This article was written 2006.
” Palestinian women do not represent only tradition. They may stand as symbols of progress. But, it may be argued, this
does not allow women to escape the burden of representing authentic culture; it simply expands the parameters and contents of authenticity”1
The signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements (the “Oslo Agreement”) by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on 13 September 1993 heralded the drawing of a new and potentially and self-determination. Yet this event, symbolically important as it undoubtedly was, also opened the way for a set of complexities, particularly as far as Palestinian women are concerned.
This paper will explore some of the ways in which women have responded to change in the post-Oslo period by distinguishing between the ideal of what they are entitled to expect in a future Palestinian state and the reality of their present lives. Taking into consideration how political institutions represent the interests of women and how women are working to improve their own status, I will argue that the transition from an ad-hoc, non-governmental women’s movement into formal participation in the embryonic government has been an unsatisfactory process.
Palestinian society can be defined in terms of contradictory trends, the first “traditional” and “religious” and the second “secular” and “democratic”. While an attachment to traditional practices does not preclude the development of democracy, it has had a distorting effect on the emergence of a modern polity. Rather than accommodating the diversity of social experience, the system has fallen prey to manipulation by powerful, conflicting interest.
Women, who tend to be regarded as conservators of tradition, have been among the principal victims.
The plight of Palestinian women can also be viewed in terms of national liberation discourse. Like their Algerian counterparts in the 1950s and 60s, the Palestinian liberation movement “resisted significant changes in personal values women were expected to uphold. The preoccupation with women’s honor as part of the definition of a respectable wife was not challenged…While the mobilization of women in the struggle was needed; it had to be reconciled with the equally important task of cultural preservation. The result were contradictory expectations of women, who were to take on new public tasks in the struggle, but without challenging the old value systems or the roles they played in the personal arena”2.
Analysts of the Palestinian women’s movement concur that women experienced empowerment as a result of their involvement in the Intifada. But although women from all segments of the society were mobilized to take part. Both spontaneously and by way of political organization, their gains were not able to be sustained. In the wake of the peace process, Palestinian women leaders “find themselves outside the male-dominated political circles where official policy regarding the future of autonomy in Gaza and the West bank is being determined”3.
We can gain some inkling of a vision for the future from the various statements by the Palestinian leadership over the years. The Declaration of Independence, for example, asserts that Palestinian will be entitled to pursue complete equality of rights. Governance “will be based on principles of social justice, equality and non-discrimination in public rights on frounds of race, religion, colour or sex”; and the state is committed to the “principles and purposes of the United Nations, and to the Universal declaration of Human Rights.”4.
Under the terms of the Declaration of Principles (DoP), the PLO agreed that the Palestinian people will govern themselves “according to democratic principles”.
In the ensuing “Cairo Agreement”5, the newly created Palestinian National Authority (PNA) promised to operate within the framework of a draft Basic Law for the National Authority in the Transitional Period. The Basic Law stipulates “39 fundamental rights and freedoms of the Palestinian people, and endorses adherence to various international covenants, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”6. It is supplemented by a bewildering array of laws left over from previous administrations: Jordanian, Egyptian and British Mandate law, Israeli military orders and, for civil cases, shari’a (Islamic) law.
The Basic Law itself has come under fire from Palestinian women’s organizations who criticize it for making no mention of equality between men and women. Afraid of being marginalized in any future Palestinian entity, women’s committees, the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), human rights NGOs and others, in January 1994, formed an umbrella group to produce a “Women’s Charter” which would be presented to the PNA for inclusion in the constitution. The document aimed at “cancelling out the laws that discriminate against women, guaranteeing the rights of women in the political, economic, social and educational spheres, and their equality in front of the law…(It) also demand(ed) that the state of Palestine comply with international women’s laws”7. Finally published in August 1994, the Charter is “telling circumspect on the crucial issues of family law and personal status”8. One reason for this omission was the continuing struggle between the secular and Islamist versions of a future state.
In January 1996, the first Palestinian election, for an 88-seat Legislative Council, took place in the autonomous areas. The greatest problem, in the words of one critic, is that “given the male-dominated Palestinian cultural tradition, there is a sharp lack of women with the kind of political and leadership skills needed to advance the women’s agenda”9. In order to be included in this process, women’s groups were again galvanized into activity.
Co-ordinating their efforts was the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC), formed in 1992 after protests that women were not adequately represented in the various PLO technical committees. In 1995, the WATC implemented a project entitled “Palestinian women and the electoral process”, with the objective of “improving women’s abilities to participate in public life”10. Although the project had aimed at achieving 30 per cent female representation on the Legislative Council and only five women (5.7 per cent) were elected, the project was judged to have been a success. It will be remembered, commented the organizers, ” for having offered a combination of comprehensive, well-balanced and much needed skills, techniques and information that satisfied the participating women’s needs and encouraged a number of them to participate in the elections as candidates.11
Behind the struggle for female representation at executive, legislative and judicial levels of the transitional government lies the frequently grim reality of life for the majority of Palestinian women. One example is the marriage age for girls in the Gaza Strip which, in line with Egyptian law, was set at 17. During the Intifada, because of school disruptions, dire economic conditions and parental anxiety about the honour of young unmarried daughters, the marriage age fell. A survey carried out in 1993 revealed that 37 per cent of females in Gaza were married before the age of 17.12
Education is another area of concern. Although the Palestinian population has traditionally prided itself on a devotion to educational achievement, for girls as well as boys, the Intifada had a disastrous effect on standards. In the early 1990s, the illiteracy rate for women in the Gaza Strip stood at 27 per cent (compared with 21 per cent for men) and in the West Bank at 32 per cent (compared with 8 per cent for men) 13.
In the arena of employment, women find themselves disadvantaged on several levels. Firstly, according to traditions, a woman’s primary function is to be a wife and mother, and her space restricted to the home. Despite economic pressures, resistance to the notion of women having careers, or even job outside the home, tends to linger.
According to a study of women working in the manufacturing sector in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 85 per cent of the employed women were unmarried, a pattern which is repeated throughout the Palestinian female labour force.14
Secondly, when forced by circumstances to seek outside employment, women often have to take poorly paid jobs with few or no rights. They generally do not enjoy the benefit of trade union protection. A recent survey found that”95.2 per cent of women do not participate in unions because they have not heard of them or because offamily pressure against their participation”.15
The study of women in the manufacturing sector revealed that, although most of the managers are men,”today manufacturing in the West Bank and Gaza strip depends mainly on a female workforce”.16
The women studied “live under constant fear of unemployment …(which is) the outcome of the worsening economic situation and weak trade unions. This situation is itself…partly the result of PLO policies”.17
Thirdly, despite holding jobs outside the home, women retain sole responsibility for housework and child care. A study carried out in the Jalazon refugee camp indicates that ” the main reason(s) for lack of widespread participation of women in the labor market…are the family conditions and the traditional division of labor between men and women, which is subject to the ideology and social values of male domination, which in turn force women to withdraw to the home and leave men free for outside work”.18
On of the most troubling problems that women must confront lies in the realm of violence. Although they have long endured the brutality of the Israeli occupation and have suffered the painful effects of national poverty and deprivation, Palestinian women-like men-have been sustained by the hope of eventual liberation. The subject of domestic violence, on the other hand, is seldom discussed in public. However, even in this taboo area, women are now starting to make a breakthrough. For instance, the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Conselling has been set up in the West Bank to advise women on their rights under Islamic Law in matters such as marriage, divorce and the custody of children; the extreme conditions of the Intifada left little room for the observance of such rights and male community leaders took advantage of the situation to impose their own notion of social In the Gaza strip in 1995, the Women’s Empowerment Project was created; it runs vocational and counselling courses for women victims of violence. But real protection for women, in the opinion of its director Shadi Sarraj, needs the support of the Palestinian Authority,” especially in education and law”.19
Nevertheless, Palestinian women are refusing to accept this generally dismal state of affairs without a fight. From the elite women’s political groupings in urban centers to grassroots organizations in local mosques, women across the country are pushing for greater participation in their society. They are doing this on their own terms and these vary considerably. I would like to conclude by briefly examining some of the sources from which they derive inspiration.
First of all, they retain their faith in education as a tool for empowerment. Women forced to leave school early in order to get married or help in the family home, are determined that their daughters will not suffer a similar fate. Some women are seeking to acquire extra skills Although “vocational and technical training facilities tend to teach women skills in traditionally feminine areas, such as sewing, typing and hairdressing… as economic opportunities expand, it is essential that women have access to diversified vocational and technical training to ensure that they can be equally qualified in comparison to men, for employment in labor markets”.20
A handful of female entrepreneurs has also emerged. In recent years, women have acquired loans from UNRWA, the GUPW and other women’s NGO’s , to promote the creation os small business enterprises for women as well as income-generating activities… Findings showed that these projects have had an important impact on the social and economic development of women by enhancing their self-esteem and allowing them to gain experience”.21
Lastly, in the absence of a state, Palestinian women look to international human rights provisions to afford them a measure of protection. Although not binding on the Palestinian
Authority, the Beijing Platform for Action provides a standard by which progress for women, in terms of female poverty, access to education and health care services, violence against women, inequality between men and women in the spheres of economic and political power and the protection of women’s reproductive rights, can be measured.22
In the period of partial autonomy, women have appealed to international legislation to protect their rights. For example, in November 1994, two women reported to the WATC that they had been prevented from applying for passports unless they had the signatures of male “guardians”. In response to the WATC’s insistence that “such a regulation is a violation of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, the Universal Declaration of the human rights, and the Convention of Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women(CEDAW)”;23 the Ministry of the Interior, in January 1995, decreed that signatures from male “guardians” would no longer be necessary.
For women in Palestine in 1997, there is still a long way to go. Their lack of legal rights is a matter for concern but is unlikely to be satisfactory resolved until a state exists. The matter of inadequate education for girls is being addressed and, in the area of employment too, Palestinian culture is undergoing changes that will better reflect female aspirations. As a result, women’s self-confidence is increasing. One would hope that governmental institutions are capable of moving beyond the present unrepresentative phase and seeing the necessity of developing a greater sensitivity towards women’s needs. They should strive to overcome the brutalities of colonization in order to create a more genuinely egalitarian society. As for dissension among the ranks of women themselves, the debate is underway. But the challenges are formidable, not least in the absence of a comprehensive peace settlement, and we should not anticipate an early closing of the gap between ideal and reality.
Notes
1- Julie M Peteet, “Authenticity and gender: the presentation of culture”, in Judith E Tucker, editor, Arab women: old boundaries, new frontiers, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (published in association with the center for Contemporary Arab Studies, georgetown University), 1993, p.60
2- Mervat Hatem, “Toward the development of post-Islamist and post-nationalist feminist discourses in the Middle East”, in Tucker, editor, Arab women:old bounadries, new frontiers, ibid., pp.42-3
3- Nancy Shalal, ” Women leaders sceptical about elections and civic policies” Jerusalam Times, 10 November 1995
4- Palestine National Council, ” Pelstinian Declaration of independence”, Algiers, 15 November 1998, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol XVIII, no 2, Winter 1989, p.215
5- The Israel-PLO Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, 4 May 1994
6- Graham Usher, Palestine in crisis: The struggle for peace and political Independence after Oslo, London: Pluto Press, in association with Transnational Institute (TNI) and Middle East Research & Information Project (MERIP), 1995, P.45
7- Musa Rimawi, ” Palestinian women activists draft an equal rights document”, Jerusalem Times, 1 July 1994
8- Graham Usher, ” Women, Islam and the law in Palestinian society”, Middle East International, 23 September 1994, p.17
9- Ghada Zughayyar, director of the Jerusalem Center for Women, quoted in “Women leaders call for unity” by Stephanie Nolen, Pleastine Report, 8 march 1996, p.20
10- ” Palestinian women and the electoral process”, Plaestinian Women’s Network, Vol 1, No 1, November 1995, p.10
11- The Candidate Training Project, The West Bank and Gaza, 14 April- 15 May 1995
12- Marianne Heiberg and Geir Ovensen, ” Palestinian society in Gaza, the West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: a survey of living conditions”, Oslo:FAFO, 1993, p.23, quoted in United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), report of the UNDP needs assessment mission for Palestinian women in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 10-19 January 1994, p.10
13- UNDP report, ibid., p.37
14- ” Exploitation of Palestinian women in factories”, findings of a report by the Women Studies Center in Jerusalem entitled” Employment of women in Palestinian enterprises in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip”, News from Within, March 1994, p.22
15- ” Socio-economic conditions of female wage labour in Palestinian factories”, preliminary study by S Hindiyeh and A Ghazawneh, Women’s Studies Center, June 1990, quoted in UNDP report, op.cit., p.71
16- “Exploitation of Palestinian women in factories”, op.cit., p.22
17- Ibid., p.22
18- “Some social effects of the Intifada in Jalazon refugee camp: women, marriage, family”, research by Dr Majdi Malki of Birzeit University, News from within, vol XI, no 6, June 1995, p.20
19- Graham Usher, ” Palestinian women tackle domestic violence taboo”, The Guardian, 1 March 1997
20- “Palestinian women: the development challenge”, Tanmiya, September 1995, p.6
21- ibid., pp.7-9
22- United Nations, platform for action and the Beijing Declaration, Fourth World Conference on women, Beijing, China, 4-15 September 1995
23- Marie Boecker Pedersen, ” Women on the lobby front”, Jerusalem Times, 21 March 1997.
