of social justice, equality and non-discrimination in public rights on frounds of race, religion, colour or sex”; and the state is committed to the “principles and purposes of the United Nations, and to the Universal declaration of Human Rights.”4. 

Under the terms of the Declaration of Principles (DoP), the PLO agreed that the Palestinian people will govern themselves “according to democratic principles”.

In the ensuing “Cairo Agreement”5, the newly created Palestinian National Authority (PNA) promised to operate within the framework of a draft Basic Law for the National Authority in the Transitional Period. The Basic Law stipulates “39 fundamental rights and freedoms of the Palestinian people, and endorses adherence to various international covenants, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”6. It is supplemented by a bewildering array of laws left over from previous  administrations: Jordanian, Egyptian and British Mandate law, Israeli military orders and, for civil cases, shari’a (Islamic) law.

The Basic Law itself has come under fire from Palestinian women’s organizations who criticize it for making no mention of equality between men and women. Afraid of being marginalized in any future Palestinian entity, women’s committees, the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), human rights NGOs and others, in January 1994, formed an umbrella group to produce a “Women’s Charter” which would be presented to the PNA for inclusion in the constitution. The document aimed at “cancelling out the laws that discriminate against women, guaranteeing the rights of women in the political, economic, social and educational spheres, and their equality in front of the law…(It) also demand(ed) that the state of Palestine comply with international women’s laws”7. Finally published in August 1994, the Charter is “telling circumspect on the crucial issues of family law and personal status”8. One reason for this omission was the continuing struggle between the secular and Islamist versions of a future state.

In January 1996, the first Palestinian election, for an 88-seat Legislative Council, took place in the autonomous areas. The greatest problem, in the words of one critic, is that “given the male-dominated Palestinian cultural tradition, there is a  sharp lack of women with the kind of political and leadership skills needed to advance the women’s agenda”9. In order to be included in this process, women’s groups were again galvanized into activity.

Co-ordinating their efforts was the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC), formed in 1992 after protests that women were not adequately represented in the various PLO technical committees. In 1995, the WATC implemented a project entitled “Palestinian women and the electoral process”, with the objective of  “improving women’s abilities to participate in public life”10. Although the project had aimed at achieving 30 per cent female representation on the Legislative Council and only five women (5.7 per cent) were elected, the project was judged to have been a success. It will be remembered, commented the organizers, ” for having offered a combination of comprehensive, well-balanced and much needed skills, techniques and information that satisfied the participating women’s needs and encouraged a number of them to participate in the elections as candidates.11 

Behind the struggle for female representation at executive, legislative and judicial levels of the transitional government lies the frequently grim reality of life for the majority of Palestinian women. One example is the marriage age for girls in the Gaza Strip which, in line with Egyptian law, was set at 17. During the Intifada, because of school disruptions, dire economic conditions and parental anxiety about the honour of young unmarried daughters, the marriage age fell. A survey carried out in 1993 revealed that 37 per cent of females in Gaza were married before the age of 17.12 

Education is another area of concern. Although the Palestinian population has traditionally prided itself on a devotion to educational achievement, for girls as well as boys, the Intifada had a disastrous effect on standards. In the early 1990s, the illiteracy rate for women in the Gaza Strip stood at 27 per cent (compared with 21 per cent for men) and in the West Bank at 32 per cent (compared with 8 per cent for men) 13. 

In the arena of employment, women find themselves disadvantaged on several levels. Firstly, according to traditions, a woman’s primary function is to be a wife and mother, and her space restricted to the home. Despite economic pressures, resistance to the notion of women having careers, or even job outside the home, tends to linger.

According to a study of women working in the manufacturing sector in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 85 per cent of the employed women were unmarried, a pattern which is repeated throughout the Palestinian female labour force.14 

Secondly, when forced by circumstances to seek outside employment, women often have to take poorly paid jobs with few or no rights. They generally do not enjoy the benefit of trade union protection. A recent survey found that”95.2 per cent of women do not participate in unions because they have not heard of them or because offamily pressure against their participation”.15 

The study of women in the manufacturing sector revealed that, although most of the managers are men,”today manufacturing in the West Bank and Gaza strip depends mainly on a female workforce”.16 

The women studied “live under constant fear of unemployment …(which is) the outcome of the worsening economic situation and weak trade unions. This situation is itself…partly the result of PLO policies”.17 

Thirdly, despite holding jobs outside the home, women retain sole responsibility for housework and child care. A study carried out in the Jalazon refugee camp indicates that ” the main reason(s) for lack of widespread participation of women in the labor market…are the family conditions and the traditional division of labor between men and women, which is subject to the ideology and social values of male domination, which in turn force women to withdraw to the home and leave men free for outside work”.18 

On of the most troubling problems that women must confront lies in the realm of violence. Although they have long endured the brutality of the Israeli occupation and have suffered the painful effects of national poverty and deprivation, Palestinian women-like men-have been sustained by the hope of eventual liberation. The subject of domestic violence, on the other hand, is seldom discussed in public. However, even in this taboo area, women are now starting to make a breakthrough. For instance, the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Conselling has been set up in the West Bank to advise women on their rights under Islamic Law in matters such as marriage, divorce and the custody of children; the extreme conditions of the Intifada left little room for the observance of such rights and male community leaders took advantage of the situation to impose their own notion of social In the Gaza strip in 1995, the Women’s Empowerment Project was created; it runs vocational and counselling courses for women victims of violence. But real protection for women, in the opinion of its director Shadi Sarraj, needs the support of the Palestinian Authority,” especially in education and law”.19 

Nevertheless, Palestinian women are refusing to accept this generally dismal state of affairs without a fight. From the elite  women’s political groupings in urban centers to grassroots organizations in local mosques,  women across the country are pushing for greater participation in their society. They are  doing this on their own terms and these vary considerably. I would like to conclude by briefly  examining some of the sources from which they derive inspiration.

First of all, they retain their faith in education as a tool for empowerment. Women forced to leave school early in order to get married or help in the family home, are determined that their daughters will not suffer a similar fate. Some women are seeking to acquire extra skills  Although “vocational and technical training facilities tend to teach women skills in traditionally feminine areas, such as sewing, typing and hairdressing… as economic opportunities expand, it is essential that women have access to diversified vocational and technical training to ensure that they can be equally qualified in comparison to men, for employment in labor markets”.20 

A handful of female entrepreneurs has also emerged. In recent years, women have acquired loans from UNRWA, the GUPW and other women’s NGO’s , to promote the creation os small business enterprises for women as well as income-generating activities… Findings showed that these projects have had an important impact on the social and economic development of women by enhancing their self-esteem and allowing them to gain experience”.21 

Lastly, in the absence of a state, Palestinian women look to international human rights provisions to afford them a measure of protection. Although not binding on the Palestinian

Authority, the Beijing Platform for Action provides a standard by which progress for women, in terms of female poverty, access to education and health care services, violence against women, inequality between men and women in the spheres of economic and political power and the protection of women’s reproductive rights, can be measured.22 

In the period of partial autonomy, women have appealed to international legislation to protect their rights. For example, in November 1994, two women reported to the WATC that they had been prevented from applying for passports unless they had the signatures of male “guardians”. In response to the WATC’s insistence that “such a regulation is a violation of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, the Universal Declaration of the human rights, and the Convention of Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women(CEDAW)”;23 the Ministry of the Interior, in January 1995, decreed that signatures from male “guardians” would no longer be necessary.

For women in Palestine in 1997, there is still a long way to go. Their lack of legal rights is a matter for concern but is unlikely to be satisfactory resolved until a state exists. The matter of inadequate education for girls is being addressed and, in the area of employment too, Palestinian culture is undergoing changes that will better reflect female aspirations. As a result, women’s self-confidence is increasing. One would hope that governmental institutions are capable of moving beyond the present unrepresentative phase and seeing the necessity of developing a greater sensitivity towards women’s needs. They should strive to overcome the brutalities of colonization in order to create a more genuinely egalitarian society. As for dissension among the ranks of women themselves, the debate is underway. But the challenges are formidable, not least in the absence of a comprehensive peace settlement, and we should not anticipate an early closing of the gap between ideal and reality.

Notes

1- Julie M Peteet, “Authenticity and gender: the presentation of culture”, in Judith E Tucker, editor, Arab women: old boundaries, new frontiers, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (published in association with the center for Contemporary Arab Studies, georgetown University), 1993, p.60

2- Mervat Hatem, “Toward the development of post-Islamist and post-nationalist feminist discourses in the Middle East”, in Tucker, editor, Arab women:old bounadries, new frontiers, ibid., pp.42-3

3- Nancy Shalal, ” Women leaders sceptical about elections and civic policies” Jerusalam Times, 10 November 1995

4- Palestine National Council, ” Pelstinian Declaration of independence”, Algiers, 15 November 1998, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol XVIII, no 2, Winter 1989, p.215

5- The Israel-PLO Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, 4 May 1994

6- Graham Usher, Palestine in crisis: The struggle for peace and political Independence after Oslo, London: Pluto Press, in association with Transnational Institute (TNI) and Middle East Research & Information Project (MERIP), 1995, P.45

7- Musa Rimawi, ” Palestinian women activists draft an equal rights document”, Jerusalem Times, 1 July 1994

8- Graham Usher, ” Women, Islam and the law in Palestinian society”, Middle East International, 23 September 1994, p.17

9- Ghada Zughayyar, director of the Jerusalem Center for Women, quoted in “Women leaders call for unity” by Stephanie Nolen, Pleastine Report, 8 march 1996, p.20

10- ” Palestinian women and the electoral process”, Plaestinian Women’s Network, Vol 1, No 1, November 1995, p.10

11- The Candidate Training Project, The West Bank and Gaza, 14 April- 15 May 1995

12- Marianne Heiberg and Geir Ovensen, ” Palestinian society in Gaza, the West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: a survey of living conditions”, Oslo:FAFO, 1993, p.23, quoted in United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), report of the UNDP needs assessment mission for Palestinian women in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 10-19 January 1994, p.10

13- UNDP report, ibid., p.37

14- ” Exploitation of Palestinian women in factories”, findings of a report by the Women Studies Center in Jerusalem entitled” Employment of women in Palestinian enterprises in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip”, News from Within, March 1994, p.22

15- ” Socio-economic conditions of female wage labour in Palestinian factories”, preliminary study by S Hindiyeh and A Ghazawneh, Women’s Studies Center, June 1990, quoted in UNDP report, op.cit., p.71

16- “Exploitation of Palestinian women in factories”, op.cit., p.22

17- Ibid., p.22

18- “Some social effects of the Intifada in Jalazon refugee camp: women, marriage, family”, research by Dr Majdi Malki of Birzeit University, News from within, vol XI, no 6, June 1995, p.20

19- Graham Usher, ” Palestinian women tackle domestic violence taboo”, The Guardian, 1 March 1997

20- “Palestinian women: the development challenge”, Tanmiya, September 1995, p.6

21- ibid., pp.7-9

22- United Nations, platform for action and the Beijing Declaration, Fourth World Conference on women, Beijing, China, 4-15 September 1995

23- Marie Boecker Pedersen, ” Women on the lobby front”, Jerusalem Times, 21 March 1997.

This article was written in 2000.

Introduction

For almost a century, Palestinians have been struggling against the colonization of their land. They have  had to contend
 with loss, exile, occupation and violence. In response, they have resisted, and armed  struggle. But Palestinian gains and victories, although far from insignificant, have so far failed to deliver an independent state; as a result, feelings of inadequacy and resignation have taken root. Although women have been involved in the liberation struggle and have shared the objectives of men, on the whole their strategies have differed.

In this paper, I will argue that resistance, in the Palestinian case, has been strongly influenced by a sense of appropriate gender roles. This assertion contains historical, psychological and political dimensions. The conservative nature of Palestinian society has meant that the liberation struggle has been unable to distance itself completely from the Islamic traditional practices, which govern day-to-day life.

Secondly, in the patriarchal environment of Palestinian society, men-who bear responsibility for the honor of the community-tend to regard themselves as having failed to protect their land, their society and their women. Now that the struggle appears to be moving towards some kind of resolution, existence is beginning to fragment. Women find themselves having to confront not only the oppressive practices of the occupation but also some of the policies being put in place by their own government. Thus, their resistance strategies are being channeled into new avenues.

In the context of this paper, “resistance” will be used in the broadest meaning of the word. To resist means to combat the forces of oppression, wherever they occur and whatever means. Resistance is defined as “the power to resist something, an influence that hinders or stops something, a secret organization resisting the authorities, especially in a conquered or enemy-occupied country. 1 However, the notion of resistance “carries not just its common-sense implications of ‘acting opposition’ but reflection of the ‘potential for subversion and contestation in the interstices of established orders’…there are many forms of gendered resistance and…women’s collective actions do not axiomatically take the form of opposition to the exercise of violence by men, whether against other men or against women.”2

In the Palestinian case, resistance is usually understood to mean a struggle for survival and for preservation of a distinct national identity. But if we broaden the definition, it can include not simply attempts to resist colonial domination, but also undesirable practices against women on the part of the Palestinian regime and in the home. I will argue that, in all these spheres, Islam plays a central role, whether women use it as a conscious tool of empowerment or relegate its influence to private life.

Questions

The specific questions to be explored here are: firstly, given the perception of the female in Palestinian nationalist thought, what forms has women’s resistance taken?

What have been the objectives of their resistance activities? And how, in the light of the ongoing debate between nationalism and feminism, have these changed over time? Finally, how has the Islamic cultural and social environment, together with shifting male and female self-perception, influenced, inspired or constrained women’s participation in the movement for national liberation? In order to answer these questions, I will begin with a brief history of women’s participation in the national liberation struggle and then explore ways in which their resistance evolved and expressed itself as something other than a support system for men’s nationalist aspirations.

Theoretical framework

It has been argued that when conflict “intrudes into the society- as in the case of invasion of colonialism- it may become very difficult to maintain traditional social order, and boundaries, such as those of gender may well break down”. 3 At such times, women may be empowered by assuming hitherto unfamiliar or non-traditional roles. But there is also a danger of violence spilling over from the battlefront to the home front.

According to a feminist perspective on conflict, “women tend to make connections between the oppression that is the ostensible cause of a conflict (ethnic or national oppression) in the light of another cross-cutting one: that of the gender regime. Feminist work tends to represent war as a continuum of violence from the bedroom to the battlefield, traversing our bodies and our sense of self. We see that the ‘homeland’ is not, never was, an essentially peaceful unitary space.”4 There is a risk here of conflict in women’s minds as they struggle to reconcile the violent chaos taking place on the streets with the peace and sanctity which are supposed to prevail within the private sphere. The former pits one’s own people against the enemy, while violence in the home is harder to deal with.

Massad argues that Palestinian nationalism conceives of nationalist agency in masculine terms.

Nationalist masculinity, he believes, is a new type of masculinity, which has little to do with “tradition”. He suggests that “Palestinian women may have more to say in Palestinian politics in the…future, but given their discursive construction in nationalist thought, they will be able to do so not as Palestinian women struggling for Palestinian women’s rights, but as Palestinian women struggling for discursively constituted rights, where Palestinian is always already conceived in the masculine”. 5 I believe that one must challenge such assumptions, which disregard the fluidity of the current situation.

Background

From the beginning of the 20th century, what may be termed “resistance” activities by Palestinian women have passed through several stages. They began as charitable and social welfare work by a small group of upper and middle class ladies. After the First World War, women took part in demonstrations against British policies. The official “women’s movement” in Palestine was launched in October 1929; its inaugural event was the convening in Jerusalem of the Palestine Arab Women’s Congress, which as attended by more than 200 women from all over the country.6  Fleischmann argues that, although Palestinian women’s activity during the British Mandate period has been described as “politically unaware”, these women “established an organized and often militant movement that was actively involved in social, political, and national affairs.”7 She reports that women’s “frequent participation in demonstrations signified their willingness to engage in ‘unladylike’ and even violent behavior, thereby defying cultural norms that prescribed limited public visibility of women”. 8   In the 1930s, the uprising of Shaykh Izz al Din al-Qassan, through its use of Islamic symbols and

language, encouraged the participation of the mass of people in social action; Qassam’s ideology has been described as “Islamic populism” and was aimed at all levels of society, 9 including women. It was inspired by a sense of desperation at the rapidly deteriorating situation and the threat to the Palestinian national entity. Yet, even though women took some part in the 1936 Revolt, they tended to be protected from the general violence and insecurity that was besetting the society.

After the catastrophe of 1948, when the State of Israel was established and hundred of thousands of Palestinians forced to flee from their homes and their land, resistance activities had to assume new patterns. The Palestinian community, scattered throughout the Middle East and beyond, was in a state of shock. Women “describe the first decade of exile in terms that evoke death and a state of mourning.

The loss of country and home and a refugee status were akin to the loss of a loved one.”10 Losing Palestine, in the words of one exile, “was like losing a husband or a son.11 In this environment, women became the principal symbols of what it meant to be Palestinian. As time passed, organized resistance intensified. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964, and under its umbrella in  1965, the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW). During this period, the character of the resistance was militantly masculine. But women were not standing idly by. For example, in the West

Bank, in 1965, the Society for the Resuscitation of the Family, In’ash el-Usra was founded by Samiha Khalil. The “objective of this organization was to help women, especially single of households, to increase their income.”12

In the wake of the 1967 war, in which Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip and thousands more Palestinians were displaced, women organized themselves to provide support services to the population. Women were also actively involved “in resisting changes imposed by the Israeli military government such as changes in the school curriculum, and women’s participation in demonstrations carried out against the demolition of homes”. 13 In addition, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, according to Cockburn, brought “a more intimate form of oppression as the occupying forces entered homes and harassed even women and children”. 14 This, in Mayer’s words, “intensified Palestinian nationalism in gendered ways by provoking a politicized response to the invasion of the private sphere”. 15

A small number of women became fighters; for example Leila Khaled, who carried out military operations as a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the late 1960’s. In her autobiography, she says: “I realized that my historic mission was a warrior in the inevitable battle between oppressors and oppressed, exploiters and exploited. I decided to become a revolutionary in order to liberate my people and myself”. 16 She was, she adds, greatly inspired by Shaykh al-Qassam, the leader of the 1930s revolt, “a man who embodied the spirit of resistance and who organized the first working class and peasant revolution in the Arab homeland.”17

In the occupied territories, Palestinian women in the 1970s developed new organizations, affiliated to the four main political factions. They departed from the welfare organizations, which were on the whole run by urban middle class women. The “younger generation of women felt that welfare organizations did not stress independence and women’s issues, focusing instead on assistance programs. The women’s work stressed forming cooperatives for food processing and for agricultural products… Most importantly, they engaged women and women’s rights”. 18

With the intifada in 1987 came unfamiliar-although equally urgent-roles for women. They early days of the intifada were, in many ways, an exhilarating time for women as they participated in fundamentally necessary ways. It seemed to many that the struggle for women’s rights was proceeding hand in hand with the national struggle; a few women began to engage in feminist debate. During this period, suggests Sharoni, “the large-scale political mobilization of Palestinian women was not perceived as a challenge to social stability but rather as a necessary and valuable contribution to the national struggle.”19 But it was also an exhausting period in which Israeli repression grew increasingly harsh, and collective punishment routine.

The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) “ began organizing demonstrations, strikes, and other acts of resistance to the occupation…Key in mobilizing the population were the UNLU-and PLO-issued communiqués and the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, issued by the PLO in November 1988 from its Tunis headquarters”. 20 According to Massad, the UNLU, which issued the intifada communiques, seemed “at times ambivalent, while at others, fully complicit in continuing the earlier tradition of conceiving the masculine”. 21  Communique No. 29,for example, congratulates women in their role as mothers. It salutes “ the mother of the martyr and her celebratory ululations, for

she has ululated twice, the day her son went to fight and was martyred, and the day the state was declared”. 22 Communique No.5 describe Palestinian women as the soil on which “manhood, respect and dignity” grow. On the other hand, Communique No. 35 of 1989 declared its admiration for the Palestinian woman “for her heroism in the national struggle”. 23 Women are also praised, “as detainees of the occupation authorities, 24 and mourned when they, along with children and old people, are killed by Israelis”. 25

An informal system of organizations, the Popular Committees, emerged, to which members of the women’s committees contributed their skills and expertise. Women were involved, for example, in the construction of alternative educational facilities, as schools were closed down all over the occupied territories, and they developed methods of food production to replace Israeli products. Girls and women also took part in spontaneous confrontations with Israeli troops on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

By the early 1990s, in the view of Hamami and Kuttab, two negative trends began to emerge.

The first was the negative social effects on women of the intifada in terms of control over women’s mobility, constraints on women’s behavior, and a tendency towards earlier marriage for girls. Secondly, it was becoming apparent that the national issue could easily be hijacked “by an ideology that saw women’s political activism not as a contribution to national liberation but as threat to it”. Women activists were being physically attacked by young men in the name of religion and Islamic dress was being imposed on women.26

In September 1993, before an astonished world, the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO unveiled an agreement which would give Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip limited autonomy and control over some parts of their land. Many believed that this represented a decisive move towards the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories. The Palestinian began to organize their own government. Planning failed, however, to take into account women’s aspiration for equal rights of citizenship. The new Palestinian Authority (PA) was almost exclusively male and the proposed constitution ignored women.

In response, women began to organize on their own behalf. They produced a Declaration of principles on Women’s Rights, which stated: “We, the women of Palestine, from all social categories and the various faiths, including workers, farmers, housewives, students, professionals, and politicians, promulgate our determination to proceed without struggle to abolish all forms of discrimination and inequality against women, which were propagated by the different forms of colonialism on our land, ending with the Israeli Occupation, and which were reinforced by the conglomeration of customs and traditions prejudiced against women, embodied in a number of existing laws and legislation.”27

As the conflict has persisted, there is evidence of an increase in domestic violence against women, although no figures are available. This has resulted from the lack of an independent judiciary and-until recently- a police force, combined with men’s perception of their own powerlessness, which seeks a release in aggression against weaker member of the family. Palestinian society, “like patriarchal societies, discriminates between the sexes, for example, the upbringing of girls and boys”. 28

Unfortunately, “when a woman is physically abused by her husband and ask for support and protection from her relatives, her relatives often force her to return to her husband under the pretext of the children’s welfare”. 29 Workshops organized by the women’s centers help women to deal with what is happening to them and, as far as possible, to combat the situation.

Modes of Resistance 

Resistance can take many forms. It can be active, violent, passive, constructive or subversive. For Palestinian women, resistance has ranged from the provision of support services to violent confrontation with the enemy. It was been influenced by models of appropriate female behaviour, which have changed over time. Yet it has also subverted conventional expectations. This is a result, on the one hand, of the desperation of their situation and, on the other, of a determination to create a “women’s movement”, which is distinct from male coping mechanisms.

During the struggle, women have been active participants “in all sectors of the Resistance- military, political, and social. They [did] however, have a more concentrated presence in the social field (mass work, education, information, and health) and/or in the lower echelons of the administration, serving as secretaries, clerks, telephone receptionists, etc. They appear[ed] least in higher-level political  positions and the military. Their participation in the contemporary national movement dates from the origins of the movement in the 1960’s.”30

For women-as for men-the are acceptable modes of resistance. It used to be a matter of honour that girls and women should be protected from direct contact with the enemy. This has become increasingly difficult to sustain. After the initial breaking down of barriers in 1967, women started to be deliberately targeted by the Israelis, as a way of humiliating men. Later, as women grew more confident, they chose to confront the Israeli army, in demonstrations and to protect their children. Eventually, women began to be arrested and imprisoned; while in prison, they were sometimes subjected to physical and psychological torture, including sexual threats or actual abuse.31

The new political situation, it has been suggested, “needs new strategies and answers-one of them being new ways in which the women’s movement links gender liberation to national liberation (both strategically and ideologically). Central to this new program is the need to understand democratization as the link concept and strategy between national liberation issues on the one hand, and the achievement of women’s social and economic rights on the other”. 32

Role of Islam

For many Palestinian women, identification with Islam has proved empowering. The Islamic movement developed “in the context of occupation and resistance, subjugation and struggle in which the hijab is ideologized and transformed into a symbol of resistance”. 33 It has been suggested that this is less true in the Palestinian case, where the women’s movement evolved along decidedly secular lines.

Nonetheless, a parallel and equally determined Islamic women’s movement exists alongside other forms of women’s organization.

There was concern in the early 1990s that “instead of being one for national liberation that would end  in the founding of a democratic secular state in which all citizens would be equal…[the Palestinians]  were suddenly struggling towards a theocratic state in which there would be no room for pluralism,  difference of democratically expressed ideas and one in which women’s needs would be defined by  Islamicists”. 34

One can discern a degree of ambiguity in the approach taken by the Palestinian leadership towards Islamic groups. While, on the one hand, such groups are dismissed as marginal, and even divisive, on the other, there has a reluctance on the part of the leadership to publicly condemn the Islamists and  thereby create dissension in the Palestinian ranks. After all, support for the Islamists is estimated to be as  high as 40 per cent in the Gaza Strip and 20-25 per cent in the West Bank.35

Groups such as Hamas offer the people of these areas “a vision of an all-Islamic Palestine, to be realized  only through tireless work in spreading Islamic consciousness all over the Arab and Islamic worlds and through mobilizing Muslims everywhere to join the ranks of the fighters for Palestine”. 36 But this highly  idealized, and some might argue unrealistic, vision is balanced by a strong social programme. “In line  with the spirit of Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has from the outset supported a network of mosques,  schools, social clubs and other social and educational facilities”. 37

In common with Islamist movements elsewhere, one of the most striking signs of the success of Hamas has been its impact on women. According to the Hamas Charter: “The Muslim woman has a role in the  battle for the liberation which is no less than the role of the man, for she is the factory of men”. 38 There is no doubt that, for many women, the current popularity of militant Islam is welcome since it offers what  they regard as the proper environment in which to lead their lives. For others, though, it is perceived as an imposition.

The so-called “hijab campaign “ in the Gaza Strip in the early part of the intifada is an illuminating example of what many women regard as the removal of choice. Since the late 1970s, Islamic groups have been seeking to re-impose some kind of hijab, or head-covering, on women, even though many Palestinian women had chosen to dispense with this. Hammami describes it as “fundamentally an  instrument of oppression, a direct disciplining of women’s bodies for political ends”. 39 although a lot of  women in Gaza prefer to cover their heads-indeed, Palestinian women or rural origin have always worn  some form of head-covering, partly as a sign of their status and partly their socio-economic conditions

did not permit the adoption of so-called “modern dress”. 40- others do not and, until the early part of the intifada, “social space continued to exist for women not wear any form of hijab”. 41 However, by December 1988, it had become impossible for a woman to appear in the streets of Gaza without a head-covering. This was achieved “through a mixture of consent and coercion”. 42

Hammami argues that the Islamists used the hijab as an instrument of social pressure. It is clear, she says, that the “intifada hijab” is “not about modesty, respect, nationalism or the imperatives of activism but about power of religious groups to impose themselves by attacking secularism and nationalism at their most vulnerable points: over issues of women’s liberation”. 43 A climate of fear was created in Gaza,  in which many women dared not to go out of doors without a head-covering in case they were attacked  religiously-motivated young men, reminiscent of the “morals squads” in post- revolutionary Iran. This form of intimidation appeared cruelly ironic in the sense that women were forced to fear not only actions  by Israeli military personnel but also by the youth of their own community.

One of the most disturbing aspects of the “hijab campaign” was the initial apparent disinclination of the UNLU to act on behalf of women. Many suspect that “certain element within the Unifies Leadership actually supported the hijab campaign, and that Fatah, in particular, was trying to form an alliance with religious groups.”44 Others were of the opinion that the issue was either “too divisive or, even worse… secondary”. 45

Whatever the reasons, it took the leadership a whole year to issue a statement condemning the imposition of the head-covering. Hammami attributes the “inability (or reluctance) of activist men to deal with the hijab campaign [to] both the weakness of the left and of feminist agendas in the West Bank and Gaza”. 46

Nonetheless, for some women, the idea of secular state is unappealing. Some Palestinian women have been influenced by trends elsewhere in the Muslim world, for example the “Islamic feminist” movement whereby women, believing that Islam is the best system by which to govern day by day affairs, seek to reclaim its meanings for themselves. Many Muslim women “have begun to take an active interest in theological arguments regarding women. They claim the right to interpret laws and religious texts themselves and to learn the skills necessary for such interpretation; they challenge androcentric and misogynist interpretations of texts; and they are determined to find in Islam justifications for demanding

individual freedom and women’s rights. They have, in other words, joined the political struggle over the right to make their religion work for them”. 47 It is natural, suggests one commentator, “that contemporary Muslim feminists, when they look at the history of their religion, are very skeptical when assured that Islam, which initially aimed to remove the disabilities women had suffered in pre-Islamic Arabia, provides the rationale for keeping women in a subjugated, inferior status”. 48

Conclusion

To conclude: At the beginning of the 21st century, the Palestinians continue to seek peace with justice. They still do not have a state of their own; and many remain in exile. Seven years after Oslo, Palestinian women are still engaged in resistance activities. They continue to resist the Israeli occupation of part of their land and the failure of Israel to honor its agreements, and they continue to struggle towards eventual statehood; but they are also fighting the Palestinian Authority itself. Perceived as corrupt and unrepresentative, the PA has failed to reflect the democratic aspiration of the Palestinian people, women

and men, and many feel a sense of betrayal. Today, according to Hamami and Kuttab, “the main issue confronting the society remains the occupation (on all levels) but with the added crisis and complication of the presence of an undemocratic governing leadership inserted between the mass of the population and the occupation.”49

However, not only do women have to resist the occupation and some of the policies of the PA, they must also tackle the issue of violence within the family, which is believed to increase during situations of conflict; at such times, according to feminist literature, there tends to be a spillover of violence into the home. But it is equally possible that this kind of violence may intensify once the conflict has been resolved. In a post-conflict situation in which women begin, firstly, to learn more about their rights; secondly, to seek to put those rights into practice; and, thirdly, to benefit from a process of empowerment, it is not inconceivable that men will take out their sense of frustration and powerlessness on family members.

In the Palestinian context, there are several ways of dealing with this. Firstly, as we have seen, through legal and constitutional channels; secondly, by resorting to the Islamic model of an ideal society; and, thirdly, by assuming it is a temporary phase and that things will improve once the sate is up and running.

In a paper, which explores the transition from conflict to post-conflict situations, Sharoni asks whether peace is more conductive to gender equality than conflict. What happens, she wonders, “to conceptions of masculinity, grounded in militarism and acceptance of violence is outlawed”. 50 She concludes that “the meanings assigned to begin a man or a woman in a particular context are not fixed or static but rather changing over time and in relation to particular political developments”. 51

Therefore, in order to challenge “the narrow formulations of peace, which inform the Oslo Accords”, 52 the leadership must come to terms “with the formation and transformation of gender identities and roles and with the ability of ordinary men and women to transform their own identities and act as agents of social and political change”. 53

Today, there is not a single “women’s movement”. Rather, a number of trends exist within the society. These have been present for some time and each contains its own mode of resistance. They also differ in terms of objectives. The danger of fragmentation among women means that there is little overall consensus about possible ways forward. One can no longer speak of a conflict between nationalist and feminist discourse.

As women have become better educated, they have grown more aware of their rights and have begun to articulate certain demands and aspirations. A variety of organizations have been established by and for women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including research centers, training institutes, legal centers, and others. Women are now represented in most sections of society: they are university lecturers, poets, doctors, business leaders, and members of the Palestine Legislative Council (PLC).

It is clear that women’s resistance activities have changed over time. They have evolved in response to changing circumstances but also to ideological currents within the society and in the wider region. Now women are coming to grips with political exclusion and marginalization, and with the day-to-day business of survival in a patriarchal and still dangerous environment. The history of Palestinian women’s involvement in the resistance movement and their evident organizational ability gives one confidence that they will eventually succeed in linking national liberation with gender liberation.

* Maria Holt  is a Research Fellow in the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster. She has a long involvement in Middle East politics, both as an academic and a lobbyist, and has published a number of books and articles on Arab Muslim women and violent conflict.

Footnotes:

1 The Oxford Paperback Dictionary

2  Jacobson, Ruth, Jacobs, Susie, and Marchbank, Jen, “introduction: States of Conflict” in Jacobs.

3  Macdonald, Sharon, “Drawing the lines-gender, peace and war: an introduction”, in Macdonalds,    Sharon, Holden, Pat and Ardener, Shirley, -editors, Images of women in Peace&Wae: Cross-    Cultural l& Historical Perspectives, London: Macmillan, 1987, p.9

4 Cockburn, Cynthia, The Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict,     London: Zed Books, 1998, p.8.

5 Massad, Joseph, “Conceiving the Masculine: Gender and Palestinian Nationalism”, The Middle    East Journal, Volume 49, Number 3, Summer 1995, p.483.

6 Fleischmann, Ellen J, “The Emergence of the Palestinian Women’s Movement, 1929-39”, Journal of Palestine Studies XXIX, no 3, Spring 2000, p.18.

7 Ibid. p.16.

8 Ibid. p. 24.

9 Johnson, Nels, Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism, London: KPI, 1982, p.54.

10 Peteet, Julie M, Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement, New York:    Columbia University Press, 1991, p.26.

11 Madame Haddad, a middle-aged woman from Jaffa, quoted by Pateet, ibid.p.26.

12  Sabbagh, Suha, “Palestinian Women and Institution Building”, in Sabbagh, Suha, editor, Arab Women: Between Defiance and Restraint, New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996, p, 108.

13 Ibid. 107.

14  Cockburn, The Space Between Us, op.cit.p.118.

15  Mayer, Tamar, “Heightened Palestinian nationalism: military occupation, repression, difference    And gender” in Mayer, Tamar, editor, Women and the Israeli Occupation: The Politics of Change,    London: Routledge, 1994, p. 63.

16  Khaled, Leila, My people shall live: The Autobiography of a Revolutionary, edited by George Hajjar,    London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973, p. 22.

17 Ibid.pp.26-7.

18  Sabbagh, “Palestinian Women and Institution Building”, op.cit.p.109.

19  Sharoni, Simona, “Gendering Conflict and Peace in Israel/Palestine and the North of Ireland”, Millennium,  Vol 27, No. 4, p. 1064.

20  Massad, “Conceiving the Masculine”, op.cit.p.474.

21 Ibid.pp.474-5.

22  Communique No. 29, “The Call of the Wedding of the Palestinian Independent State”, quoted by Massad, ibid.  p.474.

23 Ibid.p.476.

24  Communiques No. 17 and 22, Ibid.p.475.

25  Commniques No. 21, Ibid.p.475.

26  Hamami, Rima, and Kuttab, Eileen, “The Palestinian Women’s Movement: Strategies Towards Freedom   & Democracy”, News From Within, Vol XV, No. 4, April 1999, p.3.

27 “General Union of Palestinian Women, Jerusalem-Palestine: Draft Document of Principles of Women’s Rights (Third Draft), in Sabbagh, editor, Arab Women: Between Defiance and Restraint, op.cit.p.259.

28 Ibid.p.5.

29  Yahya, Mohammad al-Haj, “Violence against women leads to oppression”, Sparks, April 1992, p.5.

30 Peteet, Gender in Crisis, op.cit.p.147.

31 See, for example, Thornhill, Teresa, Making Women Talk: The Interrogation of Palestinian Women Detainees by The Israeli General Security Services, London: Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights, 1992.

32 Ibid.pp.4-5.

33 El Guindi. Fadwa, Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance, Oxford & New York: Berg, 1999, p. 174.

34 Hamami and Kuttab, “The Palestinian Women’s Movement”, op.cit.p.3.

35 Ozanne, “The shanty town fundamentalists”, op.cit.

36 Taraki, The Islamic resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising”, op.cit.p.175.

37 “The Challenge of Hamas”, monitored from the BBC World Service, 19 February 1993, quoted in AJME News (Beirut), February-March 1993.

38 “Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine”, Journal of Palestine Studies,  Volume XXII, No 4, Summer 1993, pp.127-9

39 Hammami, Rema, “Women, the Hijab and the Intifada”, Middle East report, May-August 1990, p.25.

40 Moghadam, Modernizing Women, op.cit.p.163.

41 Hammami “Women, the Hijab and the Intifada”, op.cit.p.25.

42 Ibid.p.25

43 Ibid.p.28.

44 Ibid.p.28

45 Ibid.p.28.

46 Ibid.p.28.

47 Afkhami, Muhnaz, and Friedl, Erika, “Introduction”, in Afkhamia and Friedl, editors, Muslim Women and the Politics of Participation: Implementing the Beijing Platform, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997,p.xiii.

48 Mayer, Ann Elizabeth, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, Boulder and San Francisco:  Westview Press and London: Pinter Publishers, 1995,p.94.

49 Ibid.pp.3-4.

50 Sharoni,”Gendering and Peace”, op.cit.p.1062.

51 Ibid. p.1088.

52 Ibid, p.1088.

53 Ibid, p.1089.

(The following segment is an extract from Chapter One, ‘The Refugees’, of Ms. Skinner’s book “Between Despair and Hope”.
 Ms. Skinner has given Jerusalemites the permission to post part of her chapter online.)

…Even in their displacement, Palestinians managed to maintain the fabric of their traditional way of life. More than ever before, it was important for all, even the most humble refugee to feel that the sense of community was re-established quickly. The pattern of village leadership went with the refugees and, though there were few material ways of helping, there was always a ready ear and a word of hope. A sheikh is a leader of a village or tribe and is in a sense very much the father of his people. His house or tent is always open to those who seek his help. He is expected to show leadership and courage, give sound advice and be fair when disputes are brought before him. He knows each family and all their problems well and carries the greatest of load in times of community or national crisis. Due to the wars, several village sheikhs also found themselves to be refugees.

One of the first sheikhs I was to know was Sheikh Abdul Majid El Azzeh, camp leader of the Talbiya refugee camp south of Amman in Jordan. During part of 1970/1, when I was the only foreigner with the MCC* living in Amman, my duties expanded to include the supervision of our sewing centres and kindergartens. This work took me to Talbiya camp. The sheikh’s house in Talbiya was always open to me too. Together, we would sit and discuss both the problems and progress of my work. He told me some of his wishes and from time to time referred the most recent of the needy hardship cases to me. Of course there was always the traditional cup of coffee.

The sheikh’s village of origin was Beit Jibrin**, beit meaning house, 35 kilometres southwest of Jerusalem and close to the 1948/9 armistice line. Time and time again, he would tell me the story of his village people. During the uncertain troubled years leading up to the war in 1948, the question on the minds of all the villagers was should they stay or should they move? How and when do they decide? The war decided for them, and he finally accompanied and supported his village people on the trek over the hills to Bethlehem. Here, UNRWA eventually provided them with shelter and assistance. He told me that to keep the memory of their beloved village alive, they naturally called their camp ‘Beit Jibrin’. Daily, this gave them the little flame of hope that they would return to their village one day. But years went by. Then came 1967, with yet another conflict, another war, another time of uncertainties.

He said that many inhabitants of the camp wished to move across the river to Jordan, joining thousands of others on the move. With tears in his eyes he described how for the second time he and his people were on a dusty crowded road of fleeing humanity. They found a temporary home under tents in Zizia, south of Amman. After six months on the edge of desert land, winter came with cold biting winds and heavy rains. The rains were welcomed by the farmers but not by the occupants of tents. The Red Lion and Sun Society*** of Iran provided funds for the building of a small camp in Zizia. In the meantime, the Jordan government allowed those people, like many others living on exposed hills, to move to the Jordan valley where it was much warmer. But the stay there turned out to be a very short one. Shellfire and bombings from the Israeli side became nearly a daily routine and thus, in February 1968 the sheikh returned from the valley with his village people. In tents they waited for the camp buildings to be finished. On opening day, the government of Jordan called the camp Talbiya, to honour the memory of the Prophet Mohammed’s son-in-law and heir, Ali Ibn El Talbiya…

Footnotes:

* Mennonite Central Committee, an American NGO.
** The city of Eleutheropolis of the Byzantine era, meaning City of the Free.
*** A society equivalent to the Red Cross.

More than 400 Palestinian villages were destroyed –in its entirety or partially– by Zionist gangs as part of a
 programmed plan of uprooting native Palestinians from their homeland, Palestine, and breaking new ground for a bizarre colonial project called Israel, which the days of its first stage were closing in on that awful year of 1948.

Few researchers, and historians, Palestinians and Israelis, have attempted to document this tragic chapter of al-Nakba (catastrophe). Among Palestinians were Aref El-Aref who prepared shortly in the aftermath of 1948 war a list of villages occupied and its Arab citizens were forced to leave in the course of battles. He published few years later a six-part volume about 1948 war under the title al-Nakba (1956-1960). The historian Mustafa Dabbagh published an eleven-part volume titled “Our Land Palestine” (1972-1986). A thorough description of the destroyed villages or otherwise was included in the book.

Other writers followed suit including the late Palestinian geographer Bashir Najm who coauthored with Engineer Bsharah Muammer comprehensive tables of statistics covering the people and the land.

On 1987, Abdul Jawad Saleh and Walid Mustafa published a booklet concerning the mass destruction of the Palestinian villages.

At last the Israeli historian Benny Morris published on 1989 his important book “ The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949”.

All in all, 418 villages were destroyed, depopulated or simply taken over by Zionists for various purposes. Others were utilized as sites for building Zionist settlements.

In 1992 , the distinguished Palestinian historian, Walid Khalidi, author and editor of many valuable publications, books and researches, narrating the untold story and history of the Palestinians before and after their Nakba (catastrophe), a paramount referential research work titled “ All that Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948”. Its Arabic version appeared on November 1997.

In addition to these major works, a group of researchers prepared a list of names for destroyed villages — among them was Israel Shahak, president of Israeli Human Rights group who published on 1973 somehow modified text of Aref Al-Aref list.

Shahak based his work on Al-Aref list of 399 occupied villages, omitting from it the undestroyed villages—reducing the figure to 383 villages.

The Palestinian geographer Kamal Abdul Fattah classified on 1986 another list in preparation for the forthcoming list of Ber Zeit University.

But Christoph Uehlinger from the Swiss “Association for the reconstruction of Emmuas” village prepared a list based on Al-Aref-Shahak list, and to the preliminary list of Kamal Abdul Fattah (1983)—adapting it to the Israeli maps.

Although the Israeli authorities failed to issue a list of the destroyed villages, it republished on 1950s topographic maps –originally prepared by British Mandate –giving Hebrew names to the places printing over the destroyed villages the Hebrew word “Hrous” – meaning: destroyed.

Barring Dabbagh’s book (Our Land Palestine) and the Palestinian Encyclopedia, none of these works has referred to the destroyed village with more than a name and few statistics—merely as a single element amid general sight of destruction.

General Moshe Dayan stated in 1962:

We came to this country, which was already populated by Arabs, and we are  establishing a Hebrew, that is, a Jewish State, here. Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages, and I do not blame you, because those geography books no longer exist. Not only do the books, not  exist, the Arab villages are not there either. Nahal arose in the place of Mahalul; Gevat in the place of Jibta; Sarid in the place of Tell Shaman. There is not one place built in this country that did not have a former Arab population.
Bibliography:

-All that Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 by Walid Khalidi

-The Catastrophe and the Lost Paradise by Aref al-Aref

Al-Nakba was marked by the destruction of Palestinian villages and the exodus of over 750,000 Palestinians. Historical 
records confirm that in 1947 Palestine comprised more than 900 Palestinian villages. More than 400 villages were destroyed by Israeli forces as well as their houses and buildings.

The Israelis wiped off all these destroyed villages of the map. Mayor urban centers exclusive for Palestinians such as Nazareth, Baysan, Beersheba, Acre, Ramla, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa and many others were depopulated and in their places Israeli settlements were built.

Israeli and international historians confirm the number of these destroyed villages to be at least 418 and possibly up to 472.

Here we have a list of the destroyed villages within the pre-1967 borders of Israel, which were destroyed and depopulated in 1948.

The District of Acre (26 villages)

Amqa, Arab Al-Samniyya, Al-Bassa, Al-Birwa, Al-Damun, Dayr Al-Qasi, Al-Gabisiyya, Iqrit, Irbbin Khirbat, Jiddin Khirbat, Al-Kabri, Kafr Inan, Kuwaykat, Al-Manshiyya, Al-Mansura, Miar, Al-Nabi Rubin, Al-Nahr, Al-Ruways, Suhmata, Al-Sumayriyya, Suruh, Al-Tall, Tarbikha, Umm  Al-Faraj, Al-Zib.

The District of Baysan (29 villages)

Arab al-‘Arida, Arab al-Bawati, Arab al-Safa, al-Ashrafiyya, al-Birra, Danna, Farwana, al-Fatur, al-Ghazzawiyya, al-Hamidiyya, al-Hamra, abbul Kafra, Kawkab al-Hawa, al-Khunayzir, Masil al-Jizl, al-Murassa, Qumya, al-Sakhina, al-Samiriyya, Sirin, Tall al-Shawk, al-Taqa, Khirbat, al-Tira,  Umm ‘Ajra, Umm Sabuna, Khirbat, Yubla, Zab’a, al-Zawiya, Khirbat.

The District of Beersheba (3 villages)

Al-‘Imara, al-Jammama, al-Khalasa.

The District of Gaza (45 villages)

Arab Suqrir, Barbara, Barqa, al-Batani, al-Gharbi, al-Batani, al-Sharqi, Bayt ‘Affa, Bayt Daras, Bayt Jirja, Bayt Tima, Bi’lin, Burayr, Dayr Sunayd, Dimra, al-Faluja, Hamama, Hatta, Hiribya, Huj, Hulayqat, ‘Ibdis, ‘Iraq al-Manshiyya, Iraq Suwaydan, Isdud, al-Jaladiyya, al-Jiyya, Julis, al-Jura, Jusayr, Karatiyya, Kawfakha, Kawkaba, al-Khisas, al-Masmiyya al-Kabira, al-Masmiyya al-Saghira, al-Muharraqa, Najd, Ni’ilya, Qastina, al-Sawafir al-Gharbiyya, al Sawafir al-Shamaliyya, al-Sawafir al-Sharqiyya, Summil, Tallal al-Turmus, Yasur.

The District of Haifa (51 villages)

Abu Shusha, Abu Zurayq, Arab al-Fuqara’, Arab al-Nufay’at, Arab Zahrat al-Dumayri, Atlit, Ayn Ghazal, Ayn Hawd, Balad al-Shaykh, Barrat Qisarya, Burayka, al-Burj, Khirbat, al-Butaymat, Daliyat  al-Rawha’, al-Damun Khirbat, al-Ghubayya al-Fawqa, al-Ghubayya al-Tahta, Hawsha, Ijzim, Jaba’, al-Jalma, Kabara, al-Kafrayn, Kafr Lam, al-Kasayir Khirbat, Khubbayza, Lid khirbat, al-Manara Khirbat, al-Mansi, al-Mansura Khirbat, al-Mazar, al-Naghnaghiyya, Qannir, Qira, Qisarya, Qumbaza, al-Rihaniyya, Sabbarin,al-Sarafand, al-Sarkas Khirbat, Sa’sa’ Khirbat, al-Sawamir, al-Shuna Khirbat, al-Sindiyana, al-Tantura, al- Tira, Umm al-Shawf, Umm al-Zinat, Wa’arat al-Sarris, Wadi Ara, Yajur.

The District of Hebron (16 villages)

‘Ajjur, Barqusya, Bayt Jibrin, Bayt Nattif, al-Dawayima, Dayr al-Dubban, Dayr Nakhkhas,  Kudna, Mughallis, al-Qubayba, Ra’na, Tall al-Safi, Umm Burj Khirbat, Zakariyya, Zayta, Zikrin, Al-Nabi Rubin.

The District of Jaffa (23 villages)

al- ‘Abbasiyya, Abu Kishk, Bayt Dajan, Biyar ‘Adas, Fajja, al- Haram, Ijlil al-Qibliyya, Ijlil al-Shamaliyya, al-Jammasin al-Gharbi, al-Jammasin al-Sharqi, Jarisha, Kafr ‘Ana, al-Khayriyya, al-Mas’udiyya, al-Mirr, al-Muwaylih, Rantiya, al-Safiriyya, Salama, Saqiya, al-Sawalima, al-Shaykh Muwannis, Yazur.

The District of Jerusalem (38 villages)

‘Allar, ‘Aqqur, ‘Artuf, ‘Ayn Karim, Bayt ‘Itab, Bayt Mahsir, Bayt Naqquba, Bayt Thul, Bayt Umm al-Mays, al-Burayi, Dayr Aban, Dayr ‘Amr, Dayr al-Hawa, Dayr Rafat, Dayr al-Shaykh, Dayr Yasin, Ishwa’, Islin Ism Allah, Khirbat, Jarash, al-jura, Kasla, al-Lawz Khirbat, Lifta, al-Maliha, Nitaf, al-Qabu, Qalunya, al-Qastal, Ras Abu ‘Ammar, Sar’a, Saris, Sataf, Suba, Sufla, al-Tannur Khirbat, al-‘Umur Khirbat, al-Walaja.

The District of Jinin (6 villages)

Ayn al-Mansi, al-Jawfa Khirbat, al-Lajjun, al-Mazar, Nuris, Zir’in.

The District of Nazareth (4 villages)

Indur, Ma’lul, al-Mujaydil, Saffuriyya.

The District of Ramla (58 villages)

Abu al-Fadl, Abu Shusha, ‘Ajanjul, ‘Aqir, Barfiliya, al-Barriyya, Bashshit, Bayt Far Khirbat, Bayt Jiz, Bayt Nabala, Bayt Shanna, Bayt Susin, Bir Ma’in, Bir Salim, al-Burj, al-Buwayra Khirbat, Daniyal, Dayr Abu Salama, Dayr Ayyub, Dayr Muhaysin, Dayr Tarif, al-Duhayriyya Khirbat, al-Haditha, Idnibba, ‘Innaba, Jilya, Jimzu, Kharruba, al-Khayma, Khulda, al-Kunayyisa, al-Latrun, al-Maghar, Majdal Yaba, al-Mansura, al-Mukhayzin, al-Muzayri’a, al-Na’ani, al-Nabi Rubin, Qatra, Qazaza, al-Qubab, Qubayba, Qula, Sajad, Salbit, Sarafand al-‘Amar, Sarafand al-Kharab, Saydun, Shahma, Shilta, Al-Tina, Al-Tira,  Umm Kalkha, Wadi Hunayn, Yibna, Zakariyya Khirbat, Zarnuqa.

The District of Safad (77 villages)

Abil al-Qamh, al-‘Abisiyya, Akbara, Alma, Ammuqa, ‘Arab al-Shamalina, Arab al-Zubayd, ‘Ayn al-Zaytun, Baysamun, Biriyya, al-Butayha, al-Buwayziyya, Dallata, al-Dawwara, Dayshum, al-Dirbashiyya, al-Dirdara, Fara, al-Farradiyya, Fir’im, Ghabbatiyya, Ghuraba, al-Hamra’, Harrawi, Hunin, al-Husayniyya, Jahula, al-Ja’una, Jubb Yusuf, Kafr Bir’im, al-Khalisa, Khan al-Duwayr, Karraza Khirbat, al-Khisas, Khiyam al-Walid, Kirad al-Baqqara, Kirad al-Ghannama, Lazzaza, Madahil , al-Malikiyya, Mallaha, al-Manshiyya, al-Mansura, Mansurat Al-Khayt, Marus, Mirun, al-Muftakhira, Mughr al-Khayt, al-Muntar, Khirbat, al-Nabi Yusha’, al-Na’ima, Qabba’a, Qadas, Qaddita, Qaytiyya, al-Qudayriyya, al-Ras al-Ahmar, Sabalan, Safsaf, Saliha, al-Salihiyya, al -Sammu’i, al-Sanbariyya, Sa’sa’, al-Shawka al-Tahta, al-Shuna, Taytaba, Tulayl, al-‘Ulmaniyya, al-‘Urayfiyya, al-Wayziyya, Yarda, al-Zahiriiyya al-Tahta, al-Zanghariyya,al-Zawiya, al-Zuq al-Fawqani, al-Zuq al-Tahtani.

The District of Tiberias (25 villages)

‘Awlam, al-Dalhamiyya, Ghuwayr Abu Shusha, Hadatha, al-Hamma, Hittin, Kafr Sabt, Lubya, Ma’dhar, al-Majdal, al-Manara, al-Manshiyya, al-Mansura, Nasir al-Din, Nimrin, al-Nuqayb, Samakh, al-Samakiyya, al-Samra, al-Shajara, al-Tabigha, al-‘Ubaydiyya, Wadi al-Hamam, al-Wa’ra al-Swawda’, Khirbat, Yaquq.

The District of Tulkarm (17 villages)

Bayt Lid Khirbat, Bayyarat Hannun, Fardisya, Ghabat Kafrr Sur, al-Jalama, Kafr Saba, al-Majdal, Khirbat, al-Manshiyya, Miska, Qaqun, Raml Zayta, Tabsur, Umm Khalid, Wadi al-Hawarith, Wadi Qabbani, al-Zababida Khirbat, Zalafa Khirbat.

Bibliography:

-All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 by Walid Khalidi.

-For more detailed information you can visit http://www.palestineremembered.com/